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 INTRODUCTION 
 The last couple of decades have seen a shift in perceptions regarding 
the relationship between research and teaching. There has been a 
strong emphasis on viewing the two activities as separate, led 
primarily by managerial concerns aimed at increasing academic 
efficiency. Excellence in research and excellence in teaching are 
evaluated separately, funding policies attempt to differentiate 
between the two and now some academic institutions are beginning 
to characterize their staff as engaged exclusively in one or the other 
of these two activities. In philosophy, this distinction between 
research and teaching is artificial and gravely damaging for the 
discipline (I imagine a similar case could possibly be made for other 
disciplines as well). 
 A simple, but persuasive, definition of philosophy is that it 
concerns itself with good reasoning. The discipline covers a huge 
number of topics and has links to all sorts of other subjects, from 
mathematics to English literature, from music to physics, but 
what unites all these intellectual activities under the banner of 
 ‘ philosophy ’ is that they are all concerned with uncovering good 
arguments. Because of this, philosophical research and philosophical 
teaching are identical in their approach. Philosophy researchers 
are concerned with critically assessing the work of their peers, 
examining available arguments for weaknesses and omissions and 
making useful and original contributions to the community ’ s search 
for truth. They achieve all this by engaging with the work of others, 
trying out their own arguments by publishing and sharing work 
with other researchers and, in general, developing their reasoning 
skills. Philosophical research is a community enterprise, one which 
depends on the contribution of others and thrives on debate and the 
exchange of ideas. 
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 Philosophy students are engaged in the same enterprise. Students 
are taught philosophy by being exposed to it. We learn to think 
well by thinking and practising our reasoning skills. We expose 
students to both strong and weak philosophical arguments in 
the hope that they pick up something about how to construct a 
critical, original argument. There is a reason that there is no unified 
philosophy curriculum taught across the world (or even within 
certain countries) and that is because there is no need for one. What 
unifies philosophers is not our preoccupation with philosopher P 
or idea X, but rather our interest in reasoning and good reasoning 
can be displayed by all sorts of thinkers, on all sorts of topics (and 
of course we learn as much from criticizing poor reasoning as we 
do from analysing good reasoning). There is no need for specifying 
a precise content for the philosophy curriculum because the actual 
content is not crucial  – the development of the reasoning skills is. 
 In this sense then, the researcher in philosophy and the student of 
philosophy are engaged in exactly the same enterprise and benefit 
greatly from viewing their efforts as part of a unified whole. If we 
artificially attempt to disengage research from teaching, we create 
divisions where there are none and risk harming both activities. 
A good teacher will have a good command of the materials she 
wishes to teach, and this involves understanding how different 
ideas relate to each other, how opposing views take advantage of 
each others ’ weaknesses, which questions remain unanswered, etc. 
Understanding all this is crucial to relating new ideas to students, 
and doing so in a way that is comprehensible and clear. At the same 
time, these are the building blocks of good research. By seeing how 
different ideas relate to each other, our teacher may be inspired to 
come up with a new alternative, by focusing on the weaknesses 
of competing views, our teacher may come up with some new 
replies to familiar objections, by seeing which questions remain 
unanswered, our teacher may come up with answers. Our teacher 
then is indistinguishable from a researcher. 
 At the same time our student also has to engage with the ideas 
he is presented with. Simple regurgitation of ideas is catastrophic 
for philosophical education. If philosophy were simply a matter 
of learning some facts it could be taught via multiple choice 
questionnaires, but the small group tutorial  – and ideally the one-to-
one interaction  – remains the ideal method of teaching philosophy 
because it allows students to really engage with the ideas they come 
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across. Philosophy teachers encourage their students to use the first 
tense and counsel them to use phrases such as  ‘ I will argue that ’ ,  ‘ I 
will object to ’ ,  ‘ I will support claim X ’ , etc. Such phrases illustrate 
the students ’ own contribution to the topic, they show that they 
have not merely encountered the ideas of the course but engaged 
with them, that is, understood them, criticized them, rejected or 
approved of them, replaced them or improved on them. Our student 
is indistinguishable from a researcher in this respect as teaching 
him philosophy essentially involves developing his philosophical 
reasoning skills, his research capabilities. 
 The aim of this volume is to provide a critical introduction 
to virtue ethics for readers who have some general background 
knowledge of moral philosophy. An equally important aim of this 
volume is to reject the research/teaching division and both present 
materials in a critical manner and expect readers to view them in 
this manner. This volume is not simply everything one could ever 
possibly want to know about its subject matter, virtue ethics, but 
rather represents my own research interests in this area. Ideas are 
presented through the prism of the author ’ s viewpoint, but they are 
also presented in a manner which will, hopefully, encourage the 
readers to develop their own viewpoint. Of course, one practical 
difference between research and teaching is the level of specialization 
in one ’ s audience. Students will, on the whole, tend to require 
materials to be presented at a more introductory level, but this does 
not preclude a critical approach. A talk aimed at a research audience 
already intimately familiar with one ’ s topic should be pitched at a 
different level, for example, assuming background knowledge, but 
essentially the tasks of the researcher and the teacher are the same: 
how to critically engage with the ideas and make some, perhaps 
very modest, contribution to the topic. 
 In this sense, although the present volume is, in terms of the 
level it is pitched at, primarily a textbook intended to introduce the 
student to the main claims of virtue ethics, it also includes elements 
of a research text, in that it adopts a critical, selective and reflective 
approach and, hopefully, encourages its readers to do the same. 
The volume assumes that the reader has an introductory familiarity 
with normative theories such as deontology and consequentialism 
(interested readers who lack this degree of familiarity may wish 
to read up on encyclopaedia articles on normative ethics prior to 
reading this volume) and proceeds from there to introduce virtue 
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ethics as an alternative to these theories. In what follows, I offer a 
brief outline of the main ideas discussed in this book. 
 Outline 
 Virtue ethics is an umbrella term, covering a variety of different 
theories and claims, which have their roots in the works of many 
different philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to Hume, to 
Nietzsche and beyond. It would be impossible to give an exhaustive 
account of all these diverse theories; readers interested in such an 
approach might wish to consider a number of survey articles and 
encyclopaedia entries available on all these topics. By contrast, 
this volume aspires to offer a critical, challenging and reasoned 
approach to, by necessity, only  some aspects of virtue ethics. What 
is lost in scope by this approach should be gained in depth of 
argument and in encouraging the readers to engage with the ideas 
which are discussed in a more reflective manner. The kinds of claims 
which will be examined here fall broadly under the categorization 
of Aristotelian virtue ethics, probably the most dominant and 
influential account of virtue ethics in the research literature at the 
moment. This reflects both the importance of the position itself and 
my personal research interests. 
 The volume is divided into three parts, each one of which has 
a slightly different focus. The first one assumes that the readers 
have no prior acquaintance with virtue ethics and is structured 
around the work of the philosophers who first led the revival of 
interest in virtue ethics in modern moral philosophy. This period 
of thinking is characterized by a sense of dissatisfaction with the 
then available alternative normative theories, that is, deontology 
and consequentialism, and an awareness that something crucial was 
missing from the debate. Articulating this sense of what was missing, 
of a different approach which one should take when considering 
moral matters, of a change in direction in the debates dominating 
moral theory, gave rise to the main claims of virtue ethics. Part I 
follows fairly closely the development of these ideas, by considering 
the works of major philosophers of the period and introducing the 
reader to their main arguments. 
 Part I considers the move from asking  ‘ What is the right thing 
to do? ’ to asking  ‘ How should I live my life? ’ and how answering 
this question also requires a shift from  ‘ rules ’ and  ‘ obligations ’ to 
 ‘ virtues ’ and  ‘ character ’ . Unlike rigid, inflexible rules, appeal to 
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virtues can capture the contextual sensitivity of moral situations and 
the diversity of the moral life. Instead of focusing on what we should 
do in particular, often bizarre and implausible, moral problems, we 
should concentrate on developing the right moral character that 
can respond to all sorts of unpredictable moral situations. This part 
develops an account of the meaningful life for human beings as a 
life rich in personal relationships that welcomes the importance of 
friendships and makes room for partial considerations within the 
moral sphere, something that deontological and consequentialist 
theories miss out on. 
 Finally, this part also considers the concept of  ‘ character ’ which 
plays such a central role in virtue ethics and its place in gradual, 
long term and situationally sensitive moral development. We shall 
see how the virtue ethical conception of the moral life for beings 
such as our species is a vulnerable and fragile good, achievable only 
after years of gradual development subject to external factors and 
the vagaries of luck. 
 Readers who are already intimately familiar with virtue ethics 
may wish to skip directly to Part II, although many of the themes 
elaborated on and defended in this second part have their roots in 
the discussions developed in Part I. 
 The second part of the volume presents and defends a particular 
account of virtue ethics, one which finds its inspiration in Aristotelian 
ideas and the concept of the  eudaimon life. This account also relies 
on a particular understanding of the virtuous agent as a rare ideal. 
In this sense, this part is rather selective in that it does not offer 
a comprehensive account of other alternative accounts of virtue 
ethics; rather, it seeks to defend one particular version of the theory. 
There are several themes that will be articulated within this broader 
tradition of Aristotelian,  eudaimonistic ethics, but the focus is 
not on an exhaustive description of all the discussions currently 
in the literature, rather on a more critical defence of a particular 
position. 
 The defence of this account of virtue ethics starts off with the 
recognition of the central role of  ‘ virtue ’ and  ‘ character ’ in the 
theory. Virtue is central in virtue ethics in two ways: first, moral 
judgements are judgements of the agent ’ s character and second, the 
account of the virtues is linked to human nature. We will consider 
how true virtue requires both the right reason and the right desire 
and must be chosen, chosen knowingly and chosen for its own sake; 
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it is therefore an expression of the agent ’ s character and not an 
accident, a mistake or an action motivated by the wrong reason. 
Furthermore, we ’ ll see how this account of virtue is based on 
Aristotle ’ s function argument which asks what is the function of 
human beings  qua human beings and finds that reason is the answer, 
so that virtue is the life of excellence in accordance with reason. 
This conception of virtue also relies heavily on the understanding 
of the Doctrine of the Mean as a doctrine of appropriateness, that 
is, that the appropriate amount of feeling relevant to each virtue is 
neither too much nor too little, and the right amount is relative to 
the situation and the individual  – it is the role of the virtuous agent 
to determine what the right amount actually is. 
 The discussion then moves on to examining the precise role of the 
virtuous agent. There are a number of problems associated with seeing 
the virtuous agent as an  actual role model and guide to virtue, but as 
we shall see, the virtuous agent is an example of  how to think and not 
an actual example of  what to think. The main characteristic of the 
virtuous agent is to determine virtue in accordance with the  orthos 
logos (right reason). He achieves this through moral perception, 
the ability to see the morally salient features of each situation, and 
practical wisdom, the ability to weigh up the different moral demands 
of each situation. It is these abilities, moral perception and practical 
wisdom, that we should focus on and it is in this respect that the 
virtuous agent is an example of  how to think. 
 Finally, this part of the book returns to the teleological reasoning 
behind the function argument examined earlier and asks whether 
there is any place for teleology in modern debates. It reconsiders 
Aristotelian teleology and gives a more plausible account of the 
roots of Aristotle ’ s argument, one which evades many of the critiques 
that have led modern authors to, on the whole, reject teleology. As 
part of this renewed interest in teleology, this part concludes with 
a critical reflection on two recent accounts of teleological ethics, 
those of Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa Foot. 
 The third part of this volume considers current developments 
in virtue ethics which give us some hints as to the direction of 
future research in this area. In particular, it examines three themes: 
the challenge to virtue ethics from personality psychology, some 
practical considerations regarding moral education in the virtues 
and the development of modern Kantian theories in response to the 
concerns raised by virtue ethics. 
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 Chapter 7 considers an objection raised in recent years against 
virtue ethics which uses evidence from experiments in personality 
psychology to claim that there are no such things as character traits 
or, in a different version of the objection, that it is  situational rather 
than  dispositional factors that affect behaviour (not who we are, but 
what situations we come across). This chapter will respond to the 
objection in three ways: first, it will suggest that the very evidence 
itself can be interpreted in different ways within the discipline of 
personality psychology; aggregation rather than individual instances 
of behaviour confirm the existence of character traits over time. 
 Second, I will show how a more nuanced conception of the 
development of virtue, one that includes the character traits of 
continence and incontinence, can account for the evidence of the 
experiments. For Aristotle, it is only the character traits of virtue 
and vice that are stable, reliable, long-term dispositions, because 
they both involve choice (one for the good and one for evil) and 
long-term habituation of one ’ s desires to confirm one ’ s reason. 
By contrast, continent and incontinent agents exist in a state of 
struggle between their right reason and their wayward desires. 
Continence and incontinence are developmental stages, and as such 
agents fluctuate between them, which is why we do not observe 
behavioural consistency. Otherwise, continent agents may lapse 
into incontinence when faced with great challenges, that is, exactly 
the conditions created by the experiments. 
 Third, I will argue that rather than being a challenge to virtue 
ethics, the results of the experiments are a rich source of evidence 
confirming the main claims of the theory. Aristotelian theory 
suggests that there are many ways in which one can go wrong and 
miss the mark of virtue, and this claim is supported by the evidence 
of the experiments. To conclude the chapter, I will discuss brief 
accounts of how one can go wrong on the way to virtue, suggesting 
promising avenues for future research between philosophy and 
psychology. 
 Chapter 8 will develop some thoughts on moral education, 
because education is one of the most important factors in shaping 
character. Following on from the themes developed in Part II, 
we will consider what is involved in learning  how to think, in 
developing the moral perception and practical wisdom necessary 
for virtue. The discussion starts by highlighting the importance of 
noticing moral situations in the first place. Although this may seem 
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self-evident, it is actually the case that many students of morality 
fail to notice what has moral significance in the real world. This 
chapter will also highlight the importance of moral imagination and 
will identify a number of practical ways of sensitizing students to 
moral requirements and getting them to re-conceive of themselves 
as part of a morally active world. A section of this chapter deals 
with the varied and important roles of the emotions in this account 
of morality, and therefore with what education can do to promote 
the right emotions. Finally, the chapter concludes with a look at 
the possibility of change, of how we learn, adapt and develop all 
through our lives. 
 The last chapter, Chapter 9, will come full circle and examine the 
Kantian response to the virtue ethical objections raised in Part I. 
There are a plethora of diverse answers here but they mainly focus 
on reinterpreting parts of Kantian theory that can take account of 
our empirical natures. We will see how, in response to the objection 
that deontologists rely on rigid rules, neo-Kantians provide 
more detailed accounts of the Categorical Imperative as a test of 
subjective maxims, and focus on the importance of imperfect duties 
which both require judgement for their exercise and allow room 
for partial considerations such as friendships. We will reconsider 
the place of emotions in Kantian theory and see how recognition 
of the moral law has some affective elements, while at the same 
time modern reinterpretations of Kant allow for a subsidiary role 
for other emotions as well. Finally, we will examine the Kantian 
account of virtue and conclude, first, that any comparisons between 
Aristotle and Kant on virtue have to be sensitive to the richness of 
their respective theories and second, that one of the fundamental 
tasks for neo-Kantians is to reconcile Kant ’ s conception of virtue in 
the intelligible world with his conception of virtue in the sensible 
world. 
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 Virtue ethics as a 
new alternative 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
 Virtue ethics, a revived 
alternative 
 A. A small revolution 
 In 1958, the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe published a paper that 
was to change the shape of modern moral philosophy. Until that time, 
the main debate in moral theory concerning normative theories was 
between proponents of, broadly conceived, deontological theories 
and proponents of, broadly conceived, consequentialist theories. As 
a very general definition, normative theories try to provide some 
account of what is morally good and right. One of the ways of 
classifying different normative theories is to divide them between 
those that give an account of what is right in terms of producing 
good consequences (broadly speaking, consequentialist theories) 
and are therefore outcome-based, and those that give an account of 
what is right in terms of the agent ’ s motives and intentions and are 
therefore agent-based (broadly speaking, deontological theories). 
So if you think about an act as a whole (including motives, choices, 
acting/omitting, results, etc.), consequentialists will focus on an 
assessment of the results, the consequences of what was done, 
whereas deontologists will focus on an assessment on what was 
intended, for example, whether the agent acted from duty. This 
means that consequentialists and deontologists may come up with 
entirely different accounts of what we ought to do and whether we 
should hold people responsible or not for what they have done. For 
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example, if I set out to help a friend by introducing her to someone 
she likes but unintentionally embarrass her, a deontologist may 
conclude that what I did was right as I acted out of friendship, but 
a consequentialist may conclude that what I did was wrong as the 
result was unpleasant for my friend. This type of debate, whether 
rightness resides in consequences or intentions, had dominated the 
main discussions in ethical theory until that time (and had done so, 
of course, in a manner much more complicated and sophisticated 
than that suggested by this very simplified example), but Anscombe ’ s 
paper was to change all this. 
 Instead of highlighting the differences between consequentialism 
and deontology, Anscombe focused on a feature that she claimed 
these two types of theories shared, namely their reliance on rules. 
She argued that recourse to rules was the wrong conception of 
ethics. In effect, she advised for a small revolution in the way we 
think about moral philosophy. 
 What deontology, consequentialism and most of modern moral 
philosophy share, according to Anscombe, is a  ‘ law conception 
of ethics ’ . That is, a legal understanding of morality, such that 
 ‘ ought ’ , in a moral sense, is equivalent to  ‘ is obliged to ’ , in a 
legal sense. The content of the law and the specific obligations it 
creates may differ, so that, Utilitarians for example will rely on the 
Greatest Happiness principle, whereas Kantians will focus on the 
Categorical Imperative, but the structure of the moral theories will 
be the same. They will all assume this idea of morality as a  legalistic 
commandment which is captured in the notions of obligation and 
duty. So while Utilitarians for example would advise us to perform 
the action that brings about the best consequences for the greatest 
number and Kantians would tell us to act only in accordance with 
maxims that we can will should become universal laws, which are 
clearly two different ways of acting, the  type of advice is the same; 
they are both about what we are obliged to do in the sense of a law 
or binding regulation. 
 The main problem with law conceptions of ethics is that they 
make little sense in the absence of a legislator (Anscombe rejects 
the Kantian appeal to  ‘ self-legislation ’ and interprets deontological 
theories as suffering from the same weaknesses as other conceptions 
of law ethics). Without a legislator imposing his will, the sense 
of obligation that is expressed in the moral  ‘ ought ’ comes under 
question. This is a very serious objection. The very notion of 
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 ‘ normativity ’ that normative theories are supposed to account for 
and explain, involves the idea of a moral ought, of being, in some 
way, bound to behave in a particular manner. To see this, consider the 
following distinctions.  ‘ Can I open the window? ’ is a question about 
one ’ s abilities, that is,  ‘ Am I strong enough to open the window? 
Am I tall enough to open the window? ’ etc., while  ‘ May I open the 
window? ’ is a question about permission, that is,  ‘ Am I allowed to 
open the window? ’ which assumes that there is someone who will 
permit or forbid this act. Pedantic English language teachers the 
world over delight in such distinctions and many a long-suffering 
student has had to put up with a hot stuffy room because he asked a 
question about his  ability to open the window rather than obtaining 
 permission to do so! In the same way,  ‘ Ought I (or should I) open 
the window? ’ is an entirely different type of question. You may 
wonder here why opening the window is a moral matter in the first 
place, but a plausible scenario can be construed within which the 
 ‘ ought/should ’ question makes sense. Assume you are walking past 
a primary school when you notice the building is on fire, the exits 
are blocked, but there is a ground floor, large window which you 
could open (the ability question is answered here), without any risk 
or cost to yourself and which would provide an immediate means of 
escape for a class of children. In this case  ‘ Ought I open the window? ’ 
makes a lot of sense  – in fact, most people would immediately and 
without thought answer  ‘ yes, I should do so ’ and feel bound to do 
something about the situation (should you come across people who 
are tempted to answer  ‘ no ’ to this kind of question, beware you may 
be in the presence of a psychopath!). 
 Moral questions then are questions about normativity, about 
the force of morality, about why we feel bound to act in a moral 
manner, but according to Anscombe, by seeing morality as a set of 
laws which are not backed up by the authority of a legislator, we 
cannot make sense of the idea of morality binding us to do anything; 
therefore, neither consequentialism nor deontology can really 
account for morality ’ s force. Consequentialists and deontologists 
can frame their advice in the shape of laws, but since morality is 
not governed by a legislator, they can neither convince us to follow 
this advice, nor can they account for why we generally find moral 
demands to be binding. 
 Instead of relying on this legalistic conception of ethics, Anscombe 
encourages us to reconsider the way we do ethics, to set aside law 
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conceptions of ethical theories as implausible and revive elements 
of Aristotelian theory. Specifically, she calls for a more central role 
for the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ , for reviving the importance of flourishing 
in understanding the role of morality in human lives and posits 
a radical claim to suspend all discussions of moral philosophy 
until we can achieve a better insight into moral psychology. These 
suggestions ask for a veritable revolution in the way we do moral 
philosophy and were, historically, probably one of the first calls for 
change that would eventually lead to the development of a group of 
theories that fall under the term  ‘ virtue ethics ’ . 
 Anscombe ’ s paper is well worth reading because of its veritable 
revolutionary nature, its passionate and heart-felt arguments against 
her perception of the status quo in moral debates and for sowing 
some of the seeds that inspired others to revive Aristotelian ideas that 
had been largely marginalized up until that time. Her interpretation 
is by no means faultless; for example, her characterization of Kantian 
theories is far from charitable. Many of her ideas have in turn been 
challenged, for example, some contemporary virtue ethicists resist 
the apparent conflict between the notions of  ‘ obligation ’ ,  ‘ duty ’ and 
 ‘ virtue ’ ; however, the paper ’ s main appeal remains in its historical 
role in prompting for change. These calls for change characterize this 
period in the debate, leading to a growing sense of dissatisfaction 
with the state of modern moral philosophy at the time. Thus, many 
of the discussions that were the precursors of modern virtue ethics 
are about what is wrong with other alternatives, they highlight why 
discussions of moral theory have taken a wrong term and prompt 
us to redefine the terms of the debate. 
 The rest of Part I will consider some of these early calls for a 
different perspective, the ways in which these early writers sought 
to distinguish virtue ethics from other normative theories as well as 
some of the repercussions this thinking had for the ways in which 
virtue ethics eventually developed into a stand alone, self-contained 
alternative to deontology and consequentialism. 
 B. What do we want from ethics? 
 A good place to start is to ask what we want from ethical enquiries. 
When we think of ethics, most of us think of practical problems: 
should I tell my best friend that her partner is cheating on her? Is 
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it unfair to copy from a friend ’ s essay when I have been too sick to 
finish my own? Is it permissible for a woman to have an abortion 
because she is not in a stable relationship and does not want to 
become a mother? Should higher education be subsidized by the 
taxpayer for anyone who meets the academic requirements or 
should Universities be free to charge whatever fees they want in 
order to attract the students who can afford to pay the most? We 
expect ethical theories to offer some kind of guidance on how to 
answer these questions, to help us decide what we should do. This 
idea is captured in the claim that one of the roles of ethical theories 
is to be action-guiding, that is, to give us some guidance on what we 
should do when faced with practical ethical problems. 
 One of Aristotle ’ s most interesting insights is that he questions 
the nature of the guidance we should expect from ethical theories. 
Right at the start of the  Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle tells us that 
the book will be an account of ethics and he wonders what kind of 
answer we should expect from an ethical inquiry. If we are going to 
be asking ethical questions, what kind of answers should we expect? 
This is not so much a question about the  content of the answers, but 
about what  kind of answers we should expect to find. Aristotle ’ s 
response to his own question is that ethics is an imprecise science, 
so the answer can only be as precise as the subject matter allows, 
that is in this case, not very precise. If you investigate an imprecise 
subject matter, you should expect to arrive at an imprecise answer. 
Ethics involves so much difference and variety that the answers 
to ethical problems will be diverse and vary both from situation 
to situation and from person to person. Aristotle warns us:  ‘ Our 
account of this science [the science of politics; Aristotle seems to 
understand ethics as the introduction to politics, which in turn he 
understands as the science of acting morally] will be adequate if 
it achieves such clarity as the subject-matter allows; for the same 
degree of precision is not to be expected in all discussions, any more 
than in all the products of handicraft. Instances of morally fine and 
just conduct  – which is what politics investigates  – involve so much 
difference and variety that they are widely believed to be such only 
by convention and not by nature ’ . 1 
 It ’ s important to note here that this is not a relativist claim. 
Relativism is a meta-ethical position which makes certain claims 
about moral truth, namely that there is no such thing as moral truth. 
In the same way that there is no truth in matters of taste, there are 
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merely individual preferences (e.g. there is no truth of the matter about 
whether marmite is objectively tasty or not, it ’ s just that I subjectively 
hate it and you subjectively love it  – both entirely valid, individual 
responses to a matter of personal taste), there is no truth in moral 
matters, merely individual preferences. However, this is not Aristotle ’ s 
claim here. Suggesting that the answer to ethics may be complex, 
context dependent and difficult to discover is entirely different from 
claiming that there is no answer. For Aristotle, there is a correct answer 
to moral matters, but it is complex and not easily captured in a rule, 
so in this sense, deontologists, consequentialists and Aristotle are all in 
agreement about the  nature of moral truth, they all think it ’ s out there! 
What they disagree about is what kind of  shape this truth might take. 
 C. How should I live my life? 
 Inspired by this Aristotelian insight into the nature of ethics as a 
discipline and the kind of answer we should expect when discussing 
topics in ethics, early virtue ethicists suggested that it is a mistake for 
ethical inquiries to ask  ‘ What should I do? ’ , instead the fundamental 
questions in ethics should be  ‘ How should I live my life? What kind 
of person should I be? ’ .
 The first question,  ‘ What should I do? ’ , focuses on a specific 
situation, what should I do  now , when faced with  this problem? It 
sees ethics as a way of responding to specific, problematic situations. 
Both deontological and consequentialist theories can be interpreted 
as attempting to answer this kind of question. Think of the Kantian 
Categorical Imperative; it is a universal rule that is supposed to give 
an answer to how we should act when faced with different ethical 
problems. The Categorical Imperative is a test of proposed maxims, 
so when faced with an ethical problem we should formulate a 
proposed course of action, which is captured in the maxim and then 
the Categorical Imperative gives us an answer as to what we should 
(or should not) do; similarly is the case with the Utilitarian Greatest 
Happiness Principle. The Greatest Happiness Principle tells that 
in all sorts of different situations we should do whatever brings 
about the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. As 
long as we can calculate the expected utility of the consequences of 
our actions, we can figure out what to do. However, virtue ethicists 
are worried about this approach as a way of thinking about ethics. 
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 If ethics is an imprecise, varied and diverse subject matter, then 
one rule or principle cannot be successfully applied to every varied 
situation we come across, and we cannot expect ethical enquiries 
to give us concrete answers for specific situations. Consider the 
following example: take the ethical rule  ‘ Never lie ’ ; this sounds like 
good advice, it is both helpful, in that it tells you what not to do, and, 
on the face of it, plausible. Now, consider someone who has decided 
to follow this rule and is now auditioning to play the role of Romeo 
for his local amateur theatre group which involves proclaiming his 
undying love for Juliet. In reality, our actor intensely dislikes the 
woman playing Juliet, so proclaiming his love for her would be 
untrue; therefore, he refuses to speak the words as he intends to live 
his life according to the rule  ‘ Never lie ’ . This sounds a bit weird, 
something has gone wrong. Surely acting is pretending within a 
certain context, that is, a context where both actors and audience 
are  ‘ in ’ on the pretence. Under such circumstances, telling Juliet he 
loves her is not a lie, so our original rule should be modified to 
explain that acting does not really count as lying. 
 Having overcome this little hurdle, our aspiring ethicist turns 
up for his day job as a nurse, where he is asked by a colleague to 
break some bad news to a patient and  ‘ persuade ’ the patient to 
follow a particular course of treatment. The process of persuading 
the patient involves telling him about only one of two possible 
treatments and allowing him to believe that this is his only option. 
Does this count as lying? Our aspiring ethicist has not been asked to 
utter an untruth, but merely to  ‘ forget ’ to give all the information, 
leading the patient to think by his silence that there are no other 
options. Our aspiring ethicist is now beginning to think that he 
might be getting himself into trouble; when he first came across 
his moral rule,  ‘ Never lie ’ , he thought he had succeeded in finding 
a good guide to being ethical, but now it looks like he will have to 
stop and consider what counts as lying, how lying relates to other 
concepts such as  ‘ misleading ’ ,  ‘ misdirecting ’ and  ‘ non-disclosure ’ , 
which also leads him to wonder about the role of intent in one ’ s 
expressions. 
 Our aspiring ethicist heads home feeling that he has taken on more 
than he bargained for when he decide to follow this one, simple ethical 
rule, so to take his mind off things he accepts a dinner invitation at 
his friend ’ s house. His friend, Eddie, has recently divorced his wife 
and is living on his own for the first time in a very long while. Eddie ’ s 
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confidence in himself and his abilities to cope on his own has been 
severely tested by the unpleasant divorce and the changes it has led 
in his life. Our aspiring ethicist is Eddie ’ s first ever dinner guest and 
Eddie is keen to impress with his new culinary skills and ability to 
cope on his own. Unfortunately, Eddie is a poor cook and the meal is 
quite tasteless. When Eddie, enthusiastically, asks our aspiring ethicist 
 ‘ Did you enjoy the meal?!!! ’ the aspiring ethicist is stuck. Saying 
 ‘ yes ’ would be an outright lie, but surely his friend needs a bit of 
encouragement and a little lie would not hurt anyone? 
 You may agree with our aspiring ethicist that his moral rule 
should be suspended for the moment, or you may not, in a sense 
it doesn ’ t really matter. What does matter is the realization that if 
ethics is imprecise, detailed and vague, it cannot be captured in a 
rigid, universally applicable rule. Our ethicist thought he was onto 
a winner in the sense that sticking to his rule would give him an 
answer to what he should do in ethical situations; however, this 
quickly proved not to be the case. The rule was not sensitive to 
context, required further thinking in terms of interpreting the term 
 ‘ lying ’ and what it involves and did not allow for exceptions such 
as white lies for the sake of kindness. 
 D. One size does not ﬁ t all 
 If the purpose of ethical rules is to give us guidance, so that one 
(or a small set of) overriding rule can give us specific answers to 
our problems, then it is bound to fail. If ethics is imprecise, then 
ethical theory cannot hope to offer precise guidance to specific 
situations as captured in overriding rules. Rules conceived of as all-
encompassing, universally applicable, one-size-fits-all solutions to 
all our ethical problems are not going to work. Rules are far too 
rigid and prescriptive to ever capture the variety and diversity of 
ethics. Instead of asking the specific question  ‘ What should I do 
 here ,  now , faced with  this problem? ’ , we should be asking the wider 
questions  ‘ How should I live my life? What kind of person should 
I be? ’ The answer is not going to come in the form of a rule, which 
once revealed will answer all our ethical problems, but rather in the 
form of the virtues and the good moral character. We will go on to 
discuss how the notion of  ‘ character ’ and the virtues can help us in 
this way in Chapters 3 and 4 below. 
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 Another way of making the critical point against rules though is 
to say that ethics is uncodifiable. A code, or set of rules, has many 
advantages, the principal among which is that it gives clear guidance 
on what should be done. When in doubt, one simple refers to the 
code and does as it suggests. Consider the Highway Code which is 
supposed to serve a similar function, that is, to give road users a set 
of clear, well defined and easy to both comprehend and apply set 
of rules by which they can use the roads as safely as possible. The 
Highway Code has a specific and limited remit and therefore succeeds 
in giving precise and useful instructions. Even in this case success is 
not complete and the Courts are called upon to decide on disputed 
cases, but for the majority of cases appeals to the Highway Code 
find it provides a clear and incontestable answer. Unfortunately, the 
same is not true of ethics. This is unfortunate because if ethics could 
be captured in such a set of clear and incontestable rules, this could 
potentially resolve most ethical disagreements and provide straight-
forward guidance in most ethical cases. However, we must not seek 
easy and fast action guidance at the expense of getting the  right 
guidance. For what good is a set of ethical rules if they are precise, 
quick and easy to apply but wrong? 
 We can make this same point another way if we consider what 
is involved in being an expert in a field. If all there is to certain 
practices is the correct application of rules, the expert is the person 
who best knows these rules (and by extension applies them as the 
rules are action guiding). However, expertise is often expressed in 
knowing when  not to stick to the rules, in recognizing the instances 
which are exceptions to the rules, in adjusting to situations that 
require a novel interpretation of the rules, in creating new rules or 
in having the reasoning skills to see beyond the rules that capture 
more common place situations. Consider this account of what it is 
to be a medical expert: 
 If one asks an expert for the rules he or she is using, one will, in 
effect, force the expert to regress to the level of a beginner and 
state the rules learned in school. Thus, instead of using rules they 
no longer remember, as knowledge engineers suppose, the expert 
is forced to remember rules they no longer use  . . . No amount of 
rules and facts can capture the knowledge an expert has when 
he or she has stored experience of the actual outcomes of tens of 
thousands of situations. 2 
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 The authors conclude that mistakes in deliberation cannot be 
avoided by attempting to come up with foolproof rules, as there are 
no such things and this is not what experts rely on when they make 
their judgements. 
 There seems to be much more to ethical guidance than practice-
focused rules. For example, narratives may play a great role in 
helping us understand morality; for example, the story of how 
one friend incurred personal loss to aid another reveals something 
about the fundamentally other-regarding nature of friendship that 
can ’ t be captured in a formula prescribing how one should act in 
each instance of friendship and which is easily transferable as an 
ideal across many different situations. Or, exercises in empathy, 
such as asking someone to put themselves in someone else ’ s shoes, 
may reveal an immediacy to the situation, the impact of which can 
be otherwise lost. 
 Furthermore, what is meant by moral notions, such as truthful-
ness, cannot be captured in prescriptions about what one should 
do in any one particular situation. For there is a lot more to 
truthfulness than the rule  ‘ Always tell the truth ’ . Someone who truly 
understands the concept of truthfulness will also understand the 
nuanced distinctions between lying, misleading and non-disclosure 
as well as how situations, such as acting or joking, change the tenor 
of what might otherwise be characterized as a lie. Being truthful 
doesn ’ t just involve telling the truth, but also being repelled by lies, 
feeling guilty when one does lie, etc., and in general having the right 
attitudes and emotions with respect to truth-telling and lying. 
 Virtue ethics advises us to recognize (and embrace, but we will 
come to this later) the complexity of the ethical life and accept that 
the kind of guidance we can expect will have to be tailored to the 
nature of the subject matter.  ‘ How should I live my life? ’ is not the 
kind of question that admits to a quick answer, nor to a simple one, 
nor to one answer that suits all people and all circumstances, but 
more on this later on. 
 Further readings 
 It ’ s well worth reading Anscombe ’ s original paper, reprinted in Crisp 
and Slote 1997. Some of the Aristotelian ideas about the nature of 
ethics and the kind of answers we should expect from ethical inquiry 
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are famously introduced in Book 1 of the  Nicomachean Ethics . 
The discussion on the differences between rules and virtues is 
clearly developed in Roberts, 1991. For more on this topic, you 
may wish to look up Nussbaum 1986, especially Chapter 10. 
Themes from Nussbaum ’ s book will also be picked up in Chapter 3 
of this volume. See Dancy, 2004, for some of the more recent 
developments from these kinds of ideas between the juxtaposition 
of rules and virtues. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
 Ethics and morality 
 A. The limits of morality 
 Very often when we use the terms  ‘ ethics ’ and  ‘ morality ’ , we 
intend them to be used interchangeably to refer to the kinds of 
considerations that are captured by the  ‘ can, may, should ’ example 
above. However, in the discussion that follows, we will use the terms 
a bit differently to reflect a shift in approach argued for by Bernard 
Williams, very much in the same spirit as the kinds of considerations 
that Elizabeth Anscombe brought to the forefront of current 
debates. Williams was one of the most important philosophers of 
his generation, partly due to a remarkable philosophical ability: he 
was often the first person to draw attention to a new problem, a 
new way of looking at things, a previously neglected distinction, 
an entirely novel approach. His work often resulted in many of 
his colleagues picking up his points, either in agreement or in 
opposition, and establishing entirely new and fruitful areas of 
debate. These general points apply with much force to his work 
on morality, which gave rise to many of the ideas that characterize 
the modern version of virtue ethics, and for this reason it is worth 
looking at his arguments in a bit more detail. 
 Partly like Anscombe, Williams was concerned with the notion 
of  ‘ obligation ’ and its role within what he called the morality system 
(in this sense  ‘ morality ’ here will come to be contrasted with  ‘ ethics ’ , 
the contrast will become clear in this chapter). This conception 
of morality is very much influenced by how Williams interpreted 
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Kantian ethics. He highlighted a number of features of  ‘ obligations ’ 
which govern how we understand morality: 
  1 An obligation applies to someone with respect to an action, 
it is an obligation to do something (sometimes it may 
announce a prohibition or a permission that you  may do 
something, but it is still action focused), and so morality is 
practical. 
  2 Obligations cannot conflict. This is a very important feature 
of the nature of obligations conceived in this way. What we 
are obliged to do must be in our power (otherwise being 
obliged to do it would make no sense), if we are obliged 
to do more than one thing, then these cannot conflict as it 
would make it impossible for us to do both. 
  3 If one has fulfilled all of one ’ s obligations then one can only 
feel non-moral regret for anything that was not done, since 
anything that was not done was not an obligation. Under 
this conception of  ‘ obligation ’ , we need to explain how 
one consideration outweighs another without generating 
conflicting obligations (since according to point 2 above, 
there are no such things as conflicting obligations). One 
way of doing this is by distinguishing between  prima facie 
and actual obligations. In Ross ’ terminology, a  prima facie 
obligation is a moral consideration which has good support 
for becoming an actual obligation all other things being 
equal.  Prima facie obligations exert some force, but not 
the full force of actual obligations. Consider, for example, 
a case where you have promised to meet a friend to help 
him study for an examination. The promise generates a 
 prima facie obligation to do as promised. However, on 
your way to the meeting you are called upon to help in an 
emergency (make up whatever scenario you want here as 
long as it means you are the only one who can help, there 
is no time to both help and fulfil your promise, etc.). The 
obligation to help in the emergency outweighs the  prima 
facie obligation to fulfil your promise. According to Ross, 
your obligation is to help in the emergency, and there is no 
conflict of obligations as the promise keeping was not an 
 actual obligation in these circumstances but merely a  prima 
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facie one. However, at the same time the promise keeping 
still has some force so you owe your friend reparations 
for letting him down. This allows Ross to hold that actual 
obligations cannot conflict (point 2 above) and that what is 
not done is regrettable (point 3) but not in a strong moral 
sense as it was not an actual obligation, it was merely a 
 prima facie obligation. 
  4 The fourth point is what Williams calls the  ‘ obligation 
out-obligation in ’ principle. Consider this problem: you 
come across an emergency and you are under the claim 
 ‘ In this emergency, I am under an obligation to assist ’ , but 
why is this so? Presumably because  ‘ One is under a general 
obligation: to help in emergencies ’ , but if we accept such 
a general obligation it may turn out that  all our time now 
is taken up with helping in emergencies and there is no 
longer any room for any other kind of morally indifferent 
actions. Since obligations override all other considerations 
and since here we have an obligation wide enough to 
occupy all of one ’ s time (unfortunately there are plenty of 
emergencies around the world), then morality demands 
that we spend all our time fulfilling its obligations. The 
only way to  ‘ push out ’ an obligation is to  ‘ pop another one 
in ’ ,  ‘ obligation out-obligation in ’ , and there is no room for 
anything else. 
 5 Since obligations are inescapable, moral blame is the correct 
response for anyone who did not fulfil their obligations. 
Once a course of action is established as obligatory, there 
are no excuses for not pursuing it. This applies to everyone, 
equally, and there is no perspective from which this is not 
the case. Both of these claims are seen as fundamental 
to this conception of Kantian ethics. Consider how they 
are encapsulated in the Kantian understanding of the 
Categorical Imperative. The Categorical Imperative is an 
 imperative in the sense of a command, it  must be followed, 
and it applies  categorically to everyone, there are no 
exceptions, no excuses. 
 These five points then capture the main ways Williams characterizes 
the notion of  ‘ obligation ’ and its role in the morality system. 
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However, he goes on to argue that this particular account of 
 ‘ obligation ’ generates a number of problems. For one, trying to 
understand all moral consideration under the guise of  ‘ obligations ’ 
creates more difficulties than it solves. In the promise-keeping 
example above, all sorts of weird philosophical moves are required 
to maintain  both that the  prima facie obligation can be outweighed 
by an actual obligation without creating conflict  and that even 
though we are not obliged to keep the promise in the face of the 
emergency, we must still make reparations to the friend for not 
doing so. If the promise was really outweighed by the emergency, 
the friend should have nothing to complain about; if it was not, 
then there were two conflicting obligations, both of which options 
are a problem for Ross. In real life, Williams argues, it makes much 
more sense to accept that ethical demands can conflict and deal 
with the implications of these conflicts (these implications of ethical 
demands will become clearer throughout this section). 
 Similarly, this insistence that we can make sense of morality 
solely through obligations forces all sorts of diverse things into 
becoming obligations. Williams explains this point by being critical 
of Ross ’  ‘ duties of gratitude ’ . In an effort to explain gratitude as an 
obligation, Ross turns what is a sign of good character, that is, the 
desire to do good to others when we have had good done to us, into 
an  obligation to do so. Turning gratitude into an obligation seems 
to miss the point of what gratitude should really be about. Surely if 
someone does you a good service, the appropriate response is to be 
thankful and want to help them out in return when they need you. 
To make this into an obligation changes the nature of gratitude 
itself and would make the recipient of the benefit more likely to 
resent it than be thankful for it. To return a favour out of a sense of 
duty is quite conceptually different, and relates to the demands of 
justice, rather than what is involved in returning a favour out of a 
sense of gratitude. Gratitude involves a positive acknowledgement 
of the beneficence illustrated in the benefactor ’ s act and a desire 
to reciprocate. The reciprocation need not always be direct, one 
may express one ’ s gratitude by conferring a suitable benefit to a 
third party and not directly back to the original benefactor; for 
example, I am grateful that someone helped me find an apartment 
and a job when I was homeless, so now I return the favour by 
helping other homeless people do the same. This still counts as 
gratitude as it embodies and promotes the sentiments and values 
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of the original benefactor. To label all this an obligation is to miss 
the point of real gratitude because an obligation involves doing 
something out of sense of duty and unavoidability rather than 
because one is happy to receive the benefit and happy to conceive 
of oneself as someone who has been benefited by the benefactor. 
Ethical demands are much wider than moral obligations, and we 
want our theory to make room for, and sense of, all these diverse 
demands rather than attempting to awkwardly reduce everything 
to obligations. 
 Another implication of this view of obligations is that only an 
obligation can beat an obligation. This turns almost everything 
into an obligation, causing the types of problems highlighted just 
above, but it also leaves little or no room for morally indifferent 
actions. We would actually need to come up with obligations to 
explain why we should be allowed to do morally indifferent actions, 
because if they are not obligations, then we should not be wasting 
time on them. This leads to a life dominated by obligations with 
little or no room for anything else. Again Williams ’ conception of 
ethics is much wider than his account of morality here. As we shall 
come to see, the ethical life involves many other commitments, 
commitments which we can make sense of under this wider 
conception of ethics, but not the narrow conception of morality. 
Ethics allows us to make room for the idea  ‘ that each person has 
a life to lead ’ , 1 a life which should not be overwhelmed by moral 
obligations, but which allows room for other considerations that 
make one ’ s life meaningful. 
 Finally we do not need to accept that every obligation comes 
from a more general obligation. A better way to understand what 
is happening in positive cases, cases regarding what we should 
do, is that there is a general underlying concern or disposition, 
for example, a disposition to help others in need, but that this 
disposition does not always outweigh everything else. Rather, it can 
become a deliberative priority (what we actually do) because of the 
particulars of the situation we are faced with now. Some situations 
will activate our concerns and dispositions, others will not, without 
having to rely on the  ‘ obligation out-obligation in ’ principle. We 
will discuss how general dispositions become deliberative priorities 
because of the particulars of situations when we look at the 
Aristotelian concepts of  ‘ moral perception ’ and  ‘ practical wisdom ’ 
later on in Chapter 5. 
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 Williams ’ understanding of  ‘ morality ’ then turns out to be rather 
different from that of  ‘ ethics ’ . The morality system is dominated 
by this particular notion of  ‘ obligation ’ , while ethics allows room 
for more diverse considerations. This allows ethics to give a more 
plausible account of phenomena such as gratitude, which morality 
is forced into distorting in order to make them comprehensible 
through the notion of  ‘ obligation ’ , as well as allowing for a wider 
concept of what counts as a meaningful life for human beings. 
Morality gets into problems by denying the possibility of conflicting 
obligations and reduces all obligations to more general ones, while 
ethics allows room for conflict and gives a different account of 
how some claims become deliberative priorities. These concerns 
with this particular conception of  ‘ obligation ’ and its dominance 
over what Williams calls the  ‘ morality system ’ lead him to call for 
a number of revisions, which we will consider below. The next 
chapter will further develop the final arguments in Williams ’ 
discussion which have to do with his rejection of an account of 
voluntariness that leaves no room for character and psychological 
or social determination, his rejection of the purity of morality and 
his rejection of the idea that morality transcends luck  – but we can 
set these thoughts aside for now as we first need to consider what 
is involved in living a meaningful life. In looking at all these ideas 
that are, in a broad sense, inspired by Williams, we will now move 
away from Williams ’ own work and consider how these themes 
were taken up by other authors. 
 B. The meaningful life 
 What is involved in living a meaningful life? In what sense is the 
above conception of ethics broader than that of morality and how 
does it allow room for wider considerations that make our lives 
meaningful? Consider the following scenario: the boat you were on 
has capsized, there are no other adults around or any promise of 
immediate help, unfortunately there are two babies drowning near 
you but in entirely different directions so that you only have time to 
rescue one of them before the other one drowns. Although no one 
baby is closer to you than the other, one is the baby of a stranger, 
the other is your baby  – which one would you chose to save? I 
would imagine many people would want to save their own child at 
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the expense of the stranger ’ s child and would want to do so exactly 
because this is their  own child, but is this the right thing to do? 
 In one sense, impartiality is conceptually tied to morality, in that 
to treat people partially is to treat them unfairly, or unduly promote 
or penalize them, and this seems incompatible with moral demands. 
Surely, morality requires of us to treat all others equally and to 
allow our personal preferences and prejudices to affect our choices 
is not compatible with doing the right thing. However, this account 
of the importance of impartiality is also question begging because 
treating people impartially does not mean that we should give them 
exactly  the  same treatment, rather that we should allocate different 
treatments on a warranted basis  – deciding which differences are 
warranted is the crux of the matter. Suppose you had to mark a 
number of essays and your marks were critical to the chances of 
the students passing their exams and therefore obtaining their 
degrees  – clearly a serious task which you wish to undertake with all 
due responsibility. The submitted essays differ in a variety of ways, 
some are handwritten, some are word-processed, some are typed in 
Times New Roman font, some in Arial, some are printed in black 
ink, some are printed in blue ink, etc. Your task is to decide which 
ones of these differences are pertinent to awarding different marks. 
Should all handwritten essays pass, while all word-processed ones 
fail? Should all students who chose to type in Times New Roman 
get a first-class mark, while all Arial users barely a third? By now 
you should, hopefully, be perplexed by my choice of highlighted 
differences! Surely, this is a bizarre course that measures academic 
ability based on factors as random and irrelevant as choice of 
typescript, choice of ink colour, etc. This worry reveals that when 
we are called upon to differentiate between different demands, 
we should do so on criteria appropriate to the task. If these are 
philosophy essays, then you would be warranted in awarding high 
marks to all essays that achieve a high level of clarity, analysis, 
exposition, critical and independent thinking, and by extension a 
low mark to all essays that are unclear, confused, uninformed and 
overtly descriptive. These criteria are not random, like the typescript 
and ink colour selections, precisely because they relate to the nature 
of the enterprise under examination. Philosophy concerns itself with 
clear, original, persuasive arguments, so it is appropriate that essays 
that demonstrate good philosophical skills should be rewarded in a 
task which involves the evaluation of philosophical skills. 
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 What this example demonstrates is that how we treat others 
and whether our treatment is warranted or not depends on what 
is being assessed and on the strength of the various claims placed 
upon us, something which is relative to the task undertaken. When 
Aristotle tells us that justice is to be found in treating equals equally, 
he gives us both an important and challenging insight. The insight is 
important as it captures the link between justice and morality, and 
challenging because we are still left with the difficult job of giving 
content to what counts as  ‘ being equal ’ . 
 Let ’ s go back to the example of the drowning babies and see how 
all this applies to that case. Hopefully, we can all agree that we have 
equal obligations to save equally threatened babies; however, what 
counts as an equally warranted claim for rescue on us, given that we 
can only save one baby at the expense of another? A consequentialist 
might conclude that the stranger ’ s baby has an equal claim to that 
of your own baby, as the evaluation of the claims is based on the 
interests of the babies.  Any drowning baby will experience the same 
pain and suffering through the drowning,  any drowning baby ’ s 
future interests will be equally severed by its premature drowning; 
therefore, the fact that one baby is yours while the other is not is 
entirely irrelevant to the question of which baby to save in the same 
way that the typescript choice was irrelevant to the quality of the 
essay above. Equal interests generate equal claims, so the stranger ’ s 
baby has as much of a claim of rescue on you, as your own baby 
and the fact that you are biologically related to one of the babies in 
need is irrelevant here. 
 Virtue ethicists have found this type of reasoning problematic, 
partly because it gives a distorted account of what impartiality 
requires of us and partly because it results in a very poor conception 
of what makes a human life meaningful. The first point has to do 
with the interpretation of the factors we are allowed to take into 
account when deciding between competing claims. Why can ’ t a 
parent ’ s special feelings towards their own children be allowed to 
count as a factor in favour of saving  that child, in the same way that 
exceptional clarity of argument counts in favour of awarding a high 
mark to this particular philosophy essay? The parent ’ s feelings are 
a distinguishing feature of the situation, one which differentiates 
between the two babies in need of rescue, why should it not be 
accepted as a warranted feature? The second point concerns the 
idea that if we do away with all these considerations, if we distance 
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ourselves from our special feelings towards our children, if we 
ignore the unique demands of our friends, if we alienate ourselves 
from all the important relationships in our lives which make some 
people stand out above others, we would be depriving our lives of 
much of their meaning. Surely, we can come up with a conception 
of ethics that accommodates all these relationships and allows us 
to lead meaningful lives compatible with living good lives. In this 
sense, we can be partial, we can allocate special weight to special 
relationships, but this partiality is warranted and we are still treating 
equals equally as the criteria on which we determine equality are 
defensible and justified. 
 Despite the existence of a significant number of University 
campuses with lakes, the observant reader may worry here that 
the chances of having to rescue equidistant drowning babies from 
the aforementioned lakes are rather slim, at least for most of us. 
However, we shouldn ’ t allow the improbability of this particular 
example to shadow the importance of the point it is trying to make. 
That is because fundamentally the example is about the significance 
of family, friendships and other special relationships in our life and 
the claim that awarding special status to these relationships is not 
contrary to morality, but rather a fundamental part of leading a 
meaningful life. We are not all called upon to save drowning babies, 
but we are all called upon to consider how our behaviour towards 
those near and dear to us might differ from our other behaviour 
towards strangers. To attempt to eliminate such differences would 
not only impose an unreasonable burden on us but also leads to 
much poorer, duller lives. 
 C. Why you don ’ t want to be a 
moral saint 
 If you have children or if you ever think about what kind of people 
you would like your future children to become, you probably hope 
you can raise them to be moral people, people who chose to do the 
right thing. However, would you want to go as far as hoping that 
they would be moral saints, people whose every action is as good 
as possible? If being morally good is something to aspire to, then 
it seems to follow that being  perfectly morally good would be even 
better. Surprisingly though, this is not the case. 
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 Think for a moment about what kind of person the moral 
saint would be. She would pursue the happiness of others, either 
because her happiness consisted in bringing about the happiness 
of others or because her duty consisted in bringing about the 
happiness of others. These moral demands would  ‘ crowd-out ’ all 
sorts of other non-moral activities, like the pursuit of intellectual 
and aesthetic pleasures, so no University studies or gallery visits 
for our moral saint; like the enjoyment of material comforts, so 
no back massages or sophisticated cuisine for our moral saint; like 
the pleasures involved in spending time with those we love, so no 
family reunions and no time wasted going bowling with friends for 
our moral saint  – a rather one-sided, single-focused life. At the same 
time, some attitudes seem incompatible with being a moral saint. A 
sarcastic wit requires a pessimistic attitude to the world which is 
incompatible with the positive attitude required of the moral saint. 
In Eudenides ’ novel  The Marriage Plot one of the main characters 
is contemplating a life devoted to charity and good deeds. While 
helping out at a hospital run by Mother Teresa in India, he observes 
how boring and dull his fellow volunteers are; he wonders:  ‘ What 
if you had faith and performed good works, what if you died and 
went to heaven, what if all the people you met there were people you 
didn ’ t like? ’ 2 Our moral saint could well end up being a rather dull 
and humourless person. All in all, the life of the moral saint doesn ’ t 
quite sound like the life one would want for oneself or would hope 
for, for one ’ s children. 
 The problem is that it looks like consequentialism and deonto-
logy counsel us to attempt to live the lives of moral saints. Being 
good is, under these theories, not just one desire among many, or 
even one that overwhelms all our other desires, like the committed 
athlete who sacrifices nights out and fun with friends in favour of 
daily training. Rather, the desire to be morally good, and as morally 
good as possible, will subsume and demote all other desires so that 
they are entirely lost. Again, we have a conception of morality here 
as an imperative, whose command is different from the nature of 
every other motivation. If there is any value in other activities, it is 
only through the prism of morality, so the Utilitarian might accord 
equal weight to his own happiness, but as only one the many 
equal requirements placed on him and as just one requirement 
it is likely to be outweighed by the multiple demands of others. 
All the non-moral activities mentioned above only have value as 
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means to producing happiness and can be exchanged with other 
activities which produce an equal or greater amount of happiness. 
Similarly, deontologists only value these activities insofar as they 
encapsulate respect for the moral law. However, this leads to both 
a poor and less fulfilled life and misunderstands the value of non-
moral activities. 
 D. How to avoid moral schizophrenia 
 This may come as a bit of a surprise to you but being moral is 
a dangerous business. You are in danger of succumbing to moral 
schizophrenia: 
 One mark of the good life is a harmony between one ’ s motives 
and one ’ s reasons, values, justifications. Not to be moved by what 
one values  – what one believes good, nice, right, beautiful, and so 
on  – bespeaks a malady of the spirit. Not to value what moves 
one also bespeaks a malady of the spirit. Such a malady, or such 
maladies, can properly be called  moral schizophrenia  – for they 
are a split between one ’ s motives and one ’ s reasons. 3 
 A Utilitarian may well find a place for friendship, family relation-
ships, community bonds, etc. in his theory, but will do so only 
insofar as they go towards promoting general happiness. These 
activities, these commitments, are therefore not valued for them-
selves, but rather for what they lead to, for the kinds of consequences 
they bring about. The  reason a Utilitarian has for promoting 
friendship is to bring about good consequences, but surely this is 
not the usual motive we all have for engaging in friendships. We 
don ’ t seek out new friends because we are motivated to increase 
overall utility, rather we are motivated by the friendship itself, 
something which is intrinsic to the relationship itself rather than a 
possible by-product of it. 
 Here ’ s another way of making the same point. Imagine you 
are in hospital feeling a bit poorly and your best friend pops by. 
Cheered by her visit you thank her for taking the time to come 
see you and she replies  ‘ No worries, just doing my duty ’ . Now 
that seems a bit odd, and even worse, a bit off-putting. Had she 
said  ‘ No worries, that ’ s what friends are for ’ you would have 
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been quite pleased and taken the explanation at face value. 
That ’ s because  that is what friends are for, they are suppose to 
care for each other, check up on each other in times of need, be 
attentive and kind; all this just  is part of friendship and appealing 
to the friendship is explanation enough for why she is visiting. 
By contrast, appealing to a notion of duty might make you feel 
resentful of the visit and you may even wish she hadn ’ t bothered. 
She ’ s not supposed to come see you because she  had to, because 
she felt  obliged to do so, but because she  wanted to and the 
explanation for why she wanted to is simply captured by stating 
that she is your friend. By appealing to her duty to visit you, 
your friend is having  ‘ one thought too many ’ , a phrase coined by 
Bernard Williams to explain the idea that appealing to friendship 
alone is sufficient without the need to understand the demands of 
friendship through the prism of duty, and this appeal to friendship 
is more than sufficient; it ’ s satisfactory all by itself in a way that 
appealing to the extra thought about one ’ s duty is not necessary. 
We want our friends to come see us  because they are our friends, 
not because they feel obliged to do so and the bonds of friendship 
should not be felt as restraints or commands. 
 The hospital example makes the same point regarding a split, a 
disharmony, schizophrenia between reasons and motives, but this 
time applies it to our other, by now familiar, opponent, the deonto-
logist. The charge then applies equally to both consequentialists and 
deontologists; their theories lead to a split between what we have 
reason to do and what we are motivated to do. By carrying out the 
relationship for the sake of the good consequences or out of a sense 
of duty, one misses out the essential element of friendship which is 
the commitment to the activity and to the friend. If the resulting 
goodness is all that matters, friends would be interchangeable 
and indeed one would be obliged to drop one friend as soon as 
another came along who had more potential for producing good 
consequences. Friendship only makes sense by reference to the 
specific relationship, to the ties that bind the two friends, by relating 
to the friend as the kind of person he is and for the sake of who he 
really is. To aim at friendship in general as a good to be maximized 
or a duty to be fulfilled, misses the point of actual friendship. 
 Following the dictates of consequentialism and deontology leads 
to two problems. What kind of life would I lead if I did my duty 
but rarely wanted to, that is, if my reasons and motives were in 
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disharmony? Surely, this cannot be what we want as a worthwhile 
and meaningful life for human beings. Second, the exaggerated focus 
on notions of obligation and rightness leads us to ignore or distort 
all sorts of other values like interpersonal activities and narrows the 
sphere of what we should consider important. 
 As we reach the end of this chapter, we have seen the same 
pattern of reasoning laid out by a variety of authors in a number of 
different ways, but essentially the point is the same. Morality is pre-
occupied with a particular conception of obligation which is both 
restrictive and distorting. It either ignores or subsumes all sorts of 
other values under this conception of obligation, leading to a very 
poor conception of what counts as a meaningful life. It also distorts 
what these values are really about, mistakenly thinking that they 
can all be understood under a legislative model of reasoning. What 
we need therefore is a new perspective, a wider perspective, one that 
asks what is the good life for me to lead  – an ethical question rather 
than a moral one  – and one which can accommodate a variety of 
human concerns as well as the moral ones. 
 Further readings 
 The ideas discussed in this chapter are developed at length in 
Williams, 1985. Have a look at other works by Williams for 
further discussions, for example, Williams, 1973, on the practical 
nature of morality and the impossibility of obligations conflicting, 
Williams, 1981a on agent regret (themes from this paper will be 
further developed in Chapter 3 of this volume) and his 1981b on 
the  ‘ one thought too many ’ objection. The Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy entry on Bernard Williams is particularly helpful. 
 You can read Ross ’ s original ideas on  prima facie obligations (or 
 ‘ duties ’ in his terminology), in Ross, 1931. Modern Kantians make 
a similar point with  pro tanto reasons, see, for example, Kagan, 
1989. 
 For Aristotle ’ s thoughts on justice, see Book V of the  Nicoma-
chean Ethics . 
 Modern authors who take up Williams ’ calls for change include 
Cottingham, in Crisp, 1996, for a defence and elaboration of the 
notion of partiality, Wolf ’ s seminal 1982 and Stocker ’ s influential, 
1976. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 Character and the emotions 
 A. The purity of morality 
 We can now move on to another important aspect of the virtue 
ethical critique of the status quo as exemplified by consequentialist 
and deontological theories, namely their neglect of the important 
role moral character should play in ethical theories. The notion of 
 ‘ character ’ in virtue ethics is a technical one, and we will consider 
below how virtue ethicists understand it, but first we need to 
discuss the critique of theories which disregard the importance of 
character. In order to do this, we have to return to the work of 
Bernard Williams. 
 A dominant idea driving much of Kant ’ s thought, especially in 
the  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , is what Williams 
calls the  ‘ purity of morality ’ . Kant begins the  Groundwork by 
establishing that the supreme principle of morality, what the work 
is aiming to establish, must be unconditionally good. It cannot be 
grounded either in the dictates of God or in a teleological conception 
of human nature (i.e. the idea that human nature has a function, 
a goal, an end) or in utility, as any of these options would make 
morality conditional by grounding it in something else. The only 
thing which is good unconditionally, without qualification, without 
relying on other things for its goodness, is the good will. And that 
means that the goodness of the good will is not affected by things 
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such as consequences, results, ulterior ends, compulsion, fame, 
happiness and pleasure. In a famous passage Kant writes: 
 Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly 
endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking 
in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still 
accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not admittedly, 
as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they 
are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for 
its own sake as something which has its full value in itself. 1 
 If the will were to be prevented from carrying out its purpose, either 
by ‘ some special disfavour of destiny ’ or by ‘ the niggardly endowment 
of step-motherly nature ’ , it would still remain pure and good. The 
 ‘ special disfavour of destiny ’ is simply a misfortune, you want to 
save the drowning baby but unfortunately she is too far away from 
you to reach in time. So bad luck and bad circumstances can stop 
you from achieving the good result, but, importantly, this has no 
bearing on the goodness of the good will. The good will remains 
good even if it fails in bringing about any good consequences. The 
 ‘ niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature ’ means a contrary 
natural characteristic. So if you have the will to act, but you are 
prevented from doing so by your own temperament, that is, your 
own nature, your will is still good and you are good. So if your will 
prescribes saving the baby, but you are naturally lazy or cruel so 
you don ’ t, you are still good by virtue of your good will. It is this 
second idea that interests us here, the idea that the goodness of the 
good will is entirely independent of natural dispositions, emotions 
and other factors that go towards shaping who we become. It is this 
conception of morality as pure that Williams objects to when he 
rejects the Kantian morality ’ s pressure to 
 . . .  require a voluntariness that will be total and will cut through 
character and psychological or social determination, and allocate 
blame and responsibility on the ultimately fair basis of the agent ’ s 
own contribution, no more no less. It is an illusion to suppose 
that this demand can be met. 2 
 The Kantian rejection of emotional and social influences on the 
good will comes from a mistrust of these influences and their 
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arbitrary and uncontrollable nature. For Kant, human beings are 
imperfectly rational beings because we are influenced by two sources 
of motivation, reason and desire. If we were motivated purely by 
reason, we would be perfectly rational beings and we would always 
will what is rational, that is, what is moral. We are not though, 
we are imperfectly rational beings; this does not mean that we 
do not know what is rational or moral, but rather that we do not 
always will it because of our desires. Desires are subversive, they are 
given to us by nature without us having any choice in the matter, 
for example, some people are born naturally kind, even tempered 
and courageous, while others are born naturally cruel, irascible 
and cowardly, also without having any choice in these natural 
tendencies. Furthermore, our desires develop and are influenced by 
external factors such as social influences over which we have no 
control whatsoever. Since we have no control over our desires, we 
are not masters of our own selves in this respect and desires cannot 
be the foundation of morality. A fundamental aspect of morality is 
that we praise and blame people for their moral actions and this 
in turn requires that they have control over what they choose to 
do  – the notion of  ‘ voluntariness ’ . If all morality comes down to 
is external influences and uncontrollable desires, we would never 
be able to hold anyone morally responsible for anything they did. 
One ’ s motives then are crucial for Kant. 
 In another often quoted passage from the  Groundwork , Kant 
expands on this point: 
 To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and besides there are 
many souls so sympathetically attuned that, without any other 
motive of vanity or self-interest they find an inner satisfaction in 
spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction 
of others so far as it is in their own work. But I assert that in 
such a case an action of this kind, however it may conform with 
duty and however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true 
moral worth but is on the same footing with other inclinations, 
for example, the inclination to honor, which, if it fortunately 
lights upon what is in fact in the common interest and in 
conformity with duty and hence honourable, deserves praise 
and encouragement but not esteem; for the maxim lacks moral 
content, namely that of doing such actions not from inclination 
but  from duty . Suppose then that the mind of this friend of man 
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were overclouded by sorrows of his own which extinguished all 
sympathy with the fate of others, but that he still had the power 
to help those in distress, though no longer stirred by the need of 
others because sufficiently occupied with his own; and suppose 
that. when no longer moved by an inclination, he tears himself 
out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any 
inclination for the sake of duty alone; then for the first time 
his action has genuine moral worth. Still further: if nature had 
implanted little sympathy in this or that man ’ s heart; if . . .  he 
were cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of 
others  – perhaps because, being endowed with the special gift of 
patience and robust endurance in his own sufferings, he assumed 
the like in others or even demanded it; if such a man (who would 
in truth not be the worst product of nature) were not exactly 
fashioned by her to be a philanthropist, would he not still find in 
himself a source from which he might draw a worth far higher 
than any that a good-natured temperament can have? 3 
 The second man in this passage has true moral worth, as he acts out 
of duty, he acts because he reasons that it is his duty to do so, and 
this is independent of any incidental desires he may have. In this 
case, it is even contrary to the incidentally unhelpful desires that 
he happens to have. The first man acts well but it is a coincidence 
that he does so, as he does so merely because he happens to have 
sympathetic tendencies which he is neither responsible for nor 
able to control. The problem with the first man is that his actions 
are conditional on desires which may at any moment wane and 
disappear, and his actions would disappear with them. The first 
man is at best due our encouragement as what he does is at least 
in accordance with duty (even if this accordance is incidental), but 
never our moral esteem as that is only due to those who act from 
the pure motive of duty. 
 The Kantian picture then is one where the emotions are irrelevant 
to moral worth and moral praise and blame are  ‘ pure ’ in the sense 
that they are divorced from natural inclinations, psychological 
factors, social influences, etc. For virtue ethicists, this entire picture 
is incorrect and distorts both the proper understanding of the 
relationship between reason and the emotions and the proper role 
of character in moral theory. 
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 B. The notion of  ‘ character ’ 
 The Kantian picture of morality allows us to make pure judgements 
of responsibility, that is, when we hold someone morally praise or 
blameworthy, we have a specific conception of voluntariness in 
mind, one which is free from external influences, social factors, 
psychological impulses, the emotions, etc. However, this purity is 
attained at the cost of plausibility. Even a cursory look at human 
behaviour shows that if we abstract all kinds of emotional reactions 
and social influences from the moral sphere, we end up with an 
implausible and unsatisfactory account. To correct this, we need to 
reconsider how we should make moral judgements grounded on a 
theory of character. 
 The notion of  ‘ character ’ employed here is a technical one, so it ’ s 
worth taking a bit of time to explore what it means. The etymology 
of the term comes from the Greek for carving or engraving, a 
process for making a distinctive and durable mark and this tells us 
something about our understanding of character. One ’ s character 
is distinctive, it refers to qualities that make that particular person 
who they are. Indeed, we sometimes use the term  ‘ character ’ 
to capture this very notion of distinctiveness, for example, as in 
when we call a TV reality show participant  ‘ quite a character ’ to 
intimate that they stand out, that they are memorable, that they are 
different from others. Asking for an account of someone ’ s character 
involves asking for an account of the ways in which they stand out 
from other people, the ways in which their beliefs, attitudes and 
subsequent actions differentiate them from other people. 
 Distinctiveness is a characteristic that the term  ‘ character ’ 
also shares with the notion of  ‘ personality ’ , but at the same time, 
character goes beyond the notion of distinctiveness. Learning about 
a person ’ s character tells us something about who they are, in the 
sense of revealing their commitments, what they consider important, 
the attitudes and behaviours that person counts as identifying of 
his or her own self and his or her own agency. Our character is, 
in many ways, indicative of who we are. And since many of our 
most important commitments are moral commitments, many 
aspects of our character have to do with our moral attitudes and 
behaviours. While one ’ s sense of who one is will involve all sorts of 
factors outside of one ’ s character, for example, one ’ s age, gender, 
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occupation, etc., it will also partly involve what we believe in, what 
we are committed to, what we value, what we are interested in, etc., 
all of which are aspects of our characters. We should also note that 
these values and commitments need not concern extraordinary or 
rare occurrences but, more likely, will be about everyday concerns 
and responsibilities. 
 Thinking about our commitments and values reveals another 
aspect of character, and this is its stability. Moral commitments are 
serious commitments, in the sense that they are only undertaken 
after a lot of reflection and once undertaken they are persistent and 
show a high degree of steadfastness. If you, on reflection, decide 
that kindness to others is a value you should pursue, encourage and 
dedicate yourself to, then you are likely to be strongly committed to 
being kind, a commitment which will persist over time and manifest 
itself reliably in a variety of different situations. You are unlikely to 
suddenly decide to give cruelty a go simply on a whim, or because 
you have nothing better to do or because you didn ’ t really think 
about it. One ’ s stable character traits not only will capture who 
we are but also will do so persistently over time, showing a level of 
commitment appropriate to the gravity of the activity. In this sense, 
one ’ s character is very much like a permanent engraving, deeply 
etched, difficult to erase and persistent over time. 
 Now, one might object here that people ’ s characters change all 
the time, after all we are often surprised on revisiting old friends by 
seeing how different they are to our earlier memories, we expect 
children to mature into more complex and sophisticated persons as 
adults, we see character change as a necessary and central part of 
moral maturity. However, these two ideas, the idea of stability and 
the idea of change need not be contradictory; they may just refer to 
different stages of character development. Much of our lives may well 
be spent on trying to discover who we really are, on thinking about 
what kinds of values we should commit ourselves to, on testing our 
abilities to react to different situations, on learning, growing and 
improving ourselves. At the same time, once we have committed 
ourselves to certain characteristic modes of attitude and behaviour, 
they are likely to display a pattern of reliability and stability. The 
 process of character formation may be gradual, subject to change, 
experimentation and discovery, the  settled state of one ’ s character is 
stable, dependable and predictable. 
Virtue Ethics.indb   40 7/12/2012   11:51:37 AM
CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 41
 C. Character development 
 Given the claims above, how we come to develop our characters, 
the process by which we become who we are, is going to be very 
significant for our discussion. It seems to be true that we are all born 
with all sorts of different natural tendencies. If we look at even very 
young children, we can observe differences between them; some 
are more irascible, others are more settled in temperament, some 
are more sociable, others are happier on their own, some are more 
willing to share, others are more possessive, etc. It is reasonable 
to assume then that those who are fortunate enough to be born 
with a preponderance of positive tendencies will find it easier to 
cultivate a good character, whereas those who are born with a 
preponderance of negative tendencies will have more obstacles to 
overcome. Aristotle writes: 
 Some thinkers hold that it is by nature that people become good, 
others that it is by habit, and others that it is by instruction. The 
bounty of nature is clearly beyond our control; it is bestowed by 
some divine dispensation upon those who are truly fortunate. 
It is a regrettable fact that discussion and instruction are not 
effective in all cases; just as a piece of land has to be prepared 
beforehand if it is to nourish the seed, so the mind of the pupil 
has to be prepared in his habits if it is to enjoy and dislike the 
right things; because the man who lives in accordance with his 
feelings would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, or 
understand it if he did. And when a man is in that state, how is 
it possible to persuade him out of it? In general, feeling seems to 
yield not to argument but only to force. Therefore we must have 
a character to work on that has some affinity to virtue: one that 
appreciates what is noble and objects to what is base. 4 
 Kant and Aristotle would both agree that we are born with good or 
bad natural tendencies, over which we have no control, but which 
can shape the way we develop and eventually the way we behave; 
however, they disagree over how we should react to this fact. For 
Kant, we should aim to expunge the influence of uncontrollable 
natural impulses for they pollute the purity of morality. For Aristotle, 
we should recognize and embrace their influence. 
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 We embrace the influence of natural tendencies by encouraging 
and promoting those that are good, while discouraging and 
minimizing the effect of those that are bad. The most important 
point to note about Aristotelian character development is that it 
is a long, gradual process which involves different stages (not just 
stages of progress but also regression and deterioration and not 
only wholesale change but also partial change in some areas rather 
than others) in both cognitive and affective aspects of our character. 
Not only do we start with natural tendencies that may influence us 
in good or bad ways but we also develop due to external factors 
which may also influence us in good or bad ways. To understand 
this process of gradual development, we need to consider the move 
from knowing  ‘ the that ’ to understanding  ‘ the because ’ (these are 
Burnyeat ’ s very useful translations of the original Aristotelian 
terms). 
 The process of moral character development starts with finding 
out  ‘ the that ’ .  ‘ The that ’ is the right thing to do, but we learn what 
that might be through example, habituation, external influences 
and so on. Consider a child that refuses to share his toys with other 
children. His father intervenes and says something like  ‘ It ’ s good to 
share your toys with other children who have none ’ . At this stage, the 
child has learnt something about morality, but what it has learnt is 
limited. The lesson has to do with the content of morality as applied 
to this example, but importantly the child has yet to learn why it is 
good to share, when it might be acceptable not to share and it has 
not internalized the values exemplified by sharing in such a way that 
the child himself comes to affirm the importance of sharing as one of 
his values. All this will come in time with further development, but 
to start off, we are dependent on seeing and following the example 
of others who know better. In this respect, it makes all the difference 
whether we have good role models, good parents, good friends and 
good influences which will steer us towards the good, even if we 
don ’ t yet fully understand the good ourselves. 
 A wide range of desires and feelings are shaping patterns of 
motivation and response in a person well before he comes to 
a reasoned outlook on his life as a whole, and certainly before 
he integrates this reflective consciousness with his actual 
behaviour. 5 
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 Because of such external influences, how we behave now has a great 
role to play in shaping who we will become. Aristotle counsels us to 
become just by performing just acts, 6 which at first glance sounds 
circular. For how can we perform just acts without knowing what 
they are, and how will we know what they are before we have 
become just? The answer to this conundrum is to be found in two 
different understandings of what it is to perform just acts. One can 
perform just acts because one is counselled to do so  – this person 
knows  ‘ the that ’ , what to do  – but one can only be truly just when 
one understands  ‘ the because ’ , that is, why the act is just, exactly 
what is required by justice, why acting justly is important and along 
with this comes an internalization of the value of justice such that 
one comes to affirm the value of justice. We move from a belief that 
we should do something because it is just, a belief that has been 
instilled in us by the good example of others, to an understanding 
of why it is so that comes with a personal commitment to doing 
what is just  because it is just. 
 This process of development from believing  ‘ the that ’ to 
understanding  ‘ the because ’ involves both cognitive and affective 
elements. It is not sufficient to merely have an intellectual 
understanding of kindness, one must also develop one ’ s affective 
responses to function in a kind way. The kind person doesn ’ t 
just merely think kind thoughts, he has kind feelings and more 
importantly than that, it is the connection of both kind thoughts 
and feelings that lead to kind actions. Habit is crucial in developing 
the right emotions, for it is in habituating ourselves to act and feel 
in particular ways that we actually come to act and feel in these 
ways for real. It is important to note though that virtue is not 
habit. Habits are unreflective, routine behaviours and having the 
right habits helps us to develop the right dispositions, but true 
virtue requires conscious choice and choosing virtue for its own 
sake. Therefore, virtue cannot be habit, although habit is a useful 
tool towards establishing the right emotional responses and first 
reactions. 
 We will return to the importance of developing the right 
emotional responses in the next part of this volume, but for now 
it is sufficient to note that character development will be as much 
about developing the right feelings as it will be about developing 
the right ways of thinking. Full understanding of  ‘ the because ’ is not 
Virtue Ethics.indb   43 7/12/2012   11:51:37 AM
VIRTUE ETHICS44
merely a rational matter, it is also a matter of being moved in the 
right way. Again from Aristotle: 
 It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other people that 
makes us just or unjust, and the way that we behave in the face 
of danger, accustoming ourselves to be timid or confident, that 
makes us brave or cowardly. Similarly with situations involving 
desires and angry feelings: some people become temperate and 
patient from one kind of conduct in such situations, others licen-
tious and choleric from another. In a word, then, like activities 
produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our activities a 
certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine 
the resulting dispositions. So it is a matter of no little importance 
what sorts of habits we form from the earliest age  – it makes a 
vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world. 7 
 This is how we move from natural tendencies, through the influence 
of external factors, to settled dispositions. 
 Finally, one last aspect of character is its link with action. 
Character is a state of being expressed in doing. It is a state of 
being that involves evolving or settled dispositions with both 
cognitive and affective elements that flow into appropriate action. 
To have a kind character is to be disposed to act in kind ways where 
kindness is what is required, and similarly with other dispositions. 
In this respect, character-based theories are different from both 
consequentialist theories that focus on the importance of the 
results of one ’ s actions and deontological theories that focus on the 
importance of the motives behind our actions. Character theories are 
interested in both the beliefs and desires that shape our dispositions 
and the actions that proceed from those dispositions. Of course, 
this doesn ’ t mean that all dispositions result in actions all of the 
time, but we will leave the topics of acting out of character and the 
possibility of our being prevented from realizing our dispositions in 
action until Chapter 7. 
 D. The fragility of goodness 
 The Aristotelian picture of character development then has the 
advantage of plausibility over the Kantian aspiration to a pure 
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morality. Within this account, we can make sense of the importance 
of the raw materials we are born with and the numerous external 
influences we are subjected to during our lives. However, one 
possible objection here is that plausibility is gained at the cost of 
injustice. The Kantian pure morality goes hand in hand with a 
particular understanding of justice in making moral judgements. 
If the possibility to choose morality is open to anyone at any time, 
regardless of background or influences, at least there is a sense of 
justice in holding people morally responsible as we are holding 
them morally responsible for something they chose to do. In the 
Aristotelian picture by contrast, one ’ s character is subject to all these 
uncontrollable influences, so how can we hold people responsible 
for what they become and what they do if they didn ’ t have full 
control over their character ’ s formation in the first place? 
 Consider two children of similar age. Sophie is born with some 
disadvantageous natural qualities; she has a tendency to irascibility, 
a rather self-centred approach to life and an inflated sense of her 
own self importance. She is born to a family of poor means, living 
in a deprived area, with few educational and cultural opportunities. 
Her father is not present in her life and her mother suffers from 
substance abuse problems. Her school is poorly funded, has 
difficulty in recruiting top-rated teachers and has a high truancy 
rate. Sophie ’ s friends are likely to be involved in petty crimes at 
a young age, possible substance abuse later on and many of her 
friends give up on their education at a young age. By contrast, July 
is born with some advantageous natural qualities, she has a natural 
tendency to kindness; she is even-tempered and generous. She is 
born to a cultured and well-educated family, who has educational 
aspirations for her and the financial means to support a private 
education, trips abroad, visits to cultural sites, etc. Her friends all 
come from similar backgrounds and have plans to pursue higher 
education and rewarding careers. It would be no surprise if Sophie ’ s 
life took a completely different turn from July ’ s life, but given the 
disparities in both natural tendencies and background influences 
it does seem unfair to blame Sophie and praise July for characters 
whose formation was predominantly out of their control. Of course, 
neither Sophie ’ s nor July ’ s paths are predestined, and we would 
be full of admiration for Sophie if she were to break through the 
constraints of her upbringing, but if she were to do so, she would be 
the exception rather than the rule. 
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 It is these kinds of considerations that have led some philosophers 
to worry that the Aristotelian picture of moral development is both 
elitist and unfair. Under this picture, morality is the privilege of 
the few, those who have had the good luck to have support and 
encouragement but also the finances and means to become moral. 
This kind of worry has led some commentators to very harsh 
criticisms of Aristotle; here is Bertrand Russell on the topic: 
 The book [the  Nicomachean Ethics ] appeals to the respectable 
middle-aged, and has been used by them, especially since the 
seventeenth century, to repress the ardours and enthusiasms of 
the young. But to a man with any depth of feeling it is likely to 
be repulsive. 8 
 This is a serious concern, and it is important to see whether it can 
be rebuffed. 
 Essentially, the Aristotelian response will follow lines of argument 
similar to the ones we have considered above, when discussing the 
nature of ethics. If the nature of ethics is such that it is vulnerable to 
luck and uncontrollable contingencies, then this is not the fault of 
the ethical theory that seeks to describe and account for these ideas. 
To deny that this is so is to create an unrealistic picture of ethics 
which doesn ’ t serve in helping us understand what kinds of persons 
we should aim to become. In the same way that we mustn ’ t seek a 
precise and rule-bound answer for a diverse and context sensitive 
topic, we mustn ’ t seek an answer free from the influences of luck 
for an enterprise that is fundamentally vulnerable to luck. If the 
influence of luck is part of ethics, then our ethical theory needs to 
take this into account, rather than blindly deny it. As we shall come 
to see in Part II, the good human life is fragile in many different 
respects; it is not just the vulnerability of character development 
but also the requirement of external goods such as friendship which 
are both central to living the good life but also difficult to find and 
maintain, as well as the possibility of falling foul of great disasters 
that upset all of one ’ s projects. In the next three chapters we ’ ll see 
how recognizing and accepting the fragility of goodness is not only 
a requirement of giving a plausible account of ethics but also an 
advantage, something we should welcome and embrace, for it is 
only that which is vulnerable and difficult to achieve that is also 
precious and worth pursuing. 
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 Further readings 
 Kant ’ s thoughts discussed in this chapter can be found in the first 
part of the  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals . Williams ’ 
critique of the Kantian pure morality is developed in Williams, 
1985. 
 The ideas discussed in the sections on character development 
are very much based on Aristotle ’ s thoughts from Book II of the 
 Nicomachean Ethics . There are a number of useful discussions of 
the notion of character as relating to virtue ethics, for example, 
Kupperman, 1991, especially Chapters 1, 2 and 3, or for a very 
clearly presented account of these ideas, see Annas, 2011, Chapters 2 
and 3. One of the most excellent discussions of the process of 
character formation is Burnyeat, in Rorty, 1980. 
 Bertrand Russell ’ s damning account of Aristotle ’ s ethics can be 
found in Russell, 1946 and is worth reading as his interpretation of 
Aristotle was very influential for a long time. Martha Nussbaum ’ s 
response is one of the most eloquent and moving accounts of 
Aristotelian ethics available, Nussbaum, 1986, Chapter 11, although 
most of these ideas will be covered in Part II when we discuss the 
link between  eudaimonia and virtue. 
Virtue Ethics.indb   47 7/12/2012   11:51:37 AM
 CONCLUSION FOR 
PART ONE 
 In this first part of this volume, we have covered a very wide number 
of ideas. If you are interested in pursuing any of them further, the 
 ‘ Further Readings ’ section at the end of each chapter lets you 
know about the authors who discussed and defended these ideas 
in detail. All these ideas share two characteristics: first, they share 
a particular conception of what morality has to offer and second, 
they argue that what morality has to offer under this understanding 
is unsatisfactory; therefore, they call for changes in a variety of 
respects. 
 Anscombe sets the scene by presenting an account of morality 
as developed by consequentialist and deontological theories that 
owes much to a legislative or rule-governed model. She urges us to 
reject this account of ethics as it attempts to capture in precise, rigid 
rules, a topic whose very nature is complex, diverse and context 
specific. We should move away from a legalistic conception of 
morality, dominated by the notion of  ‘ obligation ’ , to a revival of the 
Aristotelian concepts of  ‘ character ’ and  ‘ virtue ’ as well as a renewed 
emphasis on the importance of moral psychology. Instead of asking 
 ‘ What should I do here, now, with this specific problem? ’ we should 
be asking  ‘ How should I live my life? What kind of person should 
I be? ’ 
 Bernard Williams starts from a similar point, a dissatisfaction 
with the notion of  ‘ obligation ’ and the determining role it plays in 
deontological and consequentialist theories. Obligations are action 
focused, cannot conflict, leave no room for moral regret, commit us 
to the  ‘ obligation out-obligation in ’ principle and apply to everyone 
without exception in such a way that we are always subject to blame 
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for not fulfilling our obligations. This conception of  ‘ obligations ’ 
causes a variety of problems, from forcing us to conceive of all sorts 
of concepts solely as obligations, to being committed to the view 
that only an obligation can beat an obligation, to having to accept 
that every obligation comes from a more general obligation. Instead 
of this narrow and limiting conception of morality, Williams urges 
us to embrace a wider conception of ethics. 
 This wider conception of ethics allows us to make sense of a 
more meaningful life for human beings. A life within which we 
can make sense of special commitments towards those we love 
that are justified by and understood within the very context of 
the relationships. A life which is not overwhelmed by the limiting 
demands of morality but which allows room for wider experiences 
and a fuller conception of what it means to live a good life; and a 
life which brings our motives into harmony with our reasons, values 
and justifications and avoids both the perils of moral schizophrenia 
and the drudgery of moral sainthood. 
 Finally, we have examined the concept of  ‘ character ’ which is now 
central in this wider conception of ethics. We rejected the Kantian 
aspiration to a pure morality, in favour of a more plausible picture 
of character development as a gradual and difficult process, which 
is subject to many external factors and influences. One ’ s moral 
character is distinctive, incorporates one ’ s important commitments 
and values in a way that reflects who we really are and, after a lengthy 
period of development, leads to stable, predictable and dependable 
dispositions that express themselves in actions. This account of 
character development recognizes and accepts the inherent fragility 
of goodness as subject to the vagaries of luck, but as we shall see 
in the next part, this is both a plausible and a welcome picture; 
because only what is fragile and difficult to achieve is truly valuable 
and worth striving for. 
 Given that this is a volume on virtue ethics, the astute readers 
may have been surprised to see so little mention of virtue so far; 
however, as we shall come to see that in the next section everything 
we have discussed so far will go towards informing our account of 
virtue. We have concentrated on a negative picture, a critique of what 
is lacking in other alternatives, a call for change, and all of these ideas 
will now form the foundation of a more positive discussion that is 
to follow; a discussion that directly accounts for the advantages of 
virtue ethics. 
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 Before we move on though, a note of caution. So far we have 
presented all these ideas in accordance with how they were first 
put forward by their proponents. As we have seen, this required a 
particular interpretation of morality as attributed to consequen-
tialist and deontological theories; however, this interpretation 
could well be disputed. It may or may not have been the correct 
interpretation of what such theories had to offer at the time these 
discussions took place, but either way, what is certain is that 
both deontologists and consequentialists have responded to this 
type of critique by redefining, clarifying or refining their claims. 
For example, many deontologists have occupied themselves with 
showing how a modern Kantian can make room for an appropriate 
conception of the importance of friendship without falling foul of 
the kinds of objections raised in this section. Unfortunately, it is 
beyond the scope of this volume to explore these developments in 
full, but it is important to point out that the debate is not static 
and there are further responses to the line of attack outlined in this 
chapter and further rebuttals from virtue ethicists. In Chapter 9 of 
this volume, we will briefly consider how modern Kantians have 
responded to some of the concerns raised by virtue ethics, but before 
we do that we need to gain a better understanding of the positive 
claims made by virtue ethicists. So far, we have concentrated on a 
critical approach, one that found fault with other alternatives and 
one which explained virtue ethics in terms of what is it  not , in terms 
of what it stands in opposition to. Now it is time to consider a 
more substantial account of virtue ethics as a viable alternative, 
as a theory that elaborates on positive claims beyond what other 
alternatives are available. In Part II, we will explore such an account 
of virtue ethics, broadly based under the idea of eudaimonistic 
virtue ethics. 
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comes of age 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 Virtue; an Aristotelian 
deﬁ nition I 
 A. The primacy of virtue 
 In Part I, we discussed the sense of dissatisfaction with the two 
alternative normative theories, deontology and consequentialism, 
which led to calls for a revival of interest in virtue ethics. We looked at 
a number of different approaches which shared two characteristics, 
they all conceived of deontological and consequentialist claims in 
broadly the same, problematic manner, and they all called for radical 
revisions in the way we do moral theory, refocusing our attention 
on the notions of  ‘ character ’ and  ‘ virtue ’ . So far, the discussion has 
been quite critical and negative focusing on the shortcomings of 
others; however, the next stage in the development of virtue ethics 
is a much more positive project. Following these early calls for 
change, philosophers came forward willing to articulate what an 
alternative account of virtue ethics might look like. This is a much 
more constructive and positive project, as it focuses on building up 
a theory of virtue ethics and demonstrating its advantages almost 
regardless of what other alternatives have to offer. This part of the 
debate is more about the content and substance of virtue ethics 
rather than a critique of other normative theories. 
 One of the consequences of this shift of emphasis is that virtue 
ethics now becomes more of an umbrella term, subsuming a 
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number of different and varied theories under the broader term. 
While the majority of these theories take their inspiration from 
Aristotelian ideas, this is by no means true of all of them. Some 
authors have been inspired to develop modern versions of virtue 
ethics based on the work of Plato, Hume and Nietzsche, works 
which now offer a variety of alternative interpretations of what 
it might mean to subscribe to virtue ethics. At the same time, 
some consequentialists and deontologists have responded to the 
challenges laid out by virtue ethics by showing how their theories 
are perfectly capable of incorporating the lessons of virtue without 
giving up on the main, distinctive claims of their own approach. 
At least some consequentialists and deontologists then have 
argued that their theories are perfectly capable of accounting for 
the insights of virtue ethics, which generates a distinction between 
 virtue ethics and  theories of virtue . In brief, theories of virtue 
are theories from all sorts of theoretical backgrounds that have 
some account of, or allow some room for, the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ . 
Thus, a consequentialist could have something to say about the 
role of virtue in consequentialism, without thereby committing 
himself to virtue ethics. This is because virtue ethics is a normative 
account that places virtue at the centre of our understanding of 
what it is to live a good life. In some way or another, in virtue 
ethics, the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ will be primary, central or of unique 
explanatory importance, something which is not true of  theories 
of virtue. 
 In this part of the book, we will examine a particular account of 
virtue ethics, one which has probably been the most influential in 
discussions so far, eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In doing so, we will 
consider how virtue ethics has come of age in the sense of providing 
a substantial and detailed normative theory in its own right rather 
than merely a critique of other alternatives. In doing so, we will 
also make some sense of how the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ is primary or 
central in virtue ethics in contrast to theories of virtue which merely 
make room for some account of virtue. We will look at the concept 
of  ‘ virtue ’ in detail, something which we have not done so far, 
although, as we shall see, many of the ideas examined in Part I will 
play a pivotal role in constructing the account of virtue. Although 
we will mainly focus on eudaimonistic virtue ethics, we will touch 
upon some other alternatives. Finally, in Chapter 9, we shall have 
an opportunity to consider how other normative theories, namely 
Virtue Ethics.indb   54 7/12/2012   11:51:37 AM
VIRTUE; AN ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION I 55
deontology, can make room for the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ without 
making it central to their understanding. 
 The idea that the concept of virtue has, somehow, a primary role 
to play in virtue ethics distinguishes virtue ethics from theories of 
virtue which may assign some importance to the virtues but not this 
primary role. For example, Julia Driver ’ s consequentialist account 
allows room for the virtues, but under this account traits are virtues 
because they  ‘ are valued by others as traits that morally improve the 
character possessing them . . .  What makes these traits moral virtues 
is their tendency to produce beneficial effects ’ . 1 Thus, the judgement 
about the rightness of character, that is, virtue, is dependent on 
a judgement about the rightness or wrongness of actions. If a 
character trait produces good consequences, then it is a virtue and 
the main job of the theory is to give an account of what counts as 
good consequences. Driver, for example, goes on to elaborate that 
the virtues are traits that  ‘ are valued because of their usefulness in 
easing social interaction ’ . 2 Similarly, a deontologist can find room 
for the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ in his theory without relying on it to 
justify right conduct, so for the deontologist virtue is a disposition 
to do what is right, whereas for the virtue ethicist what is right 
is defined in terms of virtue. How this works out is developed in 
different ways by different virtue ethicists. 
 Gary Watson argues that virtue is theoretically dominant in 
virtue ethics because  ‘ how it is best or right or proper to conduct 
oneself is explained in terms of how it is best for a human being 
to be ’ . 3 When we praise or blame someone for what they did, 
their behaviour, we are essentially praising or blaming them for 
who they  are , their character. Right or wrong actions are mere 
manifestations of one ’ s character and not grounds on which one ’ s 
moral worth is justified upon. A second significant element of this 
primacy claim as presented by Watson is that the virtues are linked 
to who we essentially are as  human  beings , to what is characteristic 
of human lives, to what is in accordance with human nature. Not 
only that, but being virtuous is not merely instrumentally good but 
constitutive of what it means to live a good life  qua human being. 
As we shall see below, both these claims are of central importance 
to eudaimonistic virtue ethics, but we will return to these points in 
more detail in Chapter 4, Section C. First we need to clarify a bit 
further what we mean when we say that praising someone for what 
they did involves praising them for who they are. 
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 B. Doing the right thing is not enough 
 Generally, when we do the right thing, we should get credit for it, 
that is, we and other people should recognize that we behaved in 
morally admirable ways and we should get the praise we deserve. 
However, sometimes doing the right thing is not quite enough 
for moral praise. Consider the following cases where something 
good was done, but we are left with a sense of dissatisfaction, a 
concern that the person doesn ’ t quite deserve moral praise. If we 
can articulate what is missing in these cases, perhaps, we can gain a 
better understanding of what is involved in being moral. 
  1 Kate has just discovered the internet. She has never been 
very confident with computers, but she has been encouraged 
to try to learn by her friends who assure her that she can get 
loads of bargains on line. In her first attempt to buy clothes 
online, she gets a bit flustered as loads of different windows 
keep popping up. Finally, she succeeds in spending  £ 50 on a 
lovely new dress for herself. However, unknown to her, she 
has actually messed this up quite badly. In fact she has just 
donated  £ 50 to a cancer research charity. 
  2 John is on his first date with Anne, whom he has admired 
from afar for quite a while. He has finally plucked up 
the courage to ask her out and is keen to make a good 
impression. They have gone on for a walk at the local park 
which is quite busy today as a news crew is filming a report 
on local wildlife. As John and Anne turn a quiet corner 
by the lake, they come across a young boy whose canoe 
has just capsized. The boy is in trouble and is shouting for 
help in between swallowing large amounts of water. John 
considers this an excellent opportunity to impress Anne and 
possibly get on the local news if he is lucky, so he has no 
hesitation in jumping in to heroically save the boy. 
  3 On Monday, Mary notices a homeless person sitting outside 
her office. She is having a slow day at the office so she 
walks out, approaches him, invites him to join her for lunch, 
gives him money for an overnight stay in a hotel and spends 
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two hours chatting to him about his life and how she can 
help him. On Tuesday, she is in a hurry so she ignores him. 
On Wednesday, she has loads of change weighing down her 
purse so she tosses some money in his collection tin. On 
Thursday, she is getting a bit fed up with the dirty, homeless 
man in front of her and shouts at him to  ‘ get a job! ’ On 
Friday, she learns she has just gotten a big account, she ’ s in 
a great mood, so she invites him to celebrate with her at her 
favourite restaurant. 
 The behaviour of all these people is problematic, not because of 
what they did, because in general they managed to do good things, 
for example, give to charity, save lives, help someone in need, but 
rather because of  who they are which colours what they did. Kate 
has certainly done a good thing and the cancer research charity is 
bound to put her money to good use, but it seems inappropriate to 
praise her for doing something accidentally, by mistake, without 
even being aware of what she has done. John has also produced a 
good result in saving the boy but seems to have done it for the wrong 
reasons. Wanting to impress one ’ s girlfriend and seeking fame are not 
the right reasons for saving someone ’ s life. John should have saved 
the boy ’ s life  because it needed saving and from a full appreciation 
of the value of life, something that he would have done regardless 
of whether the impressionable girlfriend and filming media were 
there on that occasion. Mary ’ s behaviour is erratic at best. On some 
days she seems to behave kindly, but on others she, fairly arbitrarily 
and for self-centred reasons, reverses her behaviour. This leads us 
to question whether she really  ever behaved kindly, because helping 
others should be prompted by seeing the need in others and being 
moved to assist them, not by arbitrary reasons such as whether 
Mary herself is having a good day or not. It should be the homeless 
person ’ s ongoing need that consistently prompts Mary to respond, 
rather than whatever else happens to be taking place in her life. 
 From all this, we can conclude that behaving morally involves 
more than doing particular things, but rather doing them in a 
particular manner. Aristotle counsels us: 
 . . .  virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely 
because  they have a certain quality, but only if the agent also acts 
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in a certain state, viz. (i) if he knows what he is doing, (ii) if he 
chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake, and (iii) if he does it 
from a fixed and permanent disposition. 4 
 Virtuous acts are not just acts that bring about certain conse-
quences, but acts that proceed from particular states of character, 
virtuous states of character. Kate did not know what she was doing, 
she acted by mistake, John did not choose what he was doing for 
its own sake, he chose it as a means to impress others and Mary did 
not act from a fixed and permanent disposition, rather she acted 
in a fickle and unreliable manner. Neither of these three qualifies 
for virtue because of who they are which makes a difference to the 
quality of what they did. 
 Virtue ethics differs from both the consequentialist preoccupation 
with the importance of consequences and the deontological emphasis 
on the agent ’ s motives. As we saw in the previous section, states of 
character are states of being expressed in doing, so, for example, the 
virtue of kindness will involve both a fixed and permanent disposition 
to respond in kind ways to situations that require a kind response 
and will result in kind actions. Importantly though, kind results 
are valued because they are part of virtue, rather than because of a 
claim that good and bad outcomes are intrinsically good and bad, 
respectively. The primacy of virtue, as discussed above, is preserved. 
When one merely produces good results by accident or from vicious 
motives, or from fickle and uncontrolled emotional responses, then 
one ’ s actions despite the good results are not worthy of praise as 
they do not proceed from virtuous dispositions. 
 C. The function of human beings 
 In the sections that follow, we will, finally, be able to put together 
the elements of a definition of virtue. In order to do so, we need to 
look back over the ideas of Aristotle which have been central in 
these discussions. The reason we have taken such a circuitous route 
to get here, rather than starting with the Aristotelian definition, 
is that we will understand these Aristotelian ideas in a particular 
way, an interpretation which has been coloured and influenced by 
everything that has gone so far. The ideas we will be considering 
from now on are very firmly rooted in the Aristotelian tradition, 
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but are not limited to a strict textual interpretation of Aristotle ’ s 
works. Rather, they take inspiration from some Aristotelian ideas, 
interpret some other Aristotelian claims, enhance yet another set of 
Aristotelian theories and overall take the debate forward to create a 
comprehensive and independently viable conception of the virtues. 
 We saw above that Gary Watson ’ s claim about the primacy of 
virtue contained two elements. The first is the idea that actions are 
mere manifestations of one ’ s character and not grounds on which 
one ’ s moral worth is justified upon, which we considered above. 
Now we will move on to consider the second element, namely that 
the virtues are linked to who we essentially are as human beings, 
to what is characteristic of human lives, to what is in accordance 
with human nature. Not only that, but being virtuous is not merely 
instrumentally good but constitutive of what it means to live a good 
life  qua human being. 
 Aristotle ’ s very first sentence in the  Nicomachean Ethics is that 
 ‘ [e]very art and every investigation, and similarly every action and 
pursuit, aims at some good ’ . 5 Some of these activities have ends 
which we want for the sake of further ends, but there must be an 
end for which all else is done and which we value for its own sake. 
In order to lead meaningful lives, we need to discover this good for 
the sake of which we do everything else. Aristotle names this final 
good as eudaimonia. This is a term which is difficult to fully capture 
in translation. It is sometimes translated as  ‘ happiness ’ , but this is 
rather inadequate as happiness can be a transient feeling, dependent 
of external circumstances, which is easily upset and can apply to 
some aspects of one ’ s life but not to others. Eudaimonia, on the other 
hand, is a persistent feeling of contentment or of fulfilment with 
one ’ s life; it captures the idea of a flourishing life, a life well lived. 
Eudaimonia is not dependent on external factors, it cannot be easily 
upset and it refers to the entirety of one ’ s life. What constitutes, then, 
the good life, the flourishing life, this life of eudaimonia? 
 Aristotle rejects the life of pleasure as the eudaimon life because 
pleasure is transient and can be put to both good and bad uses. For 
example, someone can derive pleasure from torturing kittens, but 
this doesn ’ t make the torture of kittens right. Pleasure cannot be the 
object of the good life because the value of pleasure is determined 
by the value of the activity which gives rise to it and when the 
activity is evil, the pleasure derived from it is also evil. Similarly, 
he rejects the pursuit of honour, for honour depends on those who 
Virtue Ethics.indb   59 7/12/2012   11:51:37 AM
VIRTUE ETHICS60
confer it. For example, corrupt regimes may confer honour on those 
who support them, but this  ‘ honour ’ does not reflect the real moral 
value of the person ’ s acts, rather it reflects what others think of 
him. Finally, he rejects the pursuit of wealth, as wealth is a means 
to other things and not a good in itself. The good life, the life we 
should be aiming at, must be a life which is truly characteristic of 
the person and can ’ t be dependent on goods that are conferred by 
others, or goods that can be taken away or a life which reflects what 
others happen to think of one. 
 To find out what the eudaimon life consists in, perhaps, we 
should try a different approach; we should consider what is the 
good for human beings  qua human beings. In the same way that 
in health, for example, the object of the activity, that for which all 
else is undertaken, is to restore health, and in military planning, the 
object of the activity is victory, there must be an object to living 
human lives. To discover this object, we must consider the function 
of human beings. 
 Aristotle observes that where a thing has a function the good of 
the thing, that is, when we say that the thing is doing well is when it 
performs its function well. The function of a knife is to cut; a good 
knife will be a knife that cuts well. The function of the eye is to see; 
a good eye will be one that has 20:20 vision. This argument will be 
applied to man; man has a function and the good man is the man 
who performs his function well. If we find out what the function of 
man is, we will know what the good life is, that is, it is the life that 
performs that function well. 
 To find the function of man, Aristotle asks us to look at what 
is distinctive of man. What is peculiar to man that sets him apart 
from other beings? For instance, humans take nourishment and 
they grow, but they share this with plants and animals, so eating 
and growing cannot be the distinctive function of human beings. 
Sentience is characteristic of human beings, but it is also shared 
by many animals so it can ’ t be our distinctive function. The thing 
that humans alone possess, which we do not share with plants or 
animals, is reason. If the function of humans is reason, then the 
good human is the human who functions well, that is, reasons 
well, and this is the life of excellence. For Aristotle, the virtues are 
activities in accordance with reason, therefore they constitute the 
life of eudaimonia and that is why he devotes the rest of the book 
to considering what is involved in being virtuous. So eudaimonia, 
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the good life for human beings, consists in reasoning well which is 
tantamount to being moral, being virtuous. 
 The type of argument developed above is called a teleological 
argument, from the Greek  ‘ telos ’ for  ‘ end ’ or  ‘ purpose ’ . We will 
return to this kind of argument, objections against it and responses 
by virtue ethicists in Chapter 6, but for now we need to say a bit 
more about the definition of virtue. 
 D. The deﬁ nition of virtue 
 When we think of virtue nowadays, we may think that the term is 
a bit old-fashioned or associated with specific Christian ideals of 
chastity, humility, self-sacrifice, etc. or perhaps that it is associated 
with a certain conservative view of morality. For Aristotle, however, 
virtue is moral goodness, moral excellence. Aristotle ’ s definition of 
virtue is presented in Book II of the  Nicomachean Ethics :  ‘ Virtue is 
a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and 
determined by a rational principle, and by that which the prudent 
man would use to determine it ’ . 6 We will consider the elements of 
this definition one at a time. 
 For Aristotle, virtue is neither contrary to nor determined by our 
nature, rather we are shaped by nature to receive the virtues, provided 
we are exposed to the right kind of influencing and shaping factors. 
As we saw previously, when we discussed the concept of  ‘ character ’ , 
virtues as dispositional character traits will be shaped and developed 
over a long period of time and will be subject to the influence of 
numerous factors; however, once established, dispositions are stable, 
reliable, predictable and unshaken by temptations and distractions. 
The  ‘ purposive ’ element of the definition refers to the fact that virtue 
is chosen, chosen knowingly and chosen for its own sake, for as we 
have seen above virtue cannot be accidental, mistaken or unintended. 
The Doctrine of the Mean further elaborates on these ideas. 
 Consider the following three scenarios and for each one ask 
whether the person ’ s reaction/behaviour is appropriate, if yes, why 
so and if not, why not: 
  1 A group of friends are having a picnic on a nice sunny day. 
The food attracts a couple of wasps. Anne-Marie quickly 
gets up, upsets the picnic basket and runs away in fear. 
Virtue Ethics.indb   61 7/12/2012   11:51:37 AM
VIRTUE ETHICS62
  2 Peter is a keen gardener. The front of his house is laid to 
lawn which is his pride and joy. He spends all his spare time 
ensuring that it is perfectly level, weed free and mowed to 
perfection. On a Sunday morning, Peter is looking out of his 
front window admiring his lawn only to see two local boys 
running all over it (the garden is unfenced). Peter rushes 
out, indignant and shouts at the boys. His chest swells with 
righteous anger and he lets it all vent in the direction of the 
boys who have polluted his lawn. The youngest of the boys 
bursts into tears and the eldest grabs him by the hand and 
runs off pursued down the road by Peter ’ s screams, swears 
and threats. 
  3 Ernie, Tom and George are all foot soldiers during the 
World War I. Their regiment has just lined up and after 
a night of anxious waiting they are about to charge into 
enemy lines. The battle begins and Ernie rushes ahead 
of everyone else. He runs right towards the enemy lines 
without cover or protection. Tom finds his courage failing 
him and at the first opportunity he abandons his position 
and heads back towards the trenches. George stays with his 
comrades; he obeys orders to advance and retreat, remains 
in formation and does his best to play his role in the 
regiment. 
 Was Anne-Marie ’ s reaction to the wasp appropriate? Hopefully, you 
should have found it difficult give an answer to this question without 
further information. If Anne-Marie has a severe allergic reaction 
to wasp stings and has forgotten her emergency medication, then 
running away in fear seems a fairly reasonable response. If, however, 
she just doesn ’ t like wasps, running away and ruining everyone ’ s day 
seems like an exaggerated response. Judging the appropriateness of 
the response then cannot be done in isolation from knowing the 
individual circumstances of the person. This is not the only relevant 
point. Should it turn out that this was no ordinary wasp, but rather 
a mutant, alien, 20-foot-tall wasp, then the question is no longer 
why Anne-Marie ran away but why the rest of her friends didn ’ t 
follow closely at her heels. Running away in such circumstances is 
no longer peculiar, but it ’ s mandated by self-preservation; this time 
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it ’ s the staying to face the 20-foot, mutant, alien wasp unperturbed 
while eating at the picnic that requires explanation. We can ’ t judge 
the appropriateness of the reaction without knowing the individual 
circumstances of the person, the nature of the threat, the relationship 
between the two, etc. because all of these factors determine what will 
be an appropriate response. All of these factors will differ from one 
situation to the next and appreciating them will require a degree of 
good judgement. That means that the concept of  ‘ appropriateness ’ 
does not operate in a vacuum, it ’ s relative to the person and the 
circumstances and will change as these change. 
 Peter ’ s reaction, however, seems rather exaggerated. Here, we 
have some more information about the situation and it seems 
that Peter ’ s response to a relatively minor and harmless offence is 
exaggerated and causes quite a bit of unhappiness. The relevant 
point though is that although in this instance a display of a 
significant amount of anger is inappropriate and unwarranted by 
the details of the situation, this needn ’ t always be the case. Had 
Peter been exposed to persistent bullying, including racial insults 
and the thread of physical harm, a significant amount of anger 
would have been the appropriate response. An excessive amount of 
feeling is not inappropriate in and of itself, nor can it be judged to 
be inappropriate in isolation of the circumstances that provoke it. 
Whether the feeling is appropriate or not will depend on what it is a 
reaction to and sometimes a strong response is the right one. This is 
exactly the idea captured by the concept of  ‘ righteous indignation ’ . 
We would expect someone who was righteously indignant to be quite 
indignant, not merely a little bit upset. This amount of indignation 
is warranted though as it is proportional to the provocation. It is 
 ‘ righteous ’ as the agent has a right to being this much indignant 
because of the gravity of the provocation. Indeed showing less than 
the right amount of righteous indignation, for example, remaining 
passive in the face of great insults, would lead us to question the 
agent ’ s behaviour as perhaps lacking in appropriate self-respect. 
Sometimes the right thing is to be very angry and any other response 
just isn ’ t good enough; however, a lot of anger is by no means the 
right response to every situation. 
 Finally, we have Ernie, Tom and George, three soldiers who 
behave in three completely different ways. Tom is clearly cowardly 
as he abandons his post and his comrades, but Ernie ’ s behaviour also 
seems problematic. Where Tom suffers from an excess of fear, Ernie 
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seems to suffer from an, equally problematic, lack of fear. Rushing 
into battle, heedless of any other considerations and with no regard 
for orders or what others are doing, may be as problematic in its 
rashness as cowardice is in the opposite direction. George seems to 
have the  ‘ right amount ’ of fear, neither too much so as to turn him 
into a coward nor too little so as to make him rash. For courage is 
not the total absence of fear, that would be rashness, but the right 
amount of fear, which is appropriate to the nature of the situation. 
Faced with the enemy ranks in open battle should generate a 
good amount of fear and the virtue of courage cannot require 
one to be fearless regardless of the fear-provoking circumstances 
one is faced with. That wouldn ’ t be courage but rashness or 
complete insensitivity to one ’ s surroundings. Furthermore, we 
cannot prescribe, in advance of knowing the circumstances, what 
the courageous action might be. If the battle is going well, holding 
one ’ s ground or advancing may be what is dictated by courage, 
but if the enemy threatens to overwhelm your position, a tactical 
retreat could be compatible with courage. Again, what is required 
is judgement to decide what is appropriate to the situation and the 
virtuous action cannot be captured in one prescriptive rule. 
 The above three examples capture some of the significant 
elements of the Doctrine of the Mean. The Doctrine of the Mean 
is essentially a claim about the importance and nature of the 
appropriate response. If we ask what is the right thing to do, then 
the answer cannot be general, but must be related to the particulars 
of the situation and the agent. Virtue is concerned with feelings and 
actions and in these respects one can go wrong erring either by 
excess or by deficiency. Fear is the feeling associated with the virtue 
of courage, but an excess of fear leads to the vice of cowardice, 
while a deficiency of fear leads to the vice of rashness. The correct 
amount of fear, the mean, is courage. However, the correct amount 
of the feeling, the mean, is not a mathematical mean. It ’ s not an 
average of all possibilities, or a mathematical average, rather it is 
what is appropriate to the situation; very little fear is the appropriate 
response to a wasp by a person who does not suffer from any wasp 
allergies. Nor is it a doctrine of moderation, one that counsels a 
lukewarm emotional response to every situation; quite a lot of anger 
is the mean response to a serious insult. It is also a claim about the 
ways in which we can go wrong and fail to hit the mark of virtue, 
going wrong both by excess and by deficiency of feeling. 
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 It will not be easy to find the mean in each situation for  ‘ . . .  to 
feel or act towards the right person to the right extent at the right 
time for the right reason in the right way  – that is not easy, and it is 
not everyone that can do it ’ . 7 Aristotle gives us some general advice 
for finding the mean response in different situations. We must keep 
away from the vice that is more contrary to the virtue. That is, 
some vices will appear more contrary to some virtues, for example, 
we have a natural inclination towards pleasures and this makes 
licentiousness (the excess of pleasures) seem more contrary to 
temperance (the virtue with respect to pleasures) than insensibility 
(the deficiency with respect to pleasures). 8 Also, we must be on our 
guard against pleasures as we are easily swayed by them, and we 
must be aware of and guard against our own particular weaknesses. 9 
However, we must always remember that while there is only one 
appropriate response, that which reflects the particulars of the 
situation, there are many ways to go wrong and we can err by both 
excess and deficiency. Identifying and correcting our mistakes is not 
an easy process, getting it right involves both moral perception and 
practical wisdom, but everyone has the potential to go wrong in 
many different ways. 
 To summarize, the Doctrine of the Mean makes a number of 
complex and sometimes interrelated points: 
 1 feelings are part of choices and actions, and such feelings 
can be displayed in an excessive, deficient or  ‘ just right ’ 
amount, 
  2 the  ‘ just right ’ amount of feeling is not necessarily a 
moderate amount or a mathematical mean, but could be 
quite a lot depending on the circumstances of the case and 
the individual making the choice, 
  3 the right choice and action cannot be known in advance of 
the particulars of the case, so the mean is context sensitive 
and relative to the agent, 
 4 most importantly, that the Doctrine of the Mean is a 
doctrine of appropriateness, one which claims that what 
is appropriate in each situation will vary and it will be a 
matter of moral perception and moral judgement to decide 
the appropriate response in each situation and 
Virtue Ethics.indb   65 7/12/2012   11:51:38 AM
VIRTUE ETHICS66
  5 finally that there are many ways to go wrong, but only 
one correct response in each situation, but that the one 
correct response is difficult to perceive and we may often 
be deceived by our own weaknesses and tendencies to go 
wrong. 
 Further readings 
 The Aristotelian ideas presented in this chapter are discussed in 
Books I and II of the  Nicomachean Ethics . 
 Gary Watson ’ s influential paper on the primacy of virtue can be 
found in, among other collections, Watson, in Statman, 1997. A 
similar point about the primacy of aretaic concepts, like virtue, over 
deontic concepts, like duty, is made by Slote in Baron et al., 1997. 
 For a more detailed analysis of Aristotle ’ s function argument, 
see Lawrence in Kraut, 2006, and linking the function argument to 
other parts of Aristotelian theory, see McDowell, in Rorty, 1980. 
 Urmson ’ s  ‘ Aristotle ’ s Doctrine of the Mean ’ available in Urmson, 
in Rorty, 1980, is an excellent analysis of the concept, while 
Hursthouse ’ s paper in Kraut, 2006, offers an alternative, compelling 
analysis of the doctrine. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
 Virtue; an Aristotelian 
deﬁ nition II 
 A. The role of the ideally virtuous agent 
 One of the original concerns with deontology and consequentialism 
was that the reliance of these theories on rules meant that they 
could not give an accurate account of ethics, so it is only fair that 
we ask how virtue ethics resolves this problem. If deontology and 
consequentialism rely on rigid rules that do not represent the nature 
of the subject matter, at least they have the advantage of giving us 
concrete guidance. By rejecting these rules, virtue ethics risks failing 
to offer  any action guidance whatsoever, and surely we would 
expect a moral theory to give us some specific help with what we 
should do when faced with moral problems. Our inquiries into 
morality have a practical purpose; they are about the way we act so 
it is reasonable to expect moral theories to offer some guidance in 
this respect. Rules may be rigid and inflexible but at least they offer 
concrete guidance; if virtue ethics rejects rules, what does it replace 
them with and does it succeed in offering any action guidance? 
 One possible response on the part of the virtue ethicist is to point 
to the role of the virtuous agent in the theory. After all, the very 
definition of virtue appeals to the notion of the virtuous agent, so if 
we want action guidance we should appeal to the ideally virtuous 
agent, the one who has all the answers, and follow his example. 
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Virtue ethics would then be action guiding because it guides us 
to do as the virtuous agent does. However, there are a number of 
immediate problems with this suggestion: 
  1 First we face a practical problem: what  would the ideally 
virtuous agent do? If we have problems identifying what 
we, the less than ideally virtuous agents, the ones who are 
confused, tempted, side-tracked and perplexed by morality, 
should do, how can we know what the ideally virtuous 
agent would do? 
  2 We may appeal to an actual virtuous agent and follow his 
example which would at least reveal what he does when 
faced with moral problems, but how do we identify the 
virtuous agent in the first place? Moral questions seem to be 
rife with conflicting answers and lively debate, how do we 
identify within this plurality of views which account of the 
right answer corresponds to the ideally virtuous agent? 
  3 Since our main focus is the agent ’ s character, which is 
habitually but not necessarily exemplified in his actions, we 
will have a further epistemological difficulty of correctly 
establishing the person ’ s moral character. Even if we 
managed to identify someone who habitually did the right 
thing, we wouldn ’ t know if he did it for the right reasons 
and was truly virtuous. 
 4 Even if we could identify the virtuous agent, it is not clear 
that observing him could help us. Since his choices do not 
rely on a rule or principle, there is no easy rule or principle 
he could reveal to us to give us guidance. What he does 
may appear conflicted to us as external observers, and the 
reasons behind his actions may remain entirely opaque. 
How can the ideally virtuous agent go about helping us 
follow his example even if he is inclined to help us? 
 5 Even if he finds a way of accounting for his actions, why 
should we think that what is right for him is also right 
for us? Given everything we have said about the context 
sensitivity of ethics, how the Doctrine of the Mean suggests 
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the answer will be relative to the person and to the situation 
and so on, it seems contradictory to now expect to be 
able to follow another person ’ s example to the letter. Not 
only would the student need to come across an identical 
situation to the ideally virtuous agent but also, since the 
agent is part of determining the correct response, the student 
himself would need to be identical to the ideally virtuous 
agent in order for one and the same choice and action to 
be appropriate for both. Even as ideal, it is not clear how 
an ideally virtuous, perfect agent could help non-ideal, 
imperfect agents like us. 
  6 Indeed aspiring to an ideal which we fail to achieve may 
turn out to be detrimental to us. Attempting to become 
what is beyond our ability may lead to harmful distortions. 
To take an example of Nietzsche ’ s, altruism without the 
inner strength required for the virtue proper, may turn into 
a distorted, self-centred, helping of others by way of self-
promotion which is clearly not virtue. 
 The action guidance objection does not only have purely practical 
aspects but also affects the conceptual understanding of virtue 
ethics. Creating a link between the account of right action and the 
ideally virtuous agent, such that right action is defined in terms 
of what the ideally virtuous agent would do, leaves us wondering 
what is it exactly that he would do and would it be possible for 
non-ideally virtuous agents to figure this out? Furthermore, we are 
left to wonder whether the ideally virtuous agent can ever get it 
wrong or whether it is even possible for two ideally virtuous agents 
to disagree about the right course of action. 
 One possible response to this problem is to acknowledge 
that it is a problem, but it ’ s no more or less a problem for virtue 
ethics than it is for consequentialist or deontological theories. A 
consequentialist theory might, for example, link right action to 
good consequences, but the question still remains what counts as 
a  ‘ good consequence ’ , how do we differentiate between different 
kinds of good consequences, how do we weigh up the competing 
claims of different consequences, etc. Similarly, a deontological 
theory might, for example, link right action to the test of the 
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Categorical Imperative, but the question still remains: how do we 
formulate the maxim to be tested by the Categorical Imperative? 
Is the maxim in question  ‘ Never lie ’ or  ‘ Protect innocent lives ’ ? 
The same qualities of judgement and wisdom which are required 
in determining what count as good consequences may be at play 
in deciding how to formulate the maxim to be tested or how to 
determine what the ideally virtuous agent would do in our place. 
Virtue ethics owes us further answers, but they are not peculiar to 
the theory, they are the same type of answers owed to us by the 
other kinds of theories as well. 
 In what follows, I will try to elaborate on one possible direction 
virtue ethics could take in providing more content for these answers, 
but I will suggest that the role of the ideally virtuous agent has 
been misrepresented both in the objections above and in the virtue 
ethical answers to them that rely to an excessive extent on the role 
of the virtuous agent. 
 B. The  orthos logos 
 If virtue ethics itself makes the mistake of relying to an excessive 
extent on the role of the virtuous agent, it is not the fault of its 
detractors that they point out the many possible difficulties with the 
application of the concept. The solution is, perhaps, to reinterpret 
the role of the ideally virtuous agent in the first place. To do this, 
we need to return to the Aristotelian definition of virtue:  ‘ Virtue is 
a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and 
determined by a rational principle, and by that which the prudent 
man [the ideally virtuous agent] would use to determine it ’ . 1 It is the 
presence of the ideally virtuous agent in the definition that might 
prompt us to give him such a prominent role in understanding the 
theory, but that would be a misreading of the definition. Virtue is 
determined by a rational principle and by what the ideally virtuous 
man would use to determine  the rational principle , so perhaps our 
focus should be on the rational principle rather than the ideally 
virtuous agent. 
 However, our readers may begin to feel a bit cheated now. We 
started off with the virtue ethical critique of the role of rules and 
principles in moral philosophy and the rejection of such an approach 
in favour of an alternative; the search for the alternative brought us 
Virtue Ethics.indb   70 7/12/2012   11:51:38 AM
VIRTUE; AN ARISTOTELIAN DEFINITION II 71
to the ideally virtuous agent, but appeal to him seems to be deeply 
problematic, are we to just return to rules then? No, the problem 
here is one of translation. The original term usually translated 
as  ‘ rational principle ’ or  ‘ right principle ’ is  orthos logos and the 
usual translations of the term are rather misleading. Aristotle gives 
us no examples of rules whatsoever in the  Nicomachean Ethics 
which would be a bizarre choice if his final appeal was to rules or 
principles. A more correct translation for  orthos logos is  ‘ according 
to a correct appreciation of the situation ’ . 2 Thus, the  orthos logos 
is both particular, it has to do with the situation specific details 
of the circumstances one finds oneself in and it was to do with an 
 appreciation of these specifics, an ability to perceive, understand, 
judge and be motivated by these specifics. We will consider what is 
involved in perceiving, understanding, judging and being motived 
by specific features of situations in the next two sections, when we 
discuss moral perception and practical wisdom. These concepts will 
give us an insight into what it is that the ideally virtuous person 
does when he determines the  orthos logos and will explain what 
we should aim to do, that is, see the ideally virtuous person as an 
exemplar of  how to think not an exemplar of  what to think. 
 C. Moral perception 
 The ideally virtuous agent is not merely someone who does the right 
thing. As we have seen, the right action is not necessarily a guarantee 
of virtue, what we need to look at is the person ’ s character. Our 
appeal to the ideally virtuous person makes sense because it is an 
 ‘ appeal made not just to what the virtuous person would do but to 
the kind of person that the virtuous person is ’ 3 and he is the kind of 
person who appreciates the  orthos logos . 
 Indulge me for a moment. After reading the following description, 
close your eyes and imagine it: you come home from your lecture 
one afternoon and the moment you see your housemate and best 
friend you know that something is not right. She is not her usual 
bubbly self; she is uncommunicative and withdrawn. Knowing that 
she ’ s had problems with her boyfriend you suspect things have 
taken a turn for the worst but you also know that she will talk to 
you about it when she is ready. You cancel your cinema plans for 
the evening and instead sit with her waiting for her to be ready to 
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talk. Unfortunately, you were right, her boyfriend left her and she 
is very depressed about the whole thing. The two of you spend the 
evening chatting and finish off a huge tub of ice cream while singing 
 ‘ I will survive ’ at the top of your lungs. Before going to bed she gives 
you a huge hug and you know that although things are not fine yet, 
she is feeling better and you have helped. 
 Now you might immediately reply that your best friend would 
never be a wreck because of a break-up or that if she was she 
wouldn ’ t keep quiet about it or that she hates ice cream anyway, or 
a million other objections to the particulars of the situation, but in 
that case you should change the details to suit your experience with 
your particular best friend. Put in whatever it is that your friend 
cares about and whose loss would upset her, give her the correct 
reaction to grief, imagine the details you would notice that would 
alert you to that particular person ’ s change in emotional outlook, 
fill in the details as to what you would do to make her feel better 
given the kind of person she is and the kind of friendship you have 
and so on. The actual details are not important as such for our 
purposes, more the ability to imagine the scenario, immerse yourself 
in it and consider what it is that you do when you come across such 
situations, because you do quite a lot of things. 
 First, you observe changes and differences, changes which you 
can only observe in virtue of knowing the person so well in the 
first place. These observations need not be conscious, nor do you 
need to be able to list them, they may be subtle signs that you 
take on board without necessarily having them at the forefront 
of your conscious awareness. Second, you bring together rational 
and emotional capacities to bear on the situation. You remember 
her previous boyfriend troubles, you imagine what it must be like 
for her to be in this situation, you empathize with affairs of the 
heart gone wrong, you consider what you could do to help, etc. 
Third, you form a plan of action in direct relation to what you have 
perceived, for example, you cancel your cinema plans because she is 
unhappy and because you judge she may need company. Again not 
everything you do has to be consciously thought out, when you give 
her a hug, this is a spontaneous reaction to her eyes tearing up and 
you don ’ t need to have consciously preplanned all your reactions. 
However, what is important is that your behaviour is governed 
by the specifics of her situation, by seeing her upset, by seeing her 
tearful, by imagining her pain, etc., and by your understanding of 
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friendship and kindness, for example, the idea that friends support 
each other, that kindness requires that we do not abandon those in 
need. What you are doing is exercising Aristotelian perception and 
Aristotelian practical wisdom. 
 Wiggins writes: 
 A man usually asks himself  “ What shall I do? ” not with a view 
to maximizing anything but only in response to a particular 
context. This will make particular and contingent demands on 
his moral or practical perception, but the relevant features of 
the situation may not all jump to the eye. To see what they are, 
to prompt the imagination to play upon the question and let it 
activate in reflection and thought-experiment whatever concerns 
and passions it should activate, may require a high order of 
situational appreciation, or, as Aristotle would say, perception. 4 
 We have seen how ethics is a context sensitive enterprise, and 
now we see how situational appreciation, or moral perception, is 
the ability to perceive context sensitivity. Faced with a complex, 
detailed and context-specific world, we have the ability to perceive 
moral features in a way analogous to how the eye perceives visual 
features. In the same way that visual features  ‘ jump out ’ at us when 
we view a scene, moral features  ‘ jump out ’ at us when we come 
across a moral situation. In the same way that some people have 
better vision or are more visually perceptive than others, some 
people have better moral perception or are more morally perceptive 
than others. When you walk into the room you perceive the change 
in your friend ’ s conduct and this is not merely a matter of seeing 
what she is doing, but also feeling and imagining what has happened 
to her. It is because you know your friend so well in virtue of your 
friendship that you are able to perceive the changes and understand 
their importance. 
 Contrast this account of a morally active world with the 
Humean account of a morally inert world. According to Hume, if 
we examine an act, for example, murder, we cannot find anything 
in the act itself that accounts for its being a vice. Hume writes: 
 ‘ The vice entirely escapes you as long as you consider the object. 
You can never find it, till you turn your reflection into your own 
breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, 
towards the action ’ . 5 The world of facts reveals nothing about the 
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morality of murder, to understand the moral tenor of the act you 
need to look inside you, towards your own feelings and sentiments 
of disapproval of the act. Hume sees the world as a matter of 
morally inert facts and draws a sharp distinction between the role 
of reason, to perceive these facts, and the role of feelings, to give 
us insights into morality. The account of moral perception we have 
developed so far denies both of these approaches. It views the world 
as a source of moral value, one that is perceived, using both rational 
and affective faculties, by the agent. 
 Some moral features of situations are easily perceived by almost 
anyone. If you come across a lake with a drowning baby, the 
drowning baby should become immediately obvious to you as a 
morally significant feature of the situation, whereas the colour of the 
sky, the swans in the distance and the oak trees changing colour, all 
pale into moral insignificance given the fact of the drowning baby. 
While the colour of the sky, the swans and the beautiful trees are 
perfectly noteworthy in other contexts, for example, in a situation 
where there is no drowning baby and you are merely looking for 
a good spot for a watercolour painting, they fade into the moral 
perceptual background given the presence of the drowning baby. 
However, other moral features of situations may be more difficult 
to perceive. If your friend is a very private person, who shows little 
of her inner turmoil to the external world, it may take a very good 
friend to perceive a subtle change in her conduct which betrays 
her grief. And it is part of our understanding of friendship that 
it will involve an intimate knowledge of the friend, a knowledge 
which is not available to strangers and casual acquaintances, but a 
knowledge which forms part of the trust and understanding which 
is an essential ingredient of friendship. Not all particulars are easily 
perceived by just about anyone, some are only noticeable from 
privileged positions like that of a friend. 
 It is important to note here that although salient particulars will 
change from one situation to another, so that for one friend it ’ s ice-
cream and Aretha Franklin, whereas for another it ’ s a pint of beer 
and The Red Hot Chilly Peppers, this does not mean that there is 
no one objectively correct answer. Ice-cream and Aretha Franklin 
are the right answer for this friend, at this time, in this situation and 
as offered by you and this is compatible with another answer being 
right for a different friend, at a different time and in a different 
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situation. There is one correct answer for each situation, but that 
one answer is not correct for all situations. 
 When virtue ethics rejects the appeal to rules it replaces it with 
the ideally virtuous agent, not so much with what he does, but 
rather with the kind of person he is and he is the kind of person 
who has the ability to perceive morally salient particulars. When 
we look to the ideally virtuous person, we look to the ability to 
perceive morally salient particulars and this is something that we 
can educate ourselves in over time and something we can learn 
from others even if they themselves are not ideally virtuous. This 
is because the ability to perceive morally salient particulars is 
situation-specific and it is plausible to assume that some people will 
be better in some situations and contexts than others, so the trick is 
to seek guidance and role models in those situations and contexts in 
which others are successful. What we are looking for is examples of 
how to be, rather than precise descriptions of what to do, so we can 
learn from how others get it right (and wrong) rather than merely 
copying what they are doing. 
 Now you may wonder whether you have received any real help 
with action guidance here. One possible objection is that this ability 
to perceive morally salient features is rather mysterious and it is only 
supported by an argument by analogy, that is, the analogy with sight. 
However, when it comes to sensations and experiences, arguments 
by analogy can work rather well. Consider the following account 
of pain in terms of sound:  ‘ My leg began to declare itself in a way 
that I can only describe in terms of sound; from a mute condition 
it began to murmur, then to moan and whine, then to scream ’ . 6 The 
author chooses to use sound to describe the pain to really engage 
the reader ’ s senses and move him to almost feel the pain himself. 
This strategy works on activating the reader ’ s imagination, putting 
him in the fictional character ’ s shoes, making him live through 
the experience, and it achieves this a lot better than simply saying 
 ‘ It hurt, it hurt a lot ’ ever would. By transferring the escalation 
of the sound to the idea that the pain increased, we get a more 
immediate and moving sense of what it felt to experience the pain. 
When philosophers claim that moral perception is like sight, they 
are inviting their readers to  ‘ see ’ situations in this particular way. 
This is why claims about moral perception are often accompanied 
by detailed examples of moral situations, often borrowed from 
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works of literature. A book affords the time and space to really 
develop the details of a case and authors have the skill to bring such 
details to life. The argument for moral perception is not merely an 
analogy but an invitation to immerse oneself into a particular way 
of thinking, to experience a situation in all its subtleties and share in 
a moral experience. The process of developing moral perception is a 
gradual one, subject to the right education and subject to exposing 
ourselves to the rights sorts of situations. 
 If at the end of all this, having immersed ourselves in particulars, 
we still find that moral disagreement is still very much present, we 
mustn ’ t despair  – after all Aristotle did warn us that the subject 
matter is complex and difficult, so perhaps we shouldn ’ t be surprised 
that coming up with answers may be a life-long project. 
 D. Practical wisdom 
 If moral perception allows the virtuous man to see what is required 
of him, practical wisdom, or prudence, shows him  why it is required 
of him. Virtue is a purposive disposition concerned with choice; 
choice involves both the right reasoning and the right desire, and 
practical wisdom is the ability to make virtuous choices. 
 Now the origin of action (the efficient, not the final cause) 
is choice, and the origin of choice is appetition [desire] and 
purposive reasoning [reasoning directed to some end]. Hence 
choice necessarily involves not only intellect and thought, but a 
certain moral state; for good conduct and its contrary necessarily 
involve thought and character. 7 
 Practical wisdom is not merely a theoretical capacity to reason 
about the noble and the good, but also a practical one to do what 
is noble and good because one both knows what is right and has 
a disposition to do what is right. It ’ s a capacity to see what is 
required by the noble and the good in terms of choice and action; 
the ability to both deliberate well and to act on that deliberation. To 
understand practical wisdom, we need to understand Aristotelian 
choice and how it brings together reason and the emotions. In what 
follows, we will consider the ideal case of the virtuous agent whose 
reason and emotions are in perfect harmony and flow effortlessly 
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into action. In Chapter 7, we will come back to this claim and 
consider what happens with those of us who are less than ideally 
virtuous and whose reason and desires are not in perfect harmony. 
However, before we consider how things can go wrong, we should 
understand the ideal case. 
 The question of the relation between reason and the emotions 
in general has a very rich philosophical history. Modern moral 
philosophy is greatly influenced by the Humean picture of reason 
and desire as being two separate elements of action. Reason provides 
information, for example, beer can be found at the pub, while desire 
provides motivation, for example, I want beer, which results in 
the action of going to the pub to drink beer. The influence of this 
Humean account is so great that even those who reject it still hold 
on to the idea that reason and desire are two separate elements of 
action. Interestingly enough, I think that Aristotle did not subscribe 
to this division. His account of reason and the emotions did not 
seem to start from the idea that they are separate, nor did he see 
only one element as (primarily) responsible for motivating action. 
To understand why that is, we need to consider how reason and 
desire operate in the virtuous person. 
 The virtuous person ’ s emotions are not emotions he happens 
to have but stable, reliable emotions, purposefully cultivated to go 
along with and support the demands of reason. His character traits 
are cultivated emotional sensitivities that have been developed 
 because of the sorts of dispositions that they are. He chooses to have 
particular emotions because they result in particular sensitivities, 
particular ways of seeing the world and particular ways of being 
motivated by it. And the way he sees the world is both emotional 
and rational, abilities that are intertwined and mutually dependent, 
rather than separate and at odds with each other. The process of 
gradual development from doing  ‘ the that ’ to understanding  ‘ the 
because ’ which we considered in Part I, is neither exclusively 
rational nor exclusively emotional. It ’ s a process that involves 
coming to fully appreciate the noble and the good, understanding 
and internalizing not just what we must do, but  why we must do it 
 because it is the right thing to do;  ‘ [t]his is why chosen actions are 
the best indicators of character  – because they embody, express, or 
reflect the agent ’ s conception of the good ’ . 8 The notion of  ‘ choice ’ 
ensures that a good action is not done merely coincidentally in 
accordance with the right reason, but rather that it embodies the 
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right reason, that it is done because of the right reason:  ‘ . . .  virtue 
is not merely a state in conformity with the right principle, but one 
that implies the right principle ’ . 9 
 The virtuous person does not have a neutral conception of facts, 
to which he adds a separate desire in order to result in action; 
rather, our approach rejects the view of the world as motivationally 
inert. The virtuous person ’ s conceptualization of the particular facts 
includes emotive and motivational aspects. The realization that 
 ‘ she is in pain ’ includes an emotional response to that pain and 
motivation to do something to alleviate the pain. The habituation 
required for virtue involves exactly this ability to see particulars 
in situations in a special light, that is, as constituting reasons for 
action and means that one cannot share a virtuous person ’ s way of 
seeing a situation without also sharing his reasons to act 10 ;  ‘ one ’ s 
detailed grasp of what is involved in acting virtuously, in acting for 
the  right reasons, is not separable from one ’ s grasp of what each of 
the virtues involves, and one ’ s grasp of that is not separable from 
possession of the virtues themselves ’ . 11 
 Aristotle understands choice as  ‘ rational desire ’ or  ‘ emotional 
reason ’ , without placing emphasis or priority on either reason 
or desire. And human beings are the union of reason and desire 
which results in action. We are judged by our choices, by how our 
reasoning and our desires come together to produce action, and the 
choices of the ideally virtuous man proceed from the rational wish 
( boulesis ), which is a rational longing for the noble and the good. 
Practical wisdom then has a particular connection to virtue. Anyone 
can be clever in the sense of applying their intelligence to whatever 
ends they happen to want to achieve, but practical wisdom aims 
at the good. This means that although vicious people may exhibit 
what, to outsiders, may look like virtue, their behaviour is not really 
virtue as it doesn ’ t aim at the good. Imagine a burglar who steals for 
personal gain because of greed and laziness, but he accomplishes his 
burglaries with a lot of courage. He does not shy from dangerous 
situations, he remains cool under pressure but shows a prudent 
and controlled amount of fear, etc., all of which looks a lot like the 
virtue of courage. If this were indeed the virtue of courage, we would 
have a problem here as we would have a vicious person displaying 
virtue in the pursuit of vicious ends. However, this isn ’ t really the 
virtue of courage as it does not aim at the good. Many people can 
display appropriate reactions to fear, which look like the virtue of 
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courage, but unless they are aimed at the right ends, these displays are 
mere mockeries of virtue. This false courage bears the same relation 
to the virtue of courage as a shadow bears to the woman who casts 
it; both are monochrome, flat renditions of the original. Practical 
wisdom is the ability which distinguishes what kinds of fears one 
should aim to face, so that facing one ’ s fear in a pursuit of a just 
cause, the virtue of courage, is distinguished from facing one ’ s fear in 
pursuit of personal gain and self-indulgent pleasure, false courage. 
 Since practical wisdom is a disposition to make correct emotional 
judgements in choices relating to the noble and the good, it underlies 
all the virtues and unites them in the sense that it gives us a unified 
view to our lives as a whole. If kindness is the disposition to respond 
kindly to situations which require kindness, one cannot be kind 
unless one has a correct conception of all sorts of other virtues 
like fairness, loyalty, trustworthiness, etc., all of which may also be 
relevant in different situations. Since all the virtues may be present 
in all sorts of combinations in different situations, being sensitive 
to virtue in one respect must also involve being sensitive to virtue 
in all other respects. 
 It is also important to note that practical wisdom does not 
provide a blueprint or application guide for specific situations that 
is then applied top down when one comes across a problem. Rather, 
practical wisdom contains a conception of the noble and the good 
which is to be found in the specifics of situations; practical wisdom 
gives one a conception of what it means to live a eudaimon life, but 
part of this is the propensity to put that end into practice as required 
by particular circumstances. And the way to practical wisdom is 
through habituation and action:  ‘ Someone who has been properly 
brought up has been habituated into seeing the appropriate actions 
as worth going in for in the specific way that is expressed by bringing 
them under the concept of the noble ’ . 12  ‘ Going in for ’ in this quote 
means not just merely doing, but choosing, choosing knowingly 
and choosing for their own sake. So habituation, becoming just 
by performing just acts, imparts to the agent both a conceptual 
understanding of why the noble and the good should be chosen for 
their own sake and the emotional maturity to make these choices. 
 The result of habituation is a motivational tendency, but one 
with a conceptual and hence rational aspect. People with a 
properly formed character have learned to see certain actions as 
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worth undertaking on the ground that they are noble; they have 
acquired that reason-giving concept, on a way that is inextricably 
bound up with acquiring the propensity to be motivated by 
thoughts in which it is applied. 13 
 Having considered the Aristotelian definition of virtue, we should 
now return to the role of teleology in Aristotle ’ s function argument, 
a question we suspended at the time in Chapter 4 Section C, but 
should consider in fuller detail now. 
 Further readings 
 There are numerous discussions of the role of the virtuous agent 
in virtue ethics. Russell, 2009, Chapter 4, section 1, has a good 
summary with references of the main commentators who discuss 
the role of virtuous agent. The critical concerns with the role of the 
virtuous agent discussed in this chapter are raised more in-depth 
by Louden, in Statman, 1997, while Solomon in the same volume 
considers and replies to objections about the role of the virtuous 
agent and action guidance in virtue ethics. Hursthouse ’ s seminal 
paper, reprinted in Crisp and Slote, 1997, defends the argument 
that virtue ethics is no more and no less action guiding than other 
normative theories. 
 This chapter has been influenced in large part by a series of 
papers written either in response or inspired by each other. The first 
is David Wiggins ’ s, reprinted in Rorty 1980, where he first develops 
the notion of  ‘ situational appreciation ’ or  ‘ moral perception ’ 
in Aristotelian thought. This paper is closely followed by John 
McDowell ’ s 1978 paper written in reply to Philippa Foot ’ s 1972 
contribution. McDowell ’ s very influential arguments in this area are 
further developed in McDowell, 1979, and McDowell, in Engstrom 
and Whiting, 1996a. 
 For further discussions, see Annas, 1993, Chapter 2 develops 
excellent accounts of the Aristotelian virtuous person (section 5) 
and practical wisdom (section 3), as well as Hursthouse, 1999 
(Part 1 on the virtuous agent and action guidance and Part 2 on 
Aristotelian choice), while Korsgaard in Engstrom and Whiting, 
1996 develops an Aristotelian account of choice and it ’ s relation to 
the noble and the good. 
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 CHAPTER SIX 
 A naturalistic account 
of virtue 
 A. Teleology; a discredited account? 
 In Chapter 4, Section C above, we saw how Aristotle used the 
function argument to discover the good life (eudaimon life) for 
human beings. His answer was linked to what human beings are 
for  qua human beings, their distinctive characteristic, which turned 
out to be the ability to reason. A life lived in accordance to the 
dictates of reason is the life of virtue, so at that point we pushed 
on with that discussion to better understand the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ . 
Now we can return to the function argument and question what 
is involved in relying on a teleological account. In this section of 
the chapter, we will consider some of the objections and criticisms 
which led moral philosophers to be weary of teleological arguments, 
the next section will consider Aristotle ’ s account of teleology and 
whether it is indeed vulnerable to these objections, while Section 
C will consider the Aristotelian answer to the problem of moral 
luck and Section D will look at how modern virtue ethicists, 
Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa Foot, have developed versions 
of teleological arguments. 
 Just before we move on to examine the critiques of teleology, we 
should take one moment to consider in a bit more detail what is 
involved in making a teleological claim. Suppose we were to seek 
to understand the nature of  ‘ chairs ’ in a teleological manner, we 
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would need to ask  ‘ what is characteristic of chairs? ’ Chairs can be 
made of many different materials, they can be made of wood, or 
plastic or leather, etc., they come in many different sizes, styles and 
shapes, some have arms, others do not, many have four legs but 
it is possible to have a chair with three legs and so on. So neither 
material, size or other physical descriptions seem to capture what is 
 essential about the concept of a  ‘ chair ’ but nonetheless a plastic, self-
assembly, kitchen chair still has something essentially in common 
with a leather and wood, hand-worked, antique living room chair. 
A better way of capturing what is characteristic of chairs is to ask 
what chairs are for. The answer is that chairs are for sitting on. Other 
objects may also be used for sitting on, for example, sofas, and at 
the same time chairs may be used for other purposes, for example, 
for standing on to reach high up, but fundamentally the purpose 
of a chair is to provide a functional place to sit on. What all chairs 
have in common is that their purpose is to serve as somewhere to sit 
and we understand the concept of a good chair in relation to how 
well it serves this function. A chair with a really small, and therefore 
uncomfortable, seating area would not be a good specimen of the 
kind under this description. While this account may work for chairs 
though, it ’ s not immediately clear that it works for human beings 
and nature in general. 
 One of the most important critiques of teleological arguments is 
that they are outdated and proven to be invalid by modern scientific 
advances. Teleological arguments focus on the existence of a  telos , 
an end, a final cause towards which nature is aiming, the scientific 
revolution however has brought with it a better understanding 
of nature according to which nature is not purposeful in this 
relevant sense. We have understood the natural world around us 
by abandoning the assumption that animals and other elements of 
nature aim at a particular final cause. A giraffe does not have a long 
neck because it is aiming, as a species, to elongate its neck, rather 
it has a long neck because of evolutionary reasons, for example, 
creatures with longer necks were at an evolutionary advantage 
in an environment which offered food at the top branches of tall 
trees. Bertrand Russell points out how teleology was abandoned as 
science found mechanistic questions about the causes of things such 
as  ‘ What caused giraffes to have long necks? ’ to yield much more 
useful answers in terms of scientific knowledge than teleological 
questions such as  ‘ What final purpose does the giraffe ’ s long neck 
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serve? ’ 1 Russell sees the Aristotelian understanding of nature as 
conceptually tied to the scientifically outdated idea of teleology. He 
interprets Aristotelian nature as aiming at a certain conclusion and 
as belonging  ‘ to the class of causes which operate for the sake of 
something ’ . 2 Evolutionary theory teaches us otherwise, nature does 
not have a purpose, what appears to be a matter of design is in 
fact a matter of change through inherited characteristics caused by 
environmental adaptation. Natural selection does not aim at a final 
purpose, rather it is an adaptive process in response to environmental 
factors and the notion of a  ‘ teleological nature ’ , nature with a 
purpose, an end, a final cause, is scientifically outdated. 
 One possible way out of these difficulties for teleology is to posit a 
creator. The teleological explanation of the function of chairs seems 
to work very well because there is a creator behind each chair who 
made it with its specific function, that is, to be sat upon, in mind. 
If we posit a creator behind the whole of nature, we can retain the 
idea of purpose, final cause or  telos for the natural order. Nature 
has a purpose because it was created for a purpose by a being that 
could imbue it with this purpose. The problem with this solution 
though is that its acceptance is conditional on the acceptance of 
the idea of the existence of a creator. As philosophers, we expect 
our arguments to have universal appeal and we expect moral views 
to be convincing to a broad audience; however, this strategy, while 
solving the problem of the apparent lack of purpose in nature, only 
does so by positing a being that gave nature its purpose. As a result 
it is only satisfactory as a view to those who accept the existence 
of this being in the first place and will fail to convince those who 
doubt the existence of such a being. 3 
 Another criticism of the Aristotelian account of teleology is that 
it is anthropocentric, that is, it places human beings in a privileged, 
central and controlling position in the natural world. Instead of 
conceiving humans as, perhaps equal but at the very least equally 
important, a part of the natural world, it conceives of them as the 
entity around which all others are organized. The natural world is 
there to serve our purposes, to aid us in fulfilling our ends, rather 
than having intrinsic value of its own. For example, David Sedley 
argues that for Aristotle since mother ’ s milk exists for the sake of 
her babies, then all food exists for the sake of the humans who 
consume it, which makes the purpose of all animals we eat, to be 
our nourishment, that is, they exist for us to eat them. 4 This makes 
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the existence and importance of the entire natural world conditional 
on serving our purposes. 
 A further concern with teleology accepts the general approach of 
the theory, but questions how we identify the purpose of an object 
or organism. For example, pigs can be eaten by humans or used to 
provide transplant organs for humans, so why not pick either of these 
two purposes as the final end of pigs rather than focusing on the 
pigs ’ individual survival and species continuation? Out of the three 
functions, continuation of the pig species, nutrition for humans or 
provision of organs for transplants for humans, which is the correct 
function for pigs and how can we pick one over the others? 5 
 Finally, to what is already a long list of concerns, we should add a 
series of criticisms that relate to the naturalistic aspect of teleology. 
These kinds of objections might apply to all theories that appeal 
to nature to give an account of morality. The criticism is that what 
occurs in nature is a matter of description, it is just what happens, 
rather than a matter of morality, that is, a question of what should 
happen, and we must not confuse what  is with what  should be . A 
description of how things are in nature does not answer normative 
questions about how we should behave. Consider, for example, the 
following natural fact: human beings are carnivorous. This is clearly 
true, humans are both able to eat animal meat and derive nutrition 
from doing so, but it doesn ’ t help with the normative question about 
whether we  should eat animal meat. Arguments for vegetarianism 
do not deny that we are naturally able to eat meat; rather they argue 
that we morally should not do so. So knowing what we naturally do 
doesn ’ t help with knowing what we should do. 
 Furthermore, naturalistic accounts of ethics make the mistake 
of thinking that what occurs in nature is by definition benign, 
welcome and something that we should not seek to alter by virtue 
of its being natural. Clearly, however, this can ’ t be true. Nature 
includes a good dose of cruelty, suffering and pain, all of which 
cannot be morally acceptable simply because they occur naturally. 
Finally, what is natural is often confused with what is statistically 
predominant;  ‘ normal ’ in a probabilistic sense of what is likely to 
occur, but surely statistics should not generate moral precepts. Just 
because something is what the majority happen to do, isn ’ t a good 
enough argument for what we should do. 6 As my mother used to 
say to me frequently when I was young  ‘ If everyone else jumped out 
of the window, would you follow suit?! ’ 
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 B. Aristotle on teleology 
 Having looked at the kinds of objections that led to the dismissal 
of teleological arguments from much of modern moral philosophy, 
we will now consider possible replies on behalf of teleology. First, 
we will consider how these objections may be addressed from an 
Aristotelian viewpoint by looking at interpretations of Aristotle ’ s 
own works which may give us replies to these concerns. Then, 
we will go on to consider how modern virtue ethicists, Rosalind 
Hursthouse and Philippa Foot, have redeveloped and progressed 
Aristotelian teleology. In between the two discussions, we will 
consider the Aristotelian response to the problem of moral luck, 
but more on this in the next section. 
 We will start our discussion in reverse order and consider first 
the arguments against naturalistic accounts of ethics. Suppose 
we seek an account of normativity independent of our nature in 
order to avoid the objections above, where would this account of 
normativity emerge from? We would have to give an account that 
had no connection to what we are like as a species, that is, that we 
are social animals, who care for their young, who are capable of 
empathy, etc. and such an account risks being entirely disconnected 
from the kind of beings that we are and the way we live our 
lives. While an exclusive reliance on how we are like naturally 
risks confusing descriptive facts with normative conclusions, a 
severe divorce between normativity and nature risks resulting in 
nonsensical conclusions that have no particular relevance for beings 
such as such. As a species that has normative concerns in the first 
place we are concerned with ethical questions exactly because of the 
kinds of beings that we are. While difficult to assert categorically, it 
does seem plausible that fish, for example, lack the specific ethical 
concerns of human beings, and therefore the good life for fish can 
be identified without reference to the ethical connections that both 
challenge and enrich the life of humans. To find out what the good 
life consists in for fish, we need to consider them as a species and 
the same goes for humans. To conceive of normativity as entirely 
separate and unaffected from what we are characteristically like 
as a species is to deprive us of an understanding of normativity  for 
people like us . 
 This account does not make the mistake of identifying the natural 
with the normative, but rather paints a picture of the normative as 
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deriving from the natural; therefore, what a species is naturally like 
will have an enormous impact on how we understand normativity 
for that species. Normativity is connected to our nature, and 
similarly we can draw on nature to understand what is involved in 
the good life for other species. 
 What is helpful for ethics from this kind of biological naturalism 
is that we find that the normativity of our ethical discourse is 
not something which emerges mysteriously with humans and can 
only be projected back, in an anthropomorphic way, onto trees 
and their roots. Rather, we find normativity in the realm of living 
things, plants and animals already. 7 
 The good life for humans will be determined in the same way that 
we determine the good life for fish or for pigs by asking what is the 
characteristic way of being for that species  qua species. What is the 
characteristic way of being for that species is not a statistical notion, 
but rather a teleological notion, one that considers the function 
of that species and what is involved in being a good specimen of 
that species. As such it is compatible with the idea that many 
 actual specimens of that species may fail to be  good specimens of 
the species. 
 So much for teleology and nature, we will now move on to 
considering how we could interpret Aristotle to counter the direct 
arguments against teleology. While teleological arguments are 
attributed primarily to Aristotle, these types of arguments were 
present and defended well before his time, and in many ways 
Aristotle sought to revise how previous teleological arguments 
should be understood. Aristotle ’ s predecessors often saw the use of 
goals and ends in nature as being brought about by a creator, but 
this is exactly the view of teleology that Aristotle sought to revise. 
 Aristotle ’ s radical alternative was to assert nature itself as an 
internal principle of change and an end, and his teleological 
explanations focus on the internal and intrinsic ends of natural 
substances  – those ends that benefit the natural thing itself. To 
these he contrasted incidental ends of natural things, such as 
possible uses of the thing that do not serve its own functions and 
interests. 8 
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 Aristotelian teleology rather than being a theory outdated by our 
modern scientific understanding of nature, dependent on an external 
creator to generate causes, is in fact remarkably compatible with 
modern accounts of nature. 
 Aristotle gives an account of organs and beings by considering 
what something is for in terms of how it benefits the survival of that 
kind and what is necessary in order to achieve this aim. Aristotle 
points out that the organs of different animals differ because different 
animals have different modes of life and motion and therefore have 
different requirements for living these lives. For example, eyelids 
are necessary for birds in order to keep the eyes moist, eyes that 
are moist lead to more accurate vision, which in turn is necessary 
for creatures that hunt their prey on the earth from miles above in 
the sky. Fish, on the other hand, live in water and therefore have no 
need for eyelids at all. 9 This teleological account does not rely on 
a creator who gave birds eyelids but rather explains the organ by 
reference to the intrinsic ends of this species ’ nature. 
 . . .  Aristotle ’ s explanations in this field (what we call ethology) 
conform to his general pronouncements that the activities of 
animals serve to support the primary functions of their souls, 
survival (nutrition and growth) and reproduction. In animals 
with greater capacities, the lower-level activities exist for the 
sake of the higher, such as perception, namely pleasure. 10 
 Rather than being inimical to modern, evolutionary accounts of 
nature, Aristotle ’ s teleology seems to foreshadow some of their 
more important insights. 
 Aristotle achieves this without placing humans at the centre of 
the natural stage and without making the ends of other species 
subsidiary to those of humans. The function of different organisms 
is the end that is intrinsic to that organism and cannot be an end 
which is instrumental to another organism. So while we can eat 
pigs and harvest their organs for our purposes, neither of these 
activities is the function of pigs  qua pigs, as they are both incidental 
functions to the pigs ’ nature.  ‘ . . .  that which is good in itself or 
by its own nature can only incidentally be good because of, or for 
the sake of something else ’ . 11 So, neither is Aristotelian teleology 
anthropocentric nor is there confusion in deciding which of the 
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many different, possible functions of an organism is the organism ’ s 
natural function. While it is possible to put organisms to other uses, 
their function is what is intrinsic to their own nature; it is derived 
from what the organism is like in itself. 12 
 C. Moral luck 
 For Aristotle, the relationship between normativity and nature is not 
one of complete determination. As we saw previously, the function 
of humans is reason, so our ability to reason shapes and determines 
what the good life is for us. However, at the same time, our nature 
imposes some constraints on what is possible. Morality is neither 
entirely determined by our natures nor can it wholly escape our 
natures and operate in complete separation from what is natural for 
us  qua human beings. Consider, for example, the consequentialist 
demand for impartial benevolence, the demand that one accept the 
claims of competing drowning babies equally, with no special weight 
to the fact that one of these babies is your child. The virtue ethicist 
would respond here that the demand for impartial benevolence 
frustrates natural human instincts to care for our own children. 13 
These instincts exist for a good reason because they promote the 
survival of our species, and trying to overcome them would be both 
futile and counter-productive as it would lead to conceptions of 
moral demands that are at odds with what we are essentially like 
as a natural kind. Naturally, we are social creatures who benefit 
from contact with others of our species, naturally we feel empathy 
and concern towards others of our species and naturally we have 
strong protective instincts towards our own young. Our account of 
morality must embrace these facts about our nature or risk being 
irreparably distorted. 
 One consequence of these ideas is that the good life for human 
beings is therefore constrained by facts about our nature; we are 
naturally social animals so we have need of others to flourish, 
goods like friendship become essential to the good life, we have 
strong bonds to our children so we need our children to do well 
and be happy otherwise our well-being is severely affected, we have 
aims and goals so we need these aims and goals to not be affected 
by chronic pain, severe illnesses or life-shortening problems and 
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so on. All this means that the good life for human beings is very 
vulnerable to luck and gives the Aristotelian a different perspective 
on the problem of moral luck. 
 The problem of moral luck was introduced to moral philosophy 
in its present form by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel. To 
understand moral luck, we need to think a bit about the relationship 
between morality and responsibility. Imagine that Ava punches 
Stephen, fully intending to cause him harm. She decides to punch 
him, forms a plan on how to go about it and carries out her plan 
successfully. In such a scenario, we would want to hold Ava morally 
responsible for what she has done. Imagine, however, a different 
scenario in which Ava gives Stephen an identical punch, causing him 
exactly the same amount of pain and harm, but this time she does so 
because she suffers from Tourette ’ s syndrome. Due to her condition 
Ava is subject to uncontrollable arm movements and Stephen, who 
does not know this, comes up to her from behind so that he is 
inadvertently punched by one of her flaying arms. While the pain 
and harm caused in both scenarios is identical, it seems inappropriate 
to hold Ava  morally responsible for her action in the second case. 
Although she is clearly causally responsible for Stephen ’ s pain, the 
fact that she had no control over her actions, would, all other things 
being equal, absolve her of  moral responsibility for them. That is, 
in the second case, we wouldn ’ t want to blame her for what she did 
as we do not hold her responsible in the relevant way. These two 
scenarios bring out the connection between morality and control, 
that is, we generally only hold people morally responsible for acts 
that they had control over. Making judgements of responsibility, 
judgements of moral praise and blame, presupposes agency and 
voluntariness, that is, that this act originated in the agent in a way 
in which it is an expression of his agency. The problem of moral 
luck challenges this assumption about the necessary connection 
between morality, control and responsibility. 
 Cases of moral luck are paradoxical, they are cases where a 
significant element of the situation is outside of the agent ’ s control; 
however, we still want to hold him morally responsible for it. 14 So 
we have lack of control as in the Tourette ’ s case, which normally 
leads to absolving the agent of moral responsibility, but at the same 
time we still want to attribute moral praise or blame. Cases of 
moral luck then are cases of tension, unease, cases where we are 
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not entirely certain that our judgements are merited. The problem 
of moral luck is best illustrated by example and the examples below 
correspond to the three kinds of moral luck identified by Nagel: 
 1 Two drivers go to their local pub fully intending to drink 
and not having made any alternative arrangements about 
how they will get home at the end of the night. They both 
get drunk and then drive home. Because they are drunk 
they both lose control of their vehicles and swerve onto 
the pavement; however, one is lucky in that there is no one 
about, he manages to swerve back onto the road and makes 
it home safely. The other drunk driver is less lucky; when 
he swerves onto the pavement, he hits and kills a pedestrian 
who happened to be there. This is a case of  resultant moral 
luck , that is the results of one ’ s actions are outside of the 
agent ’ s control (whether there was one pedestrian, two 
pedestrians, a group of children or no one at all on the 
pavement at the time the car swerved onto it was not under 
the driver ’ s control) but we still want to hold him morally 
responsible for what he did, that is, killed a pedestrian. 
 2 A German citizen decides to immigrate to Argentina in 1930 
and as a result never has to face a difficult moral choice: had 
he stayed in Germany, would he have had the strength of 
character to stand up to the Nazis? Would he have been able 
to resist the peer pressure to conform to the ruling regime, 
would he have been able to stand up to the threats against 
non-conformists and speak out against a terrible evil? We 
will never know because he simply bypassed the entire 
moral test because he had already immigrated. Millions of 
fellow Germans failed the same test and responded with 
complicity and silence to the evils perpetrated by the Nazis, 
but perhaps the only thing that separates our immigrant 
from his fellow countrymen is his good luck in being in 
another country where he did not have to face the same 
moral test.  Situational moral luck refers to the kinds of 
situations we come across which are outside our control 
but may still shape our characters, put us under pressure or 
tempt us to act immorally: 
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 What we do is also limited by the opportunities and 
choices with which we are faced, and these are largely 
determined by factors beyond our control. Someone who 
was an officer in a concentration camp might have lead 
a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to 
power in Germany. And someone might have become 
an officer in a concentration camp if he had not left 
Germany for business reasons in 1930. 15 
 3 Finally  constitutive moral luck refers to the fact that who 
we are, the kinds of people we are including our natural 
inclinations, capacities and temperament are all out of our 
control but we are still praised for being kind and blamed 
for being cruel. We have no control over our natures, the 
fundamental strengths and weaknesses we are born with, 
but these go a long way towards shaping who we become. 
 These examples show how moral luck is an oxymoronic term, 
morality presupposes control, whereas luck is about lack of control 
and cases of moral luck are problematic because they bring the two 
together. There is a tension in all cases of moral luck. There is unease 
that the lucky drunk driver gets away without repercussions, there 
is a feeling of unfairness in the judgement of wrongdoing levelled 
against the German citizens who failed a test any of us would have 
also failed had we had to face it, there is an unease with the idea 
that we hold people morally responsible for natural tendencies that 
they merely had the good or bad luck to be born with. The problem 
of moral luck is characterized as a problem because it leaves us 
feeling that something should be done to either make the problem 
disappear or revise our judgements in light of it. 
 There are a number of possible responses to the problem of 
moral luck. As we saw in Part I, the Kantian emphasis on the purity 
of morality would mean that a Kantian would reject altogether 
the possibility of moral luck. He would base judgements of moral 
responsibility solely on the good will and not on its results, and he 
would expect the good will to overcome situational and constitutive 
factors. The good will is good without any qualifications, so the two 
drunken drivers are equally guilty for driving drunk and endangering 
the lives of others regardless of whether they hurt anyone or not, 
orienting oneself towards the moral law is a possibility at all times 
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for all German citizens regardless of what moral tests they actually 
face and acting out of duty is a possibility for all of us regardless of 
our backgrounds. 
 The Aristotelian has a completely different approach to the 
problem of moral luck; it ’ s less of a problem and more of a part 
of the human experience. Luck is part of the human condition, we 
are shaped by our nature and our development is affected by our 
environments. We cannot escape luck, but nor should we want to 
because luck is part of the human condition: 
 That I am an agent, but also a plant; that much that I did not 
make goes towards making me whatever I shall be praised or 
blamed for being; that I must constantly choose among competing 
and apparently incommensurable goods and that circumstances 
may force me to a position in which I cannot help being false 
to something or doing some wrong that an event that simply 
happens to me may, without my consent, alter my life; that is 
equally problematic to entrust one ’ s good to friends, lovers or 
country and to try to have a good life without them  – all these I 
take to be not just the material of tragedy but everyday facts of 
lived practical reason. 16 
 Reason must choose virtue, do so knowingly and do it for the 
sake of virtue, but that does not mean that reason has free reign 
irrespective of external influences. The moral life is like a delicate 
plant that requires care, favourable weather conditions, the right 
nutrients, etc. to flourish, but can be cut down by a storm, a drought 
or the wrong type of soil. Aristotle gives us the example of Priam, 
the legendary king of Troy, whose army is defeated, whose city is 
sacked, whose sons are killed and whose life is ruined through the 
loss of all the external goods that are necessary for the good life. 
Priam is less eudaimon because, through extreme bad luck, he has 
lost the ingredients necessary for the good life. The function of 
Priam ’ s life was to govern and the loss of all these external goods 
means that he can no longer act virtuously at all, so luck has put an 
end to his eudaimonia. Virtue is a state of being expressed in action 
and while being prevented from acting once or twice has no effect 
on one ’ s virtue, being entirely deprived of all the means for virtuous 
action does affect one ’ s ability to be virtuous. 
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 Constitutive and situational luck are embraced by Aristotelians. 
We are delicate creatures that lead fragile lives, in that our happiness 
cannot be guaranteed as it is situated in who we are and the world 
we live in. We have to accept that becoming moral is a sensitive 
enterprise, one that is vulnerable to all sorts of contingencies. There 
is unfairness in the way luck affects our lives, but a moral theory 
that can accommodate this offers a much more plausible picture 
of the kinds of lives beings like us live, than one which seeks to 
deny the influence of luck and tries to make us immune to all sorts 
of empirical factors that go towards making us who we are. The 
problem of moral luck is no longer a problem, but a correct account 
of what life is like for creatures like us. 
 Having said that, for Aristotle, reason plays a part in the moral 
life, so the drunk driver should have planned other options for 
getting home before he got drunk and in not doing so he displays the 
vice of callousness regardless of whether he actually killed anyone 
or not later on, but at the same time reason is not all powerful. Our 
natural constitutions, our environments, our family and friends play 
a huge role in who we become, but we have little or no control over 
such factors. This means that while situational and constitutive luck 
greatly influence our lives, resultant luck is less of a concern for the 
Aristotelian as agents are judged on their characters, not on the 
actions that proceed from them. We will return to these ideas in 
Chapter 7 when we consider the problem of weakness of the will, 
but for now we must conclude our discussion of teleology. 
 D. Hursthouse and Foot on teleology 
 Finally in this chapter on teleology, we will look at how modern 
virtue ethicists have developed naturalistic teleology beyond 
Aristotle ’ s ideas. Hursthouse and Foot work very much in the same 
tradition and credit each other with inspiration, although Foot ’ s 
naturalism is perhaps more radical than Hursthouse ’ s. 
 According to Hursthouse, certain character traits are virtues 
because they make their possessor a good human being, a notion 
which is understood in terms of  ‘ human nature, on what is involved 
in being good  qua human being ’ . 17 The virtuous man recognizes 
the good life; however, what makes it the good life is not that it has 
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been recognized by the virtuous man but rather because of the way 
it relates to human nature. Similarly, a good action and one ’ s reasons 
for acting are not defined by what a virtuous person would do and 
his reasons but rather because they have a particular relationship 
to a naturalistic conception of flourishing. In this way, Hursthouse 
bypasses many of the objections we considered earlier on about the 
over-reliance of virtue ethics on the role of the virtuous person. 18 
 As one would expect of a naturalistic account, what she has 
to say about humans is very similar to what she has to say about 
animals. All living things can be evaluated in the same way, that is, 
 qua specimens of their natural kind. The more sophisticated animals 
can be evaluated with respect to four ends: individual survival, the 
continuance of the species, characteristic pleasure/freedom from pain 
and the good functioning of a social group. Exactly the same can be 
said of human beings, since we are part of the natural world as much 
as other animals; however, a significant addition in the human case 
is that our characteristic way of being 19 is the rational way. Humans 
are not merely pawns of nature, entirely determined by their natural 
constraints, but rather we are rational creatures, a fact which allows 
us to make choices and be held accountable for them. 
 The relationship between nature and reason though is different 
in Hursthouse than in Aristotle. Where for Aristotle nature it a 
constraint that could occasionally frustrate reason, for Hursthouse 
nature provides the raw materials that reason can shape into its 
own purpose. This is a stronger version of the role of reason and 
its ability to influence our human natures, but still a naturalistic 
account, one which looks to evaluate humans as part of the natural 
order. Rationality itself is the natural way of being for humans, 
not a statistical notion, but a normative one,  ‘ . . .  our rationality 
makes us different from other living things, but is as much a natural 
fact about us and the world we live in as are facts about other 
species, and about us insofar as we are like them and our lives like 
theirs ’ . 20 
 The other relevant point about Hursthouse ’ s conception of 
rationality is that it allows for a wide and general account of the 
eudaimon life. There isn ’ t just one, determinate and specific way 
to lead a flourishing life, rather we can each reason about what 
consists in the good life for us in our specific circumstances. The 
answer to what kind of life I should lead is an objective one but it 
is qualified in two ways: first it is contingent on facts about human 
Virtue Ethics.indb   94 7/12/2012   11:51:38 AM
A NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF VIRTUE 95
nature and second it allows for different conceptions of the good 
life for different people in different circumstances. 
 Hursthouse ’ s naturalism seeks to bridge the plausibility of a 
theory based on what we are like  qua members of our species, with a 
robust conception of rationality that allows us to critically reflect on 
our choices. One of the concerns however with this account is why 
do we then come across so many humans who appear to be defective 
members of the species, that is, who fail to follow the dictates of 
rationality as based on our human nature? Why do most humans fail 
to act in accordance with the species ’ characteristic way of being? 
This is problematic both in terms of what other living creatures do  – 
for example, wolves are not inundated with members who refuse to 
share the hunt with the pack, who fail to accept the pack hierarchy, 
who are defective as specimens of the species  – as well as being 
problematic conceptually, for we would expect to see a preponderance 
of humans behaving in the way that is characteristic of the species. 
Either rationality is a natural characteristic of humans, but we would 
then expect to find most specimens of the kind conforming to the 
characteristic, or rationality is a normative concept which does not 
necessarily reflect the way people are and is therefore divorced from 
the naturalism that Hursthouse finds so attractive. 
 Foot also presents a naturalistic account of morality, similarly 
seeing virtues as those traits that enable human being to flourish and 
understanding what is involved in flourishing by reference to our 
particular natures as members of a natural kind. However, she also 
sees the virtues as traits that we  need in order to fulfil our natural 
function;  ‘ Anyone who thinks about it can see that for human beings 
the teaching and following of morality is something necessary. We 
can ’ t get on without it ’ . 21 Virtues are necessary for human beings 
in the same way that other characteristics are necessary and other 
animals;  ‘ Men need the virtues as bees need their stings ’ , 22 Geach 
writes in the same vain as Foot. We need morality to function 
as human beings and this claim is based on what we are like as 
members of a natural kind. 
 The virtues are not only necessary for humans but also beneficial 
for their possessor: 
 It seems clear that the virtues are, in some general way, beneficial. 
Humans do not get on very well without them. Nobody can get 
on well if he lacks courage, and does not have some measure 
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of temperance and wisdom, while communities where justice 
and charity are lacking are apt to be wretched places to live, as 
Russia was under Stalinist terror, or Sicily under the Mafia. 23 
 The virtues are not merely instrumental for living the good life, 
they are constitutive of it. We come to evaluate human lives in the 
same way we evaluate animal and plant lives. When we apply the 
term  ‘ good ’ to a human disposition, we are using it in the same way 
we apply the term  ‘ good ’ to a root system. In the same way that 
a good root system is strong, robust and successful in providing 
nutrients to the tree, a good disposition is beneficial to the human 
who possesses it. What it is like to be a good human being derives 
from biological facts about what it is to be a human being. 
 One of the main problems with Foot ’ s account is that it may be 
losing its grip on normativity. She establishes such a close connection 
between goodness and facts about our biological and zoological 
nature that it is unclear where the normativity of morality will 
emerge from. In a sense, this is a variant of the objection we saw 
above, namely that one cannot draw normative conclusions from 
descriptive facts. Moral facts have a feature that natural facts do 
not, that is, the force of morality, the power of the  ‘ ought ’ , and if we 
rely exclusively on natural facts, it is not clear how we will be able 
to draw normative conclusions. Humans look after their young, 
form social relations and mate for life; however, they also abuse 
their children, behave in antisocial ways and get divorced; which of 
these natural facts about the species should we focus on? It is not 
clear that behaving in antisocial ways is biologically inconsistent 
with being human, although we would still want to claim that it 
is immoral and wrong  – on Foot ’ s account it ’ s not clear how we 
would be able to do so. 
 Further readings 
 Johnson, 2005 offers an excellent, detailed, book length account of 
the main objections against Aristotelian teleology and a superbly 
analytical defence against these objections on behalf of Aristotle. 
For critical accounts of teleology, see Kitcher, 1999 and Hull, in 
Hull and Ruse, 1998. For summary accounts of naturalism as an 
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approach to ethical theory, see Buckle, in Singer, 1991, or Sturgeon, 
in Copp, 2006, or the very detailed Lenman, 2009, online. 
 The problem of moral luck was first presented in its current 
form to modern moral philosophy in the papers by Williams, and 
by Nagel, both reprinted in Statman, 1993, which has an excellent 
introduction by Statman on the problem of moral luck. In the 
same volume, Andre gives an Aristotelian ’ s response to moral luck 
and for a book length discussion of Aristotle on moral luck see 
Athanassoulis, 2005. 
 Hursthouse ’ s thoughts on naturalism form Part III of her 1999 
book, while Foot ’ s work can be found in her 1977 and her 2001 
books. For a critical summary of the two theories, see Stohr and 
Wellman, 2002. 
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 CONCLUSION FOR 
PART TWO 
 The aim of this chapter has been to follow through the development 
of a particular kind on eudaimonistic virtue ethics. This is not the 
only version of virtue ethics in the literature but it is the one that has 
probably had the most impact in research in the area. Furthermore, 
not all authors discussed in these chapters would agree with all the 
interpretations as presented nor would they be willing to accept 
all the arguments, all the way through, as presented. Rather, this 
is an account of how a particular train of thought has developed 
because of the contributions of a variety of thinkers who have been 
influenced by each others ’ work. Fundamentally, this version of 
virtue ethics has its roots in Aristotle, although many of the ideas 
presented require the interpretation of original texts, while others 
take inspiration from Aristotelian ideas and develop them in new 
and novel directions. 
 We started off with an idea which has been fundamental in 
distinguishing virtue ethics from deontology and consequentialism, 
namely that the concept of  ‘ virtue ’ has a primary role in virtue ethics. 
This was captured by two thoughts: that moral praise and blame 
are appropriate judgements of the agent ’ s character and that the 
virtues are linked to human nature. We considered how praise for 
true virtue is only appropriate for actions that are chosen, chosen 
knowingly and chosen for their own sake, rather than actions that 
come about as a result of accidents, mistakes or non-virtue related 
motives. 
 We then looked at a detailed definition of virtue starting with 
Aristotle ’ s function argument, that is, the argument that in order 
to find out the good life for human beings, we should ask what 
human beings are for, what is their function  qua human beings. 
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The function of humans turns out to be the ability to reason and 
the good life is the life in accordance with reason, that is, the life of 
virtue. Much of our understanding of virtue rested on the Doctrine 
of the Mean as a doctrine of appropriateness. The Doctrine suggests 
that feelings are parts of choices and actions, and must be displayed 
in the right amount, neither too much nor too little, but just right. 
The right amount of feeling to be displayed in virtue is relative to 
the individual and the circumstances and so cannot be known in 
advance of knowing the particulars of the situation. 
 Following on, we considered the role of the virtuous person 
and acknowledged a number of difficulties with the idea that we 
should apply directly to the virtuous person as a guide to virtue. 
Rather what we should take from the virtuous person is his ability 
to perceive the morally salient particulars of a situation and to 
apply practical wisdom to their evaluation. Both are abilities that 
take time and effort to develop, form part of the long process of 
Aristotelian character development, and both are abilities that 
involve intertwined reasoning and affective skills. 
 Finally, we returned to question the validity of the teleological 
approach, examining some of the criticisms that had led to its 
abandonment by modern moral philosophers, but then went on to 
offer possible replies to these problems through a reinterpretation of 
Aristotle. As part of this discussion, we considered the Aristotelian 
response to the problem of moral luck, seeing it less as a problem 
and more as a valuable part of the human experience. To conclude, 
we considered two new versions of naturalistic teleology to be found 
in the work of virtue ethicists Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa 
Foot. 
 In Part III, we will cast a forward-looking glance at the future 
of virtue ethics. In Chapter 7, we will consider the virtue ethical 
response to the challenge presented by personality psychology 
and in doing so will try to account for why most people fail to 
be virtuous. In Chapter 8, we will look at some practical issues 
concerning professional education in the virtues. And finally in 
Chapter 9, we will consider how neo-Kantians have responded to 
the arguments put forward by virtue ethicists and how this dialogue 
has served to redefine both theories. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 The challenge from 
personality psychology 
 A. The fundamental attribution error 
 In Part I of this volume, we looked at the work of a number of 
philosophers who were dissatisfied with the available options in 
modern moral philosophy and called for a radical change in the 
way we understand normative theories. The result was a group of 
theories that conceive of  ‘ virtue ’ and  ‘ character ’ as primary in their 
accounts of ethics. In Part II of this volume, we followed a particular 
train of thought that has developed into eudaimonistic virtue ethics. 
We saw how this approach has its routes in Aristotle ’ s ethics, but 
also how new interpretations and new elements have been added 
in response to modern objections. In Part III, we will now consider 
current developments in virtue ethics and examine three distinct areas 
of interest. In this chapter, we will examine the challenge posed to 
virtue ethics from personality psychology 1 and, in responding to this 
challenge, we will get a better understanding of the practical impact 
of virtue ethics for people like us rather than for idealized perfectly 
virtuous agents. In Chapter 8, we will consider a practical issue: how 
should we go about educating for the virtues in the professions? 
Some professions, for example medicine, have a particular interest 
in instructing their students in the virtues and in this chapter we will 
consider practical problems with and solutions for educating for the 
virtues. Finally, in Chapter 9, we will look at how Kantians have 
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responded to the criticisms levelled against their theory by virtue 
ethics, and how these responses have shaped the debate between the 
two alternatives. However, first we must see whether virtue ethics can 
meet the challenge from personality psychology. 
 Right at the start of the new millennium, just as virtue ethics was 
generally acknowledged as a viable alternative to other normative 
theories, two philosophers, Gilbert Harman and John Doris, came 
up, independently, with versions of an argument which claimed 
that empirical work from personality psychology showed that the 
conception of character which plays such a central role in virtue 
ethics simply does not exist in the case of Harman, or is fatally flawed 
in the case of Doris. We will examine the argument in detail and 
how it was presented slightly differently by the two philosophers, 
but fundamentally the claim is that philosophy as a discipline has 
been unaware of work that has taken place in another discipline, 
personality psychology, and that empirical results from personality 
psychology prove that there are no such things as character traits. If 
there are no such things as character traits, then ethical theories that 
rely on them to make sense of morality, most importantly virtue 
ethics, are in deep trouble as they rely on concepts that do not in 
fact exist. If true, this is an extremely serious challenge to virtue 
ethics as well as any other theory that relies on the concepts of 
 ‘ character ’ or  ‘ virtue ’ . 
 In this section, we will look at the challenge in detail, as presented 
by both Harman and Doris. In the next section, we will reconsider 
the empirical evidence the challenge relies on, suggesting that 
perhaps the evidence is less supportive of Harman ’ s and Doris ’ s 
cases than it would at first appear. In Section C, we will examine 
the main response from the virtue ethical camp, namely that the 
issue here is not the non-existence of character traits but their 
misidentification and the sensitivity of character development to 
situational factors. Finally in Section D, I will suggest that rather 
than posing a challenge to virtue ethics, evidence from personality 
psychology can be a rich ground for further philosophical reflection 
and is very much compatible with other virtue ethical claims. 
 Gilbert Harman ’ s case against virtue ethics is a comprehensive 
one: 
 It seems that ordinary attributions of character traits to people are 
often deeply misguided and it may even be the case that there is 
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no such thing as character, no ordinary character traits of the sort 
people think there are, none of the usual moral virtues and vices. 2 
 This conclusion comes from a mistake we make called the funda-
mental attribution error. We tend to make all sorts of mistakes in our 
everyday reasoning. Faced with a fair coin that has come up heads 
five times in a row most people expect the sixth throw to produce 
tails as that result is  ‘ overdue ’ (in fact, the chance of coming up tails 
remains the same as every other toss, 50:50). When assessing the 
risks of a surgery, we are more likely to go ahead if presented with 
the success rate rather than the failure rate (even though knowing 
one provides information about the other). In the M ü ller-Lyer optical 
illusion, two horizontal lines are identical in length but one appears 
much longer because of the direction the arrows point to at either 
end of the line. The lines continue to appear different to us even 
when we know they are the same length. If we make mistakes when 
we reason about risk or probabilities and even mistakes when faced 
with known optical illusions, perhaps we also make mistakes with 
how we think about other people ’ s characters and that mistake is 
the fundamental attribution error. When we make the fundamental 
attribution error we attribute to others character traits that they 
don ’ t actually have in the same way that we mistakenly assume 
that the coin is due to come up tails or assume that the success rate 
represents less of a risk than the failure rate. 
 We will consider two of the most famous experiments in 
personality psychology: first the Milgram experiments and then the 
Good Samaritan experiment. Imagine Adam and Bob both volunteer 
to take part in an experiment about learning and how pain affects 
one ’ s ability to get the answer right. Adam is the  ‘ questioner ’ , he 
asks a series of questions which Bob has to answer. If Bob gets 
the answer right, Adam moves onto the next one, however if 
Bob gets the answer wrong, Adam administers an electric shock 
which gets progressively stronger. Bob is strapped in to the electric 
shock machine next door, but Adam can see him through a mirror. 
Unfortunately, Bob is not very good at this test and keeps getting 
the answers wrong. Adam keeps shocking him, but as the level of 
the shocks increases Bob becomes increasingly uncomfortable, then 
vocal and unhappy about the experiment, then apparently more 
and more in pain. Adam is encouraged to continue shocking Bob 
by the experimenter who is also present in the room. However, this 
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experiment is a trick, it is a trick played on Adam. Bob is not a 
volunteer, but an actor, he is not receiving electric shocks; he is merely 
pretending to be in pain. This is not an experiment about learning 
rather it is a test to see how far Adam is willing to go on shocking 
Bob just because he is told he must do so by the experimenter. 
 The experiment was designed with the after effects of the 
World War II in mind. During the Nuremburg trials, a number 
of defendants argued that what they did in torturing and killing 
millions of prisoners might have been wrong but they were 
absolved of responsibility for it because they were simply following 
orders. The Courts rejected this defence on the grounds that we 
ought to stand up to authority and refuse to do things we know 
are morally abhorrent. The Courts assumed that simply being told 
by someone in authority to do something immoral is no excuse 
for obedience and most people would know this and refuse. The 
Milgram experiments were set up to confirm this conclusion, that 
is, that most people would refuse to act immorally simply because 
they were told to, but in fact the experiments seem to prove the 
opposite. While 100% of people predicted in advance that they 
would refuse to obey authority in situations in which they were 
ordered to act immorally, only 40% in fact stopped shocking Bob. 
Up to 60% of people in Adam ’ s position were willing to continue 
shocking Bob even when he was in very evident distress, and even 
when the electric shock machine dials indicated he was receiving 
a shock capable of causing serious harm or death. Participants 
were far more willing to continue shocking when encouraged to 
do so by someone in authority, and their behaviour was affected by 
surprising factors, for example, whether the experimenter was male 
or female, wearing a white coat or not, and carrying a clip board or 
not (as it turns out, white coat wearing, clip board carrying males 
are perceived as the most authoritative). 
 While the Milgram experiments tempt subjects to act immorally 
by getting someone in authority to prompt them to do so, the Good 
Samaritan experiment places subjects under pressure in a situation 
where inaction is immoral. In the Good Samaritan experiment, 
students training to become priests are asked to prepare a lecture 
on the Biblical Good Samaritan parable (the Good Samaritan being 
the only person who stopped to help a stranger in need while others 
walked on by). The students are told that they are running late and 
asked to hurry to the lecture theatre. On the way to the lecture 
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theatre they come across a person who appears to be in some kind 
of distress at the side of the road. This time the injured person is 
the actor and is placed there to see whether the rushing students 
will stop and  be the Good Samaritan or continue on their way to 
merely  talk about the Good Samaritan. Again, the large majority of 
students failed to stop and help. 
 According to Harman, these experiments show that although 
we assume that we and other people are kind and helpful, we are 
mistaken, we attribute to ourselves and to others character traits 
that in fact do not exist  – we make the fundamental attribution 
error. 
 Doris ’ s 3 argument is different from Harman ’ s but has similar 
conclusions, namely that behavioural reliability (i.e. stable character 
traits that result in reliable behaviours), which is central to the 
theoretical understanding of virtue ethics, is not backed up by 
the empirical observation of behaviour undertaken in personality 
psychology. Doris points out that virtue ethics postulates the 
existence of structured, reliable behaviours, that is, character traits 
that are stable, predictable and exhibited over time; however, this 
is not the case in practice. Doris does not go as far as Harman in 
doubting the very existence of character traits, but he does claim that 
the empirical evidence argues against the Aristotelian conception of 
character traits as robust dispositions. Doris ’ argument has four 
lines of attack. First, he argues that differences in behaviour in 
a population are the result of situational differences rather than 
dispositional differences as virtue ethics would have us believe; it ’ s 
not our characters that differ but the situations we come across. So, 
for example, the reason why A behaved dishonestly at time t, was 
because he was tempted by the presence of the loose change rather 
than because he is dishonest as opposed to the honest majority; 
honesty and dishonesty do not exist as character traits. Second, even 
when behaviour does appear reliable, this can easily be challenged 
by introducing situational variation. Ultimately, behaviour may only 
appear reliable because situations and contexts tend to be similar, 
so we all tend to come across the same situations and therefore 
appear to have stable responses to them. Third, individuals are not 
evaluatively consistent, for example, some Nazis exhibited both 
brutality towards certain people and at the same time compassion 
towards other people or towards animals, so they were both brutal 
and kind at different times. Finally, Doris points out that people 
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possess many more traits than those traditionally identified by some 
virtue ethicists (including Aristotle himself). 4 Fatally for a theory 
which claims to put forward a more plausible conception of moral 
psychology than its rivals, virtue ethics seems to ignore the findings 
of personality psychology. 
 This is the case against virtue ethics. In the following section, we 
will cast a critical look at the evidence that gives rise to the objection, 
while in Sections C and D, we will consider whether virtue ethics 
can in fact accommodate the conclusions of personality psychology 
rather than be challenged by them. 
 B. Reconsidering the empirical evidence 
 I am not an expert in personality psychology, but if the conclusions 
of another discipline are to be applied to philosophy, then there 
is some obligation on philosophers to become familiar with these 
conclusions in their entirety, by which I mean that we should be 
familiar with all discussions of these conclusions in the other 
discipline and not merely the ones that appear to support our case. 
So what is personality psychology, what do the experiments show 
and how should their conclusions be interpreted? 
 Personality psychology is the study of individuality. It concerns 
itself with processes in individuals which are responsible for resulting 
behaviour. The study of personality relies on measurements of 
behaviours, such as correlations between different characteristics. 5 A 
significant area of debate in personality psychology has focused over 
the question of the existence of traits. The once dominant approach 
of assuming that dispositions are fundamental to personality has 
been challenged by a series of experiments. 6 Unfortunately, the 
experiments providing this empirical data are limited, as, by their 
very nature, they are problematic. It is essential to these experiments 
that the subject is deceived as to the true aim of the exercise (and, 
as an aside, because of this they raise serious ethical questions 
concerning the permissibility of conducting research without valid 
consent, concerning the risks of exposing subjects to gravely stressful 
situations and concerning the problems with revealing to unwitting 
subjects that they may be a lot less moral than they thought. These 
ethical concerns make the replication of such experiments all but 
impossible nowadays 7 ). Doris has raised concern with the limited 
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number of experiments philosophers appear familiar with, 8 so it is 
worth trying to refer to as many of the analyses of the experiments as 
possible, as well as the two main experiments we outlined above. 
 The experiments were conducted within a theoretical background 
which assumed that there are internalized behavioural dispositions, 
and that these dispositions manifest themselves independently of 
situational factors. 9 The experiments were designed to test whether 
traits could be successfully used as behaviour predictors. So, the 
first question we need to answer is, what did these experiments 
show? The experiments are claimed to have illustrated a number of 
points, these are discussed below in no particular order: 
 1 The prevalence of immorality: The experiments are 
surprising in that they illustrate a greater degree of immoral 
behaviour than would have otherwise been expected 
(from asking potential participants to predict their own 
behaviour). The results surprised the researchers themselves 
in this respect, with Milgram writing  ‘ What is surprising is 
how far ordinary individuals will go in complying with the 
experimenter ’ s instructions . . . It is the extreme willingness 
of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an 
authority that constitutes the chief finding of the study and 
the fact most urgently demanding explanation ’ . 10 
  2 Unpredictability of behaviour: Closely related to this idea 
is the psychological claim of the experimenters that we 
cannot predict behaviour from the ascription of traits to 
individuals. 11 
  3 Inferring traits from single instances: Another result of the 
experiments was to cast doubt on the theoretical claim that 
one could infer the existence of traits from single instances. 12 
  4 Limited cross-situational consistency: This is the claim that 
traits are not exhibited reliably in different situations. 13 
  5 The importance of situational factors: Related, but distinct 
from the above point, this is the claim that situational rather 
than dispositional factors are more likely to account for 
variations in behaviour, so that  ‘ [d]isruption in habitual role 
behaviours and environmental relations can alter even long-
standing personality patterns ’ . 14 
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 These claims are made by the psychologists who carried out these 
experiments and those who have since analysed their work. Harman ’ s 
critique does not make explicit reference to these claims as such but 
rather takes it more or less as granted that personality psychology 
 has illustrated that there are no such things as character traits. 
However, as will become evident, the claims are more complex than 
Harman ’ s conclusion, which is the reason why they are presented 
here in detail. Doris ’ account is more sensitive and makes use of the 
fourth and fifth claims, as well as the second claim which he relates 
to the unpredictability of behaviour. Here, it is interesting to note 
the ease with which philosophers appeal only to the claims which 
further their argument, making no reference to the rest. Claim 
three is never mentioned, although in personality psychology this 
has generated the greatest amount of controversy, with discussions 
focusing on the importance of aggregating as opposed to relying on 
single instances of behaviour (on this point see below). As an aside, 
we should be apprehensive of arguments that rely on  ‘ picking ’ 
evidence from another discipline and presenting it out of context 
as such a practice risks highlighting only evidence which promotes 
one ’ s case and does not fairly reflect the level of dissent on the issue 
within the originating discipline. 
 There are number of points that should be raised in relation to 
the empirical evidence itself and how it has been received within 
its own discipline. The first point is that the experiments involve 
very complex interpretations of data and there is some dispute in 
the literature as to how the data should be interpreted and what 
it purports to show. 15 Having an opinion on this debate, let alone 
resolving it, requires an extensive knowledge of statistics, which I 
thoroughly lack; however, it is worth noting that there is a debate 
within the discipline itself about how the data should be interpreted. 
Similarly, there is discussion about the main conclusion, that is, that 
traits cannot be used as behaviour predictors. Epstein points out 
that although traits cannot predict  single instances of behaviour, 
as dispositions they are useful when aggregating the same act over 
occasions, 16 so that  ‘ . . .  behaviour is simultaneously situationally 
specific and unstable at the individual level and general and stable 
at the aggregate level ’ . 17 Furthermore, the conclusions of some of 
the experiments themselves have to be interpreted with caution. 
One of the conclusions of the Good Samaritan experiment was that 
 ‘ . . . whether a person helps or not is an instant decision likely to 
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be situationally controlled. How a person helps involves a more 
complex and considered number of decisions, including the time 
and scope to permit personality characteristics to shape them ’ , 18 
which seems a much more subtle conclusion than the blanket 
claim that traits do not exist. It also seems to suggest that even the 
experimenters themselves acknowledge the influence of situational 
factors on how our character traits express themselves. 
 Another interesting point to note about the evidence is that not all 
experiments in this area of personality psychology that are implicitly 
cited in this debate are of relevance to moral philosophy as some are 
set up to measure morally neutral behaviours. Some studies were 
set up to discover whether traits such as extraversion, expressive 
movements and punctuality could be consistently identified in 
behaviour, but it is unclear what relevance such results would have 
for a theory of morally right and wrong action. 19 Finally, some of 
the relevant studies, that is, ones that did test plausibly moral traits, 
were conducted on children. For example, Hartshorne and May ’ s 
study on honesty and resistance to temptation was conducted 
on 8,000 children 20 ; the significance of this point should become 
evident below. 
 It seems then that the claims of personality psychologists 
themselves are both more modest than how they have been 
interpreted by some philosophers, for example, Harman, and more 
detailed and comprehensive than how they have been appealed to 
by others, for example, Doris. Also, there is significant debate within 
the discipline as to how this evidence should be interpreted in the 
first place and exactly what it shows at the individual and aggregate 
levels. And finally, some of the experiments are of doubtful relevance 
to philosophy as they examine morally neutral behaviours, while 
others draw conclusions about children, which, as we shall see, are 
a special case. 
 C. Weakness of will 
 The previous section cast some doubt on the interpretation of the 
empirical evidence the Harman/Doris critique of virtue ethics relies 
on from within personality psychology itself, but let us now assume 
that the evidence does indeed fully support the conclusions 1 – 5 above 
and see if virtue ethics may still have a response to these points. 
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 Harman views character traits as  ‘ relatively long-term stable 
dispositions to act in distinctive ways ’ 21 and we have to agree 
that virtues are indeed such character traits. It is also plausible 
to assume that one ’ s character is exhibited in one ’ s actions, as 
we have accounted for character as a state of being expressed in 
doing; however, the relation between character and action is a 
complex one. Character manifests itself in action, in that being in a 
virtuous state of character will lead one to act virtuously; however, 
action is not all that there is to someone ’ s character in this sense. 
Actions are merely external manifestations of internal states and 
an inference is required before we can make judgements about the 
character from which the actions resulted. For example, in my role 
as a conscientious teacher, I call upon a shy student to present her 
work to the class. This is perceived by all present and the student 
herself, as an act of kindness showing the attention to individual 
needs required in teaching, as I am allowing the student special 
time to present her work, while others are kept quiet and attentive. 
It turns out that my student greatly benefits from the experience, 
gaining in confidence and attributing this gain to my skills as a 
teacher. However, unknown to all observers, my act was motivated 
by a desire to humiliate the student. Unfortunately for me, and 
against all my expectations, my act backfired and failed to reach its 
vicious aim. To the casual observer, my act is evidence of my kind 
and considerate character; however, knowledge of my inner state 
reveals me to be a mean, spiteful person, albeit rather incompetent 
in carrying out my spite. As we have seen previously, doing the right 
thing is not enough for virtue, one must do the right thing for the 
right reason and with the right desire, and here is an example where 
someone merely appears to be doing the right thing without being 
virtuous. However, as external observers of someone ’ s character, all 
we have access to is the person ’ s actions. 
 The personality psychology experiments only reveal evidence of 
the subjects ’ behaviour; the researchers then have to work hard to 
explain what this behaviour means in terms of the person ’ s whole 
character. The second conclusion drawn from the experiments 
was that we cannot predict behaviour from the ascription of traits 
to individuals. However, we ascribe traits to individuals in the 
first place by drawing inferences from their behaviour, and these 
inferences are very vulnerable to error as the only evidence of the 
person ’ s character we have in the first place is the behaviour we 
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observe. If my students concluded from the example above that I 
am a kind and caring teaching, they would be making a mistake, 
but they would nonetheless be very surprised to see me act callously 
and spitefully the next time I taught them because they would not 
be aware of their own error about my character. If we recognize 
that our initial ascription of traits must be tentative, due to the 
difficulty of drawing inferences about one ’ s character from one ’ s 
behaviour in the first place, then we should not be surprised that 
future behaviours do not conform to what we expected. Character 
trait ascription is a difficult business, and we should expect to get 
it wrong. 
 Indeed, we are often tentative about the ascription of character 
traits and only do so for people we are intimately familiar with. 
We will only vouch for the characters of those we know well, the 
people we know over a long period of time, those whom we have 
seen act in a variety of circumstances, those whom we can say with 
confidence that we have seen repeated evidence of their character 
in their actions, for example, our friends, our family, etc. This idea 
casts doubt on whether the third conclusion of the experiments 
poses a threat to virtue ethics. The third conclusion was that one 
cannot infer the existence of traits from single instances; however, 
this is not part of the Aristotelian project in the first place. No 
account of virtue ethics expects us to be able to make character 
evaluations from single instances of behaviour. We need to observe 
a person ’ s character over a long period of time and indeed Aristotle 
even seems to suggest that a person cannot be judged to have led 
a eudaimon life until that life is over 22  – a rather long time indeed, 
with plenty of opportunities for observing that person ’ s character 
in action. 
 One possible worry here is that the researchers asked subjects to 
predict their own behaviour, and since we have access to our inner 
states, there should be a higher degree of reliability in predicting our 
own behaviour. However, knowledge of one ’ s own self, especially 
when it comes to one ’ s moral strength, is a very difficult thing. 
We would generally like to think well of ourselves and are opti-
mistic about our chances of doing the right thing but we are often 
mistaken  – that is the correct conclusion of the experiments. This 
conclusion is also a very interesting one for both psychologists 
and philosophers to consider further. Why do we find it difficult 
to correctly assess our own moral strength? Why do we tend to err 
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on the side of virtue in assuming the best of ourselves? These are 
interesting questions that require further thought, but unfortunately 
we have to set them aside for our purposes here. 
 Another very important point is that character evaluation requires 
not just observation of the agent in action and observation of the 
agent in action over time but also observation of the agent in action 
in different circumstances and, in particular, under circumstances 
that are likely to tempt or pressure the agent into acting immorally. 
The experiments don ’ t represent just any, random, kind of situation, 
but rather  specific situations, purposefully engineered to put subjects 
under pressure or temptation to act immorally. To understand why so 
many people gave into these pressures and temptations, we need to 
consider Aristotle ’ s account of all character traits not merely virtue. 
 Aristotle identified four character traits 23 : virtue, continence, 
incontinence and vice. Virtue and vice are similar because they are 
both stable, long-term, predictable and reliable character traits of 
the kind that Harman has in mind; although of course virtue chooses 
the good and vice chooses evil. Continence and incontinence differ 
from virtue and vice in this respect as they are both in a state of flux. 
We have seen how we are all born with certain natural tendencies 
and we have claimed that virtue is a stable character trait, so it is 
reasonable to ask: how does one get from natural tendencies to full 
virtue? There seem to be two possibilities: either there is some kind 
of instantaneous transformation from natural tendencies to fully 
settled virtue or the process is gradual. If virtue ethics suggested 
the instantaneous transformation option from natural tendencies 
to full virtue, I think there would be grounds for a serious objection 
here, as such an account seems deeply implausible when we look 
at human nature. However, as we have seen earlier, virtue ethics 
clearly argues for the second option: the move towards virtue is a 
gradual, slow change, which happens over a long period of time 
and is very vulnerable to external factors. 
 We all start off with certain natural tendencies which are then 
shaped by external factors and in this long process we fluctuate 
between continence and incontinence with respect to different 
virtues. The states of continence and incontinence are unlike the 
states of virtue and vice in that they are not stable and reliable, but 
rather they are, definitionally, flexible, interchangeable and shaped 
by situational factors. This is because continence and incontinence 
represent moral progression; they are states  we go through on our 
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way to virtue. Virtue, continence and incontinence all have some-
thing in common: unlike vice, they all aim at the good. However, 
unlike the virtuous agent, the continent and incontinent agents 
are plagued by desires contrary to the right reason; they are both 
tempted, they both have to fight a struggle between their reason and 
their desires. The continent agent wins this struggle and does the right 
thing, so externally his behaviour is indistinguishable from that of 
the virtuous agent; however, whereas the virtuous agent ’ s character 
flows smoothly and effortlessly into action because his desires are in 
line with his reason, the continent agent has to struggle to do what 
he knows is right. The incontinent agent loses this struggle and does 
the wrong thing, as his desires overwhelm his reason. 
 The best way to understand this progress is by example. I will give 
you a personal example, but if you can try and identify some aspect 
of your own character development that fits in with this account, 
you may find it will make more sense. When I was young I coveted 
my mother ’ s fur coats. I thought they were the most beautiful, soft, 
luxurious coats ever and I couldn ’ t wait to be old enough to own 
one (or many!). My state at the time was probably best described 
as a state of ignorance as I knew nothing about fur coats and where 
they came from. I was then shown a video at school explaining 
where fur came from, complete with baby seals being clubbed to 
death and all the gory details of the fur trade. Having found out 
where fur came from and what was involved in producing the coats 
I knew that I should no longer desire them, but this did not make 
the desire go away. I was now in a position where I could end up 
being either continent or incontinent. Faced with a beautiful fur 
coat and the money to buy it, it was a toss-up whether I would be 
able to withstand my desire to own it or not. If I bought the coat, 
I would be incontinent; if I walked away I would be continent. My 
will was weak; I knew the right thing to do, that is, not buy the fur 
coat, but my contrary desires resisted my reason. However, over 
time, my desires had a chance to be shaped by my reason. The more 
I learnt about the fur trade, the more I came across the animals that 
were used for the trade, the more I saw how the fur was procured, 
the more I was moved to think differently about fur coats. Now fur 
coats no longer look luxurious, soft and desirable. They look like 
the pain and suffering that has been involved in producing them 
and therefore are no longer desirable. Walking away from a fur coat 
sale is no longer a struggle as I do not wish to own something that 
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was produced by so much suffering; my desires are now in line with 
my reasoning and flow smoothly into action. 
 The important point is that all this was a gradual move towards 
virtue, characterized by different approaches at different stages. 
Had you tempted me with a fur coat early on in my development, 
I would have failed the test. Had you tempted me with a fur 
coat on a bad day, on a day when I was sad or less able to resist 
temptation, I would have failed. Similarly, if we tempt people 
with immorality, they are much more likely to fail the test, and 
if we put obstacles in their way, they are more likely to stumble 
across them. The participants in the Milgram and Good Samaritan 
experiments were, for the most part, people who, like most of us, 
struggle to do good. On some days they succeed, but tempt them 
or pressure them to extremes and they are likely to fail. What we 
are seeing in these experiments are not people who were mistakenly 
thought to be virtuous but are indeed vicious, but rather people 
who drift between continence (right action) and incontinence 
(wrong action) in their struggle for moral maturity and stability. 
It is also important to truly appreciate that character development 
is a life-long process, as this insight has significant implications for 
the formation of empirical experiments. The Hartshorne and May 
study into character was conducted on children and this in itself 
is problematic. Character development is not a phase exclusive to 
childhood, it continues throughout one ’ s life, nor is it a process that 
we can expect to record in a matter of days, weeks or months. To 
observe character changes, we need to not only observe individuals 
in many different types of situations but also over very long periods 
of time  – this raises serious questions about the methodology of the 
experiments in personality psychology. 
 So while the ultimate goal, virtue, is a stable, predicable and 
reliable character trait, the road to virtue is nothing but. This explains 
claim four, the limited cross-situational consistency. Traits are not 
exhibited reliably in different situations because  the situations 
affect the person ’ s ability to exhibit the trait. Temptation, pressure, 
duress, distraction, etc. are all likely to divert people from the path 
to virtue. We can also account for the fifth claim, the importance 
of situational factors. Situational factors are indeed important, but 
they are important because they shape dispositional factors. The 
German who stays in Nazi Germany and fails the moral test will 
find his character shaped by the experience. It is not the case that 
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situations affect what we do, while character traits do not exist, 
but rather that situations affect our characters which in turn result 
in different behaviours. 24 Virtue ethics has claimed so all along, so 
rather than being contrary to virtue ethics, the conclusions of the 
experiments are entirely consistent with the theory. 
 Finally we need to account for the first conclusion, the prevalence 
of immorality. Virtue ethics can explain this conclusion because what 
we are observing are imperfectly virtuous agents struggling with 
demanding and challenging moral tests. The experiments are examples 
of weakness of will, agents struggling and often failing to act morally 
under difficult circumstances. What is interesting about the experiments 
is not the  prevalence of immorality but the  diversity of immorality. 
Aristotle warned us that there are many ways to go wrong 25 and the 
experiments highlight these ways of getting it wrong. 
 D. Getting it wrong 
 One of the most interesting aspects of these experiments is that they 
confirm the Aristotelian claim that there are many ways of getting 
morality wrong. Rather than presenting a challenge to virtue ethics, 
these experiments are a rich source of materials confirming virtue 
ethics and giving practical illustrations of the theory ’ s claims. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to give a full account of all the 
aspects of the experiments and their relevance to virtue ethics, but 
as this is a significant point, I will use the remainder of this chapter 
to partly illustrate this claim. 
 We saw earlier that the acquisition of virtue is a gradual process. 
Not only does developing a moral character take time but the process 
is dependent on the availability and quality of a number of factors. 
The presence of role models, good education, practices which assist 
in the habituation in the virtues, favourable peer influence, etc. can 
all go towards making us virtuous. We should not be surprised 
then that empirical experiments arrive at similar conclusions. The 
Hartshorne and May studies of honesty and deception in children 
concluded that honesty 
 ‘ goes by gangs and classrooms ’ that  ‘ a pupil resembles his friends 
in his tendency to deceive ’ , that it occurs less often when an 
atmosphere of cooperation and good will is established between 
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teachers and friends . . . To instill honesty, they recommended 
training in behaviours  ‘ characterised by integrity of performance 
and intelligent grasp of the social significance of honour ’ . 26 
 Not only do the researchers in this study recognize the influence 
of the environment in the development of both virtue and vice but 
they also recommend developing appropriate habits on the road 
to virtue. Notice also that the final recommendation incorporates 
two significant elements of virtue ethics. Although good habits are 
essential in the development of virtue, virtue is more than habituation. 
Actual virtue involves knowledge and choice, which is significantly 
more than an action performed out of habit. Hartshorne and May 
recognize that training in habits of honesty and integrity is a part 
of moral development, but they recommend that it is accompanied 
by a deeper understanding of why honour is valuable and what it 
demands of us. Here is advice to not only develop virtue through 
habit but also develop real understanding of what virtue is and what 
it requires of us, so that what was a habitual act can eventually 
be affirmed as an act of virtue. Effectively Hartshorne and May 
are recognizing the importance of moving from  ‘ the that ’ to  ‘ the 
because ’ that we discussed in Chapter 3 section C. 
 Furthermore, one should not underestimate the complexity of the 
conclusions of these experiments. Some commentators relating 
the experiments rather simplify these conclusions, suggesting that 
the experimenters expected to find generalized behavioural patterns 
for specific behaviours (often those associated with positive traits 
or virtues) and instead found that behaviour could be unexpectedly 
(and often negatively) influenced by situational elements. However, 
the conclusions of the experiments showed a much deeper and 
more sensitive approach to understanding human behaviour. When 
faced with a morally demanding situation, subjects may display 
virtue or vice but more often they may well be confused about 
what is required of them, may be torn between conflicting moral 
obligations, may be victims of weakness of will or have accounts 
of morality which place more emphasis on internal states (such as 
intentions) rather than their external manifestation in actions. Here 
are some examples of the above from the experiments. 
 Darley and Batson report of the Good Samaritan subjects that 
they were  ‘ in conflict between stopping to help the victim and 
continuing on his way to help the experimenter  . . . Conflict, rather 
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than callousness, can explain their failure to stop ’ . 27 These are not 
people who are, strictly speaking, immoral, but people who are 
challenged by the situation and confused as to what the right thing 
to do might be. Milgram reports numerous cases of weakness of 
will concluding that  ‘ [m]any people were unable to realize their 
values in action and found themselves continuing in the experiment 
even though they disagreed with what they were doing ’ 28 and 
 ‘ [s]ome subjects were totally convinced of the wrongness of what 
they were doing but could not bring themselves to make an open 
break with authority ’ . 29 While other subjects would characterize 
their behaviour as wrong, Milgram again reports that some subjects 
 ‘ derived satisfaction from their thoughts and felt that  – within 
themselves, at least  – they had been on the side of angels ’ . 30 
 Furthermore, the experiments reinforce Aristotelian claims 
about the appropriateness of behaviour and in particular the 
claims of the Doctrine of the Mean that the right action involves 
neither too much nor too little emotion we considered in Chapter 4 
Section D. In a little discussed passage, Darley and Batson expand 
on the behaviour of those, few, subjects who did stop to help. 
Curiously, the mode of helping itself raises a number of interesting 
considerations. They identified two approaches among those who 
stopped to help: one style of helping was responsive to the  ‘ victim ’ s ’ 
needs and expressed wishes about the amount and type of help 
they needed. However, there was another style of helping with 
subjects directing their actions towards the presumed underlying 
needs of the  ‘ victim ’ . This mode of helping was little modified by 
the  ‘ victim ’ s ’ own wishes, even to the point where  ‘ victims ’ worried 
by the possible approach of the next experimental subject could not 
persuade the current subject to leave them alone. This may well be 
an instance of misidentified response and an example of vice at the 
other end of the scale. If not helping at all is clearly a vice, then, 
perhaps, helping beyond what is needed to the point of encroaching 
on another ’ s wishes and autonomy is the other vice of excess and a 
good example of the Doctrine of the Mean in action. 
 Rather than posing a challenge for virtue ethics then, the empirical 
conclusions of the personality psychology experiments are perfectly 
compatible with the theory and even illustrate important aspects of 
virtue ethics. Virtue ethics has nothing to fear from this work; rather, 
philosophers should work closer with psychologists to confirm the 
many points of agreement. 
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 Further readings 
 The case against virtue ethics is made in Harman, 1998 – 9, and 
various works by Doris, 1998, and 2002 and in Doris and Stich, in 
Smith and Jackson, 2005. 
 In this chapter, I have argued that true virtue is rare and this 
response with respect to personality psychology is defended in 
Annas, 2003, online, Athanassoulis, 2000, Kupperman, 2001, and 
DePaul, 1999, while Kamtekar, 2004, also develops an Aristotelian 
response to the challenge. 
 The account of weakness of will on which this position relies on 
is developed by McDowell, 1996b, in Lovibond and Williams. 
 There have been a number of other responses to the challenge 
from personality psychology, indicatively: Sreenivasan, 2002, 
comprehensively questions the interpretation of the experimental 
data and Montmarquet, 2003, challenges the validity of the 
experimental conclusions. Another account of virtue ethics which is 
compatible with the results of the experiments is Merritt ’ s Humean 
inspired virtue ethics, in Merritt, 2000. 
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 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 Moral education and 
the virtues 
 A. Failing to notice 
 So far then I have developed and relied upon a particular account 
of virtue ethics, one that sees the perfectly virtuous agent as a rather 
rare phenomenon, and characterizes most of us as struggling on the 
long road to virtue, oscillating between continence and incontinence 
on different occasions and with respect to different virtues. Doris 
considers the virtue ethical response I have developed so far, that is, 
the claim that the virtues are rare, but worries that such a response 
robs Aristotelianism of its traditional appeal, that is, its appeal 
based on the promise of an engaging and lifelike moral psychology. 1 
He wonders how reflection on a few gifted individuals can facilitate 
moral behaviour and how such a theoretically construed project 
could possibly fulfil Aristotle ’ s aim of engaging in a practical enquiry. 
I have indeed presented an account of virtue ethics according to 
which the virtuous agent is a rare find, but as we saw in Chapter 5 
this doesn ’ t prevent us from making use of the concept. What we 
should be interested in is not what the virtuous agent might actually 
do but  how he thinks and how to develop the moral perception and 
practical wisdom necessary for virtue. 
 Doris is concerned that  ‘ . . . if virtue is  expected to be rare, it 
is not obvious what role virtue theory could have in a (generally 
applicable) programme of moral education ’ , 2 unless one subscribes 
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to a very elitist account of virtue according to which only the very 
few are entitled to a moral education. However, moral education 
does not pose a problem for virtue ethics and if anything this is 
more of a concern for a position like the one held by Doris. 
According to Doris, it is situational factors that influence behaviour, 
not dispositional ones. If that were true, it would be very difficult 
to see any role for moral education at all. All we would need is a 
lot of luck to avoid the situational factors that lead to the wrong 
behaviour and a lot of luck to come across the situational factors 
that lead to the right behaviour. Since the circumstances we come 
across, for example, whether we are tempted, or pressured or in 
a hurry, etc., cannot be affected by education, according to this 
account, luck is the only thing we can  ‘ rely ’ on to produce good 
behaviour. In contrast, because virtue ethics allows that situational 
factors may shape dispositional traits, there is a role for education, 
since once these dispositional traits are correctly shaped by the right 
situational factors which include the right education, they can result 
in the right action. This account of virtue ethics places an enormous 
emphasis on moral education as this is what stands between us 
and the vicissitudes of the world. Our only hope to withstand 
situational factors is to have the moral maturity and strength that 
comes through a long and gradual process of moral development. 3 
 Taking a cue then from Doris ’ concerns about the role of moral 
education in this version of virtue ethics, in this chapter we will look 
at some practical considerations concerning character development 
and we will reflect on what might be involved in moral education 
if we assume an account of the ideally virtuous agent as a rare 
individual who is more of an example of  how to think rather than 
of  what to think. In doing so, we will keep making some references 
back to the experiments we considered in the last chapter as they 
remain a rich source of inspiration. Another point of reference for 
this chapter will be examples from actual students of morality from 
my own experience, and that of other teachers, of teaching non-
philosophy students ethics at the Higher Education level. 
 To start then, we should return to the most basic part of ethical 
decision making: noticing that a situation requires our moral 
attention in the first place. There are many ways in which we might 
fail to notice a situation. For example, some participants in the Good 
Samaritan experiment report entirely failing to notice the person 
in need  – they just did not see him. This seems entirely plausible, 
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especially since the seminaries were in a hurry and their attention 
was diverted elsewhere. Provided this failure is non-culpable, this 
kind of case absolves the subject from responsibility for failing 
to act morally because he simply was not aware that there was a 
situation which required this kind of response. However, there is 
a more interesting sense in which people  ‘ fail to notice ’ ; although 
they are aware of the situation, they fail to notice that it has  moral 
significance. This is not a matter of being perplexed about what to 
do, but a more basic issue of failing to notice that there is a  moral 
 question in front of you. Consider this account of the subjects ’ 
recollections from the Good Samaritan example: 
 Our seminaries in a hurry noticed the victim in that in the 
postexperimental interview almost all mentioned him as, 
on reflection, possibly in need of help. But it seems that they 
often had not worked this out when they were near the victim. 
Either the interpretation of their visual picture as a person in 
distress or the empathic reactions usually associated with that 
interpretation had been deferred because they were hurrying. 
According to the reflections of some of the subjects, it would be 
inaccurate to say that they realized the victim ’ s possible distress, 
then chose to ignore it; instead, because of the time pressures, 
they did not perceive the scene in the alley as an occasion for an 
ethical decision. 4 
 The subjects entirely failed to perceive what they were seeing as 
a moral situation, as a situation that in some way involved them 
in a moral question. They didn ’ t altogether fail to see the victim 
in need, prostrate on the ground, but they failed to see the moral 
significance of this fact, they failed to perceive the situation as one 
which required their moral involvement. Morality is demanding, it 
asks questions of us, it involves in the world around us, so how is it 
possible that these seminaries entirely missed the point? 
 Even worse, the failure of the Seminaries is not an altogether 
rare, one-off occurrence. In my years teaching ethics to medical 
students, I have realized that one of the most important steps in 
their education is to try to sensitize them to the situations they came 
across. Medical students tend to be extremely intelligent, high-
achieving students, capable of academic excellence in a variety of 
subjects, with a strong interest in pursuing medicine, so their failure 
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to perceive moral situations isn ’ t a matter of lack of intelligence or 
lack of interest. At the same time, medical practice abounds with 
moral questions, dealing as it does with vulnerable people who have 
to make very difficult decisions, so their failure to perceive moral 
situations is not down to the rarity of the moral situations either. 
Despite the availability of morally sensitive situations and the fact 
that the students are bright, motivated and interested, the students 
often fail to notice morality in practice. 
 Consider the following real example: a group of fourth year 
students were following a ward round. During ward rounds, 
students get to observe clinician/patient interactions and then 
discuss any issues that may have been raised during their round in 
a special seminar with their tutor. Given the nature of this teaching, 
nobody knows in advance what kinds of issues may crop up, but 
the students are asked to look out for not only clinical details but 
also make observations relating to communication skills, team 
work, social and cultural issues, etc. The students are not asked any 
questions during the rounds, they are not examined or put under 
any pressure to react to what they see  – they are passive observers. 
In one of these sessions, a group of six students observed a teenage 
girl who was refusing treatment being physically restrained by 
three nurses; while treatment was being administered, the patient 
proceeded to scream and try to free herself from the restraints. In 
the seminar that followed the tutor asked whether the students had 
observed anything of interest in the round and no one could think of 
anything. She then asked specifically whether the students noticed 
anything of ethical importance but again no one could think 
of anything significant they might have seen. The tutor was extremely 
surprised as in her opinion the forced treatment of the teenager raised 
a number of ethical questions. It is important to note that the students 
were genuinely unable to recall the case as ethically important, as 
opposed to being reluctant to do so for fear of censure or out of 
timidity or out of a worry that they may be penalized. When the tutor 
presented the case to them as an ethical dilemma, they were all able 
to see that a serious moral question had been raised. 5 
 How is it possible for these well-meaning, intelligent and 
motivated medical students to somehow miss the fact that they were 
witnessing a morally relevant situation? I think the answer lies with 
the fact that moral questions do not always occur spontaneously to 
people nor is morality in action immediately evident to everyone. 
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When I start my moral philosophy classes, I tell my students that 
they should expect this class to change their lives. This may sound 
pretentious, but why shouldn ’ t it be true? Why shouldn ’ t a class that 
asks  ‘ What is the right thing to do? ’ ,  ‘ What kind of person should I 
be? ’ ,  ‘ How should I live my life? ’ not lead the students who take it 
to reconsider their own actions, their own characters and their own 
lives? To the contrary, it would be peculiar if the class failed to have 
any kind of practical impact on the students because morality is not 
an abstract topic solely relevant to passing exams, but a practical 
pursuit, central to everyone ’ s lives. The practical impact I expect my 
teaching to have on my students is not a matter of indoctrination, I 
am not aiming to recruit them to any one particular moral view or 
pass on particular answers to ethical problems. Rather I am hoping 
that the course will change the way they view the world, that they 
will come to see the world as a morally active place and that they 
will begin to develop the skills to think and feel about the situations 
they have now been sensitized to. 
 This point is particularly important for students who are 
studying ethics as part of their professional development, as the 
object of their study will be of immediate and significant relevance 
to their professional lives. These medical students have to come to 
see moral concerns as being of concern to them, as affecting them, 
as being relevant to them. If they can do that, then the features of 
moral situations will  ‘ stand out ’ more prominently for them. It may 
be that the very ability to perceive a situation as morally relevant is 
a skill we actually develop rather than one which is automatically 
and unproblematically shared by everyone, but its development is a 
crucial step in becoming morally aware. Hinnman draws an analogy 
between great art and moral wisdom. In the same way that great 
art reveals an entirely new way of viewing the world, it changes our 
perspective and provokes our emotional responses, moral wisdom 
also changes the way we view the world, sensitizing us to different 
aspects of the world, giving us a different viewpoint and engaging 
our emotions. 6 
 B. Moral imagination 
 The first step in moral development then is to come to see the world 
differently, to come to see the world as a place full of situations 
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that require our attention, our reflection and possibly our reaction. 
Mary Warnock writes on moral imagination: 
 . . . there is a power in the human mind which is at work in our 
everyday perception of the world, and is also at work in our 
thoughts about what is absent; which enables us to see the world, 
whether present or absent as significant, and also to present this 
vision to others, for them to share or reject. 7 
 In practical terms this may mean coming to see the world as others 
see it and coming to see ourselves in the world as playing particular 
roles shared by others in our professions or stations or roles in life. A 
doctor, for example, needs to come to see the world differently, with 
a certain degree of compassion and understanding for pain, suffering 
and vulnerability. This involves cultivating a particular sensitivity 
to situations concerning others who are in pain, who are suffering 
or who are in positions vulnerable to exploitation. This sensitivity 
is not merely a matter of complete identification with those others. 
A doctor who fully identified with all his patients would quickly 
become incapacitated through the emotional burden of all the pain 
and suffering around him. The correct approach lies in a mean, 
neither too little emotion, which makes a doctor cold, distant and 
ineffective in his attempts to connect with patients and appreciate 
their point of view, but neither too much emotion, which makes a 
doctor too involved and incapacitated by overwhelming emotions. 
 Students of morality also come to see the world as a morally alert 
place through the example of others. It is by seeing others react with 
concern, sympathy, anger, indignation, etc. that we come to realize 
that there may be cause for concern, sympathy, anger, indignation, 
etc. Students come to see certain aspects of the world as being of 
concern to them because they are of concern to those they wish to 
emulate. One of the most successful methods of getting students 
to see the importance of ethics to their chosen career is to include 
those who are already successful in this career as their teachers. If a 
practising doctor tells medical students that the study of ethics is not 
only useful but also indispensable to the practice of the profession 
they are more likely to take this advice on board. A practising doctor 
will also be able to come up with ethical examples that are directly 
relevant to the students ’ own future experiences, examples they 
can identify with and examples they can look out for when they 
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observe practice. Similar points can be made for other professions 
or activities, for example, Sherman mentions how experienced 
naval officers play a significant role in the ethical education of 
midshipmen by providing relevant and accessible examples of ethical 
situations. 8  ‘ We learn best from those with whom we can identify 
and from those whom we value positively. This underlies Aristotle ’ s 
view that friendship ( philia ) is the central arena in which character 
development takes place ’ . 9 Aristotelian friendship is based around a 
shared love of the good, so having the right friends in this respect is 
a crucial step in moral development. Friends and role models need 
not be perfect to be of use as friends and role models, but they do 
need to be oriented towards the good. 
 Similar remarks apply to teachers of ethics. 10 Probably as a result 
of teaching numerous classes on Aristotle and virtue ethics, I am 
sometimes asked by students if I am an example of the ideally virtuous 
agent (!). I chose to interpret this question in a flattering manner, and 
although the answer is invariably and emphatically  ‘ no ’ , it is worth 
remembering that teachers set the moral tone in classrooms. By this, 
I mean that teachers need to set the tone in terms of dignity, integrity 
and respect in a classroom. While intellectual sparing is at the heart 
of philosophical teaching and we expect our students (and ourselves) 
to ferociously attack the arguments of our opponents, this should 
never extend to personal attacks. It is the role of teachers to guide 
discussions away from the offensive and the personal and towards 
appropriate intellectual antagonism, instilling the virtues of both 
respect and integrity in intellectual debates in their students. It is the 
role of teachers to disapprove of disparaging remarks and make this 
disapproval known but without entirely destroying the confidence 
of the student who made the mistake  – the point of mistakes is to 
learn from them, not to be annihilated by them. 
 Decency and integrity in our everyday encounters are both 
important in themselves and likely to be important in 
strengthening our disposition to be moral when we face the big 
decisions. If we do not nurture ethics on the small scale, we may 
not get it on the grand scale either. 11 
 How one behaves in everyday, relatively mundane encounters 
sets the tone for how one behaves when faced with more difficult 
and challenging moral problems. If one doesn ’ t practice virtue in 
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a small scale though, it is implausible to imagine that it will be 
effortlessly available to us in the grander scale. The teacher has to 
be genuinely enthusiastic, conscientious and engaged with morality 
if she has any chance of transmitting these attitudes and values to 
her students. 
 Relevant and accessible role models stimulate the students ’ moral 
imagination as does immersive role play and innovative methods 
of teaching, including the use of narrative, that encourage students 
to think for themselves. The importance of narrative cannot be 
underemphasized in this respect. Virtue ethicists often appeal to 
literary examples to make their points about moral character and 
this is because authors have a particular ability to present a fully 
immersive picture of the situations their characters come across. 
Novelists and playwrights specialize in bringing the background 
to the foreground, giving us an insight into the rich lives of their 
protagonists, in making us a part of the story they are telling. Such 
examples provide rich ground for discussion and employing similar 
techniques by asking students to take on  ‘ personas ’ and act out 
scenarios engage the imagination. 
 It is also important that the teaching of ethics is fully integrated 
into teaching in general. Ethics is not a separate discipline, 
practised in a classroom and abandoned as soon as one exits the 
door. Teaching medical ethics to medical students alongside the 
teaching of anatomy, patient history, diagnostics, treatment, etc. 
mimics most closely the way these students will eventually come 
across ethical problems, that is as part of their professional practice, 
intertwined with clinical and socio-cultural aspects of the same 
case. The narratives mentioned earlier should include a richness of 
pathological, clinical, social and ethical elements to better represent 
what real patients are like. 
 In this section then, we have assumed a fairly wide role for moral 
imagination, both alerting us to moral situations, allowing us to 
contemplate alternative possibilities, helping us to immerse ourselves 
in the circumstances and aiding us to develop morally. I have hinted 
briefly at how moral imagination may be encouraged through 
relevant role models, appropriate teachers, detailed narratives 
and role play. All these techniques help us think about situations 
before we have to actually face them in real life, but thinking about 
morality is not enough, moral education crucially involves teaching 
in emotion. 
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 C. The emotions revisited 
 According to the account of virtue ethics I have developed so far, it ’ s 
not possible to think morally without feeling morally. We discussed 
the role of the emotions in Aristotelian character in Chapter 3; 
however, they play such an important role in character development 
that it is worth returning to the subject here. We can now identify 
a number of functions the emotions fulfil and relate them to moral 
education: 
 1 The world provokes emotions in us. It is the person ’ s 
suffering that triggers our pity and our desire to help. How 
the world is can provoke different emotional reactions 
though. In some variations of the Good Samaritan 
experiments, the  ‘ victims ’ were portrayed as dirty, off-
putting and potential threatening. Unsurprisingly, seminary 
students were far less likely to help those  ‘ victims ’ they 
perceived as potential threats than those they perceived 
as merely in need. By presenting the  ‘ victim ’ as a potential 
threat the experimenters are alienating him and encouraging 
the subject to perceive him as outside the sphere of his 
moral obligations. In short, they are placing the subjects 
in a situation where it is difficult for them to empathize 
with the victim in the first place and where a great leap in 
perspectives is required for successfully taking into account 
the feelings and needs of the victim. The conditions of the 
experiment itself placed obstacles in the way of the proper 
exercise of empathic imagination, the proper exercise 
of which will have made it easier for the subjects to act 
morally. Instead of eliciting feelings of concern, sympathy 
and pity, the circumstances of the experiment were set up 
to elicit feelings of fear for one ’ s well-being, and thus make 
emotional attachment and therefore kind action much more 
difficult. Milgram himself explains how some variations 
of his experiment were set up to make sure that  ‘ [t]he 
victim ’ s suffering possesses an abstract, remote quality for 
the subject. He is aware, but only in a conceptual sense, 
that his actions cause pain to another person; the fact is 
apprehended but not felt ’ . 12 It should be no surprise that if 
we set people up to fail, they will fail. 
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 The world not only provokes some emotions, but other 
emotions are impossible without reference to the world. 
For example, the emotion of shame only makes sense if the 
agent has carried out a dishonourable misdeed. If the agent 
judges his actions to have been justified and honourable, 
there is simply no room for shame. 
 What we should learn from these examples is the 
importance of setting people up to succeed, of appealing to 
what is best in them, of encouraging all naturally helpful 
tendencies and rewarding all positive emotions, of making it 
easy for them to empathize and to be emotionally moved in 
the right direction. The emotions make it possible for us to 
understand others, empathize with their predicaments so it 
makes a huge difference what kind of people and situations 
we come across, how we perceive them and what kinds of 
emotional reactions they generate in us. Learning from the 
experiments in personality psychology, we know that moral 
development must be a managed process. Students must be 
exposed to easy tests to promote learning and growth, before 
they face greater challenges. 
 The social-psychological research points to the same 
conclusion: If we bend so easily before the winds of 
situational pressures, then we need opportunities during 
development, if not to face the strongest winds, as [sic] 
least to deal with some of the complexities and pressures 
of real situations. 13 
  2 A kind person will be moved to feel sympathy and concern 
for someone in need but will also view that person as 
someone in need because of his feelings of sympathy and 
concern. Our emotional responses colour how we construe 
and understand situations. The right emotions allow us to 
perceive the world in a particular way, they move us by 
bringing particular features of situations to our attention 
and the very same thing can be perceived differently due to 
our emotional filters. For example, an arm extended in an 
attempt to touch someone may be perceived as a threat if 
the touching is judged to be unwelcome and fearful or as an 
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act of love if the touching is perceived to be supportive and 
welcome. 
 Appropriate emotions allow as to interpret situations 
correctly, for example, as requiring a response of kindness, 
or indignation or shame. Aristotle writes,  ‘ The emotions are 
all those affections which cause men to change their opinion 
in regard to their judgements . . . ’ , 14 and modern author, 
Nancy Sherman, elaborates: 
 We can think of them [emotions] as modes of attention 
enabling us to notice what is morally salient, important, 
or urgent in ourselves and our surroundings. They help us 
track the morally relevant  ‘ news ’ . They are a medium by 
which we discern the particulars . . . Moreover, emotions 
draw us in in a way that grabs hold of our attention and 
puts to the top of our priority orderings, thoughts or 
actions regarding these matters. We focus with intensity 
and impact, making inferences that might otherwise not 
have arisen or been thought of in as compelling a way. 15 
   The emotions allow us to perceive the world in a particular 
way, so it is important that we cultivate the right emotions 
in the first place. A teacher who has been encouraged to feel 
that students are a distraction from his real job of doing 
research will become impatient and unwilling to listen to his 
students. This in turn will make their demands, questions 
and problems appear trivial, annoying and insignificant. 
The teacher ’ s feelings of irritation and boredom will cloud 
how he perceives teaching and its demands, in a sense 
making teaching irritating and boring. Teachers should 
try to cultivate feelings of patience, understanding and 
care towards their students, so that they come to see their 
students in patient, understanding and caring ways. 
  3 Crucially the emotions motivate us to act. As we saw in 
Chapter 4 Section B, simply doing the right thing is not 
enough; the right act must be accompanied by the right 
emotion. Our example in that chapter, John, the young man 
who saves the drowning child to impress his girlfriend, has 
a rich emotional involvement in what he is doing, it just 
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isn ’ t the right one! He may well be feeling pride, concern for 
himself, possibly even love for Anne, the girlfriend, but none 
of these emotions are relevant here. They motivate him to act, 
and coincidentally his act coincides with the right act in this 
situation, but overall what he has done has not proceeded 
from the right character trait. The desire to save the drowning 
child should be motivated by feelings of concern for the life 
about to be lost, not feelings of concern for one ’ s self and 
how one appears to those one wants to impress. Self-centred 
emotions are inappropriate here and although they have, 
coincidentally, led to the right action in this situation, there is 
little reason to think they will do so again in the future. 
 The person who is appropriately concerned with the 
welfare of others can rely on these emotions to motivate him 
on multiple occasions when the welfare of others is concerned. 
The person who is inappropriately concerned with his own 
welfare will look after the welfare of others only when it 
happens to coincide with his concerns. Having the right 
emotions commit us to the right actions because we have the 
right concerns and come to view the world in the right way. 
 Even difficult acts can be made better by displaying the 
right emotion. Doctors cannot always treat patients and 
will sometimes have to turn patients down for reasons 
not directly related to their welfare. A doctor who has 
to tell a patient that there aren ’ t sufficient funds for his 
medical treatment can do so with compassion, patience, 
understanding and support or can do so with disregard, 
impatience, cruelty and boredom. The result is the same, the 
patient does not get treated for financial reasons and this is a 
terrible outcome, but if the outcome cannot be avoided, the 
way it is explained to the patient makes all the difference. 
 4 Finally, the emotions convey our values to others, they 
let them know what we care about, what moves us, what 
upsets us. The account of the emotions I have relied 
upon in this chapter sees them not as blind, random and 
uncontrollable feelings but as part of our moral judgements. 
Aristotle characterizes the emotions as produced by 
evaluations. Circumstances excite and account for the 
emotions, for example, the sick man is easily provoked 
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with respect to his illness because this is what makes 
him vulnerable; the lover is easily provoked with respect 
to his love-affairs because this is what he cares about. 
Our relationships with others account for and shape our 
emotions, for example, we are more angry with our friends 
if they let us down than with total strangers, because relying 
on our friends is part of friendship. Our emotions display 
to others what we think and care about, for example, 
anger would not be anger without a judgement that one 
had been unjustly treated, fear would not be fear without 
the judgement that one was under threat. 16 In this sense, 
our emotional commitments display that we have taken 
responsibility for our actions, that our actions are the 
product of who we are and an expression of our agency. 
 The emotions then play a crucial role in moral education and 
it matters greatly what one feels, towards whom and in what 
circumstances. We should habituate ourselves in the right responses 
towards pleasure and pain in the hopes, that over time, what is 
habit becomes second nature. 
 D. Change 
 The final aspect of moral education I would like to discuss is the 
idea of change, development, progress, growth but also failure, 
disappointment and regression. Moral development is not a period 
restricted to childhood, but an ongoing process that takes up the 
whole of one ’ s life. Gradual self-understanding is crucial to this 
process and that requires both learning from successes but also 
adapting in response to failures. It is the responses to failure that 
provide some of the most interesting insights in the personality 
psychology experiments. 
 Milgram discusses a number of different reactions from subjects 
who had surprised even themselves by following the immoral 
dictates of authority, including: 
 A subject who wrote to the experimenters seeking a career 
change, from engineering he wanted to change to psychology as 
this subject is  “ much more important in today ’ s world ” . 17 
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 Morris Braveman, a subject who reported:  “ What appalled 
me was that I could possess this capacity for obedience and 
compliance to a central idea, i.e. the value of a memory experiment 
even after it became clear that continued adherence to this value 
was at the expense of violation of another value, i.e. don ’ t hurt 
someone else who is helpless and not hurting you. As my wife 
said,  ‘ You can call yourself Eichmann ’ . I hope I can deal more 
effectively with any future conflicts of values I encounter ” 18 . 
 another subject who reported:  “ To me, the experiment pointed 
up  . . . the extent to which each individual should have or discover 
firm ground on which to base his decision, no matter how trivial 
they appear to be. I think people should think more deeply about 
themselves and their relation to their world and other people. If 
this experiment serves to jar people out of complacency, it will 
have served its end ” 19 . 
 The number of people who obeyed authority in the Milgram 
experiments may have been a surprise, but what is a far more 
interesting reaction to consider is the response of these subjects 
to their own failure. The first subject in the quote above made a 
complete change in his life as a result of the experiments. The way 
he had behaved led him to re-examine what was important in his 
life and what he should be devoting his professional life to. This 
is a radical rethinking of what the good life consists in for this 
man, a fundamental change of direction in terms of what he finds 
important, what he wants to direct his efforts and attention to. The 
second subject above, Morris Bravemen, was led to reflect on his 
own actions. By his own admission, he was appalled by what he 
had done and was also led to reconsidering his reasoning process 
and how he made judgements about values. Being aware of his 
mistake and the ways in which he erred is bound to help him avoid 
the same errors in the future. Finally, the third subject is led to a 
radical reconsideration of the importance of morality. What he had 
thought was a trivial, unimportant, simple decision, revealed itself 
in retrospect to have been of significant importance, affecting the 
man ’ s relationship to others and the world in general. Here is an 
example of someone who, through a very sharp awakening, has 
become more sensitive to the moral complexities of the world. 
 We hope for incremental improvement in our moral development, 
but we have to be prepared to learn from the inevitable, but hopefully 
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only occasional failures. When these failures do occur, their lessons 
have the potential of being deeply felt and meaningful as they reveal 
our weaknesses and the areas of our own character that should most 
concern us and attract our attention for improvement in the future. 
The biggest lessons in moral education come from ourselves, and 
while we should take justified pride in our successes, it is our failures 
that we learn most from. The examples above reveal that people 
are willing to learn from their failures and will, as a result, take 
even drastic steps to change their lives. Failure is an integral part of 
moral education, especially when it can be stage-managed so that it 
is instructive rather than destructive. The role of moral education 
with respect to failure is to allow it to take place in a controlled 
manner so that it can lead to lessons learnt and not annihilation. 
 Failure is also one of the many things we can learn from by 
observing others. We do not need perfect role models, as there is 
a lot we can learn from imperfect ones. Observing the failures of 
others can give us warning about our own pitfalls as long, of course, 
as we are aware that what we are observing is a mistake and not an 
example to emulate. 
 This chapter has an impossibly ambitious goal in attempting to give 
an account of moral education in the virtues. However, it has been 
worth grappling with, nonetheless. Partly because this chapter attempts 
to give the beginnings of answers to questions that arise naturally from 
the position we have considered in this volume. If our main aim is to 
learn how to think and feel morally, then virtue ethics owes us some 
account of how this is possible, how we become sensitized to the 
world, how we develop moral perception and how we build on moral 
wisdom. Partly because the chapters in this section are springboards 
for further discussion and ideas about what might lie in the future for 
research in virtue ethics. And partly because the main questions virtue 
ethics asks,  ‘ What kind of person should I be? How should I live my 
life? ’ , are practical questions that require practical answers. 
 This chapter has rejected some of the distinctions that shape 
discourse in modern discussions of moral education. It has rejected 
the choice between two rival versions of moral education, one whose 
focus is on mindless development of character through unreflective 
habits and the other whose focus is on reasoning skills concerned 
with applying principles. Neither option is satisfactory. We learn 
through example, through habit, through repetition, but the aim 
is to develop understanding, to internalize the relevant values and 
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chose virtue for its own sake. The basis of moral authority is the 
right reason, which we are able to perceive through our natural 
ability to reason and feel, but the process of developing moral 
wisdom is tough and gradual, requires personal development, 
discovery and sensitization in both reason and emotion, rather than 
indoctrination or direct instruction. The road to virtue is not only 
shaped by situational factors which go towards making us who 
we are but is also entirely vulnerable to them. One role of moral 
education is to manage these situational factors, expose us to the 
best influences, test us only when appropriate and to a degree which 
we can reasonably hope to learn from rather than be devastated 
by. Finally, moral education cannot teach us what to do, it has to 
content with trying to teach us how to think and how to feel; what 
we do with these abilities, what kinds of characters we develop and 
what kinds of actions these characters result in, is up to us. 
 Further readings 
 Lickona also argues that the personality psychology experiments 
are useful for gaining insights on how we should teach ethics using 
arguments which parallel the ones in this chapter, Lickona, in 
Callahan, and Bok, 1980. For an overview of the history of character 
and moral education, see Arthur, in Nucci and Narvaez, 2008. 
 For more on moral imagination and its place in Aristotelian 
character development, see Hartman, 2000, Kekes, 1991, and 
Pardales, 2002. On the central role of narrative in character 
development, see MacIntyre, 1981. 
 Aristotle ’ s views on the emotions are developed in the  Art of 
Rhetoric . An excellent modern account of Aristotle on the emotions 
and character development can be found in Sherman, 1989, while 
the collection by Carr and Steutel is well worth taking a look at 
for more in-depth accounts of virtue ethics and moral education, 
Carr and Steutel, 1999, or for an overview of Aristotle on moral 
education, see Carr, in Nucci and Narvaez, 2008. If you have 
a particular interest in the education of medical students and 
other professionals, you might want to read Athanassoulis, in 
Ashcroft et al., 2007. 
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 CHAPTER NINE 
 The Kantian response 
 A. The role of the categorical imperative 
 We started off this volume by examining how virtue ethics emerged 
out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the other two alternative 
moral theories, deontology and consequentialism. This critique of 
the two rivals rested on a particular conception of these theories 
and a specific understanding of their claims which was then used 
to draw attention to the weaknesses and deficiencies of the theories 
which would be remedied by virtue ethics. Within this context it 
is understandable that the increase in interest in virtue ethics was 
accompanied by responses to its criticisms from the rival camps. 
The responses concentrated on two areas: first, they deny the 
understanding of deontology that virtue ethicists rely on to build 
their critique and, second, they show how the purported advantages 
of virtue ethics are also shared by deontology. In a sense then the 
picture painted in Part I of this volume is unrepresentative, not 
because it is incorrect but rather because it is incomplete. To fully 
understand virtue ethics, we need to come full circle and examine 
the kinds of responses that the virtue ethical critique has provoked. 
While consequentialists have been equally vigorous in the defence 
of their theories as deontologists, practical constraints limit us to 
examining just one of the theories, so for our purposes we will only 
examine the Kantian response to virtue ethics. 
 In responding to the virtue ethical challenge, modern deonto-
logists have shifted their focus to lesser researched works by 
Kant such as the  Metaphysics of Morals , the  Religion within 
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the Boundaries of Mere Reason and the  Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View . These works show a different aspect of 
Kant ’ s work, one which might lead us to revise how we should 
interpret his overall theory. Modern deontologists have, in the same 
way that virtue ethicists have reinterpreted Aristotelian ideas, often 
gone beyond Kant ’ s own works, to consider expanded and altered 
accounts of his theory. In this chapter, we will try to follow some of 
the main discussions in this area, in particular those that correspond 
to the themes discussed in Part I of this volume. 
 One of the most serious objections raised by virtue ethicists 
against deontologists is that they rely on rigid, inflexible rules that 
do not capture the particular details of situations and therefore do 
not account for the diversity of ethical life. A promising response 
to this objection is to re-conceive the role of the Categorical 
Imperative. The aim of the  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals is to search for the supreme principle of morality, but 
this doesn ’ t mean that this supreme principle will give us an 
 easy answer to all moral problems or that  all answers to moral 
problems can be given by sole reference to this principle. In this 
sense, the term  ‘ principle ’ is misleading here if we understand by 
it an overriding rule which operates as a concrete guide to action. 
Rather than a concrete guide to actions, the supreme principle 
of morality is conceived as a Categorical Imperative because it 
guides action from an inner moral constraint. Acting from duty 
is acting from an inner acknowledgement of the binding force of 
morality on us as a constraint and as a command. When we act 
from duty, we are motivated by the  ‘ purely rational appeal of a 
universally valid rational principle ’ 1 rather than being motivated 
by our inclinations and empirical natures. To understand this, we 
need to make a small detour and consider Kant ’ s views on our 
empirical nature. 
 As we shall see in the third section of this chapter, Kant does make 
room in his account of morality for our desires and inclinations, but 
their role differs fundamentally from that of desires in Aristotelian 
theory. This is because Kant has a different starting point with 
respect to his views on desires, inclinations and the empirical side 
of human nature. Kant deeply mistrusts our inclinations; he views 
humans as likely to be blinded by self-deceit because of inclinations 
that mislead us and distort the demands of morality. For example, 
because we are (naturally) full of self-conceit we misjudge ourselves 
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to be morally better than we are; because we are (naturally) full 
of jealousy we misjudge others to be morally worse than they are. 
Humans have a propensity to evil, so we must constantly guard 
against the motive of self-love and we must always view our natural 
inclinations with mistrust. The source of moral worth, therefore, 
can never be inclinations as they are both likely to mislead us and be 
fickle, unreliable and not under our control. The supreme principle 
of morality cannot be derived from empirical considerations and 
our grounds for acting cannot be inclination. 
 This doesn ’ t mean that inclinations have no value, just that they 
have no  moral  value , as we shall see later on in this chapter. Nor 
does it mean that our empirical natures have no place in Kantian 
theory, rather that they have a very specific place. Our empirical 
natures cannot be the grounds of our actions, our actions must be 
constrained by our rational natures as instantiated in the Categorical 
imperative, but the very point of some of Kant ’ s later works such 
as the  Metaphysics of Morals is to show how the application of the 
supreme principle of morality is constrained by our empirical natures 
and situated in the empirical world. The Categorical Imperative 
is a test for maxims and there are two broad responses to how 
maxims should be understood as  ‘ subjective principles of action ’ 2 : 
either the  formulation of maxims admits of qualifications and/or 
the  application of maxims admits of sensitivity to particulars. To 
act from duty is to follow a Categorical Imperative even against all 
inclinations, so the  grounds of our actions cannot be found in our 
empirical natures, but that doesn ’ t mean that the  formulation of 
our maxims and/or the  application of our actions cannot reflect our 
empirical natures. 
 Onora O ’ Neill ’ s account of maxims is an example of how the 
formulation of maxims admits of qualifications. For O ’ Neill, 
the role of the maxim is to capture features of the act on which 
the agent ’ s choice depends, so the formulation of the maxim is already 
discriminatory. That is, not just any formulation will do, but rather 
only the formulation that captures the agent ’ s intentions:  ‘ For what 
will be decisive is what an agent ’ s fundamental intention or principle 
in doing a given act really is. What counts is whether the expression 
of falsehood expresses a fundamental attempt to deceive, or whether 
agreement with another (in itself innocent enough) expresses a 
fundamental refusal to judge or think for oneself ’ . 3 An agent can ’ t 
get away with universalizing a very narrow maxim to deceive such 
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as  ‘ I will lie only when I can get away with it and it benefits myself ’ , 
because the intention expressed in the maxim, that is, to deceive, 
is not universalizable. This approach generates maxims sensitive 
to the particulars of situations, thus satisfying the concerns of the 
virtue ethicist, while maintaining the core ideas of Kantian thought, 
namely that the theory should be grounded in notions of rationality 
and pure moral worth rather than empirical considerations. 4 
 The other possible avenue is to argue that the application of the 
maxims allows for context and sensitivity to our empirical nature, 
and therefore requires judgement. Barbara Herman reconceives of 
maxims as  ‘ deliberative presumptions ’ . The Categorical Imperative 
does not give us rules for action but is a test for very generic 
maxims of the type  ‘ Do X for Y reason ’ . When a generic maxim 
fails the test of the Categorical Imperative, it generates a deliberative 
presumption against doing actions of that type for reasons of that 
kind. Reminiscent of  prima facie duties, deliberative presumptions 
are defeasible moral considerations that serve as general rules 
against exemptions from self-interest and can be defeated only if in 
specific circumstances the agent ’ s actual maxim is not one of self-
interest. The defeasibility of deliberative presumptions therefore 
requires contextual judgement. Herman ’ s approach allows for a 
great deal of context sensitivity, although some may worry that this 
comes at the cost of moving too far from Kant ’ s original ideas. 
 Finally, some neo-Kantians see both the formulation and the 
application of maxims as related to empirical context. For example, 
Allen Wood argues that, for Kant, practical judgement is the 
capacity to move from a universal principle to practical instances 
of it, but that capacity cannot be substituted by more principles, 
rather it is a capacity acquired by experience and practice. 5 While 
the authority of the Categorical Imperative is independent of our 
empirical nature, the rules that derive from it must be interpreted 
in light of empirical facts about human beings and their application 
takes place in a particular context, none of which can be captured 
in rigid rules. 6 Wood concludes:  ‘ The point is that when it comes 
to applying moral rules or duties, what moral agents need is not to 
be  told what to do , but rather they need guidance in  thinking for 
themselves about what they choose to do ’ . 7 These final thoughts 
about the role of moral judgement are very much in accord with 
what a virtue ethicist might have to say on the topic, although 
it is interesting to note that if there is any force to the objection 
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that virtue ethics is not action guiding because it is not sufficiently 
prescriptive, the very same objection now applies to Kantians. 
 Another way in which the interpretation of the role of Categorical 
Imperative can resist the virtue ethical objection of inflexibility is 
to focus on imperfect duties, an idea we will examine in the next 
section. 
 B. Imperfect duties and impartiality 
 Kant distinguishes between two kinds of duties, perfect and imperfect 
duties. Perfect duties like  ‘ Do not lie (from the motive of self-interest 
and with the intention to deceive) ’ are negative duties prohibiting 
actions from certain motives. It is these duties that the Categorical 
Imperative is meant to be a test for. If a maxim fails the test of the 
Categorical Imperative, then there is a perfect duty to not act in this 
way and this duty cannot be overridden by inclinations. Imperfect 
duties, however, are different. Rather than forbidding an action done 
from a particular motive, they command the pursuit of an end. For 
example, we have imperfect duties towards ourselves to develop 
our talents and imperfect duties towards others to promote their 
happiness. While both perfect and imperfect duties are similar in 
the sense that they command with the same force, they differ in that 
imperfect duties allow us quite a bit of latitude in how we realize 
the end they command. There are a variety of actions that qualify 
as promoting the happiness of others, and imperfect duties allow us 
room to decide when, how and towards whom we fulfil the duty. 
 Because of this interpretation of imperfect duties, neo-Kantians 
need not be tied down to inflexible, prescriptive and limited rules, but 
can take account of the variety of the circumstances of the moral life. 
There are many different ways of promoting other people ’ s happiness 
and Kant ’ s thoughts are perfectly compatible with allowing room for 
the agent to interpret how and when this is done. This interpretation 
of Kant on imperfect duties has a number of implications. According 
to Marcia Baron, it allows for a number of conceptions of the 
good life. It allows the Kantian to recognize the diversity of natural 
talents people may have and allow them to develop in different 
ways. Furthermore, a person may fulfil her imperfect duties through 
developing her artistic talents and spending some of her time on 
charitable causes without having to become an entirely self-sacrificing 
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altruist in the cause of promoting the happiness of others. The moral 
saint is not the Kantian ideal and indeed being a moral saint may 
be problematic under the Kantian understanding of morality as it 
involves a very one-sided preoccupation with the happiness of others 
which may well involve a corresponding neglect of one ’ s own talents. 
Baron quotes Kant in support of this interpretation of the rejection 
of the life of the moral saint, who seems to suggest, in the  Critique of 
Practical Reason , that the man who gives his life to save others will 
have done a good thing in accordance with duty, but in losing his 
life will have infringed on his duties to himself (once dead he can no 
longer fulfil any of his talents). 8 
 Another implication of the existence of imperfect duties is that 
having an imperfect duty to promote the happiness of others is 
perfectly compatible with aiding some people more than others, 
so would allow for special treatment of those who are near and 
dear to us. The virtue ethical objection that other theories fail to 
account for partial relationships like family ties and friendships may 
have more force against theories that require the maximization of 
impersonal value than Kantianism. So, for example, Utilitarianism 
requires moral agents to maximize utility with no reference as to 
whose utility is being maximized, all  ‘ units ’ of utility count equally 
with no regard for who they benefit. As a result, Utilitarianism is 
far more vulnerable to the objection that it cannot account for the 
special status of friendships. However, Kantianism is not a theory 
requiring us to promote impersonal value. Baron argues that it is 
perfectly permissible to show preferential treatment to other people 
some of the time. Preferential treatment is only problematic when 
it shows a morally unjustifiable preference. 9 To make sense of this 
conclusion, we need to reconsider what is impartiality and why 
there might be a requirement for impartiality. 
 Aristotle enjoins us to  ‘ [t]reat equals equally and unequals 
unequally ’ . 10 The advice at first seems a bit vacuous as it seems self-
evident, but the point of the claim is that the difficult task in just 
distributions is to determine who is equal to whom and according 
to what standard of equality. In Chapter 2, Section B, we saw how 
this applied to philosophy essays, essays that showed equally good 
elements of a good philosophy essay were warranted the same 
mark, but at the centre of this understanding of just distributions 
of marks was the conception of what counts as a good essay. Neo-
Kantians argue that their theory can accommodate the same insights. 
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Consider Baron ’ s example about what kind of partial treatment you 
are allowed to give: it is permissible to invite some people over to 
dinner on the grounds that you like them and not invite others on the 
grounds that you do not like them as much, but it is not permissible 
to only offer your help to those who desperately need it because you 
like them and ignore those you do not like. 11 This is because people 
in general do not have a claim to becoming your dinner guests, but 
they do have a claim to your aid when they desperately need it. There 
is room for choice in deciding who you invite to dinner and there 
is room for favouring those you like; however, the same is not true 
with respect to emergency, life-saving aid. Aristotle would have no 
quarrel with any of this, as the legitimacy of partial considerations 
can only be justified within certain contexts that allow latitude for 
partial choices.  ‘ That he is my friend ’ is an acceptable justification 
of some partial choices, for example, why I give him my time and 
emotional support as opposed to a stranger, but not others, for 
example, why I gave him the job over a more qualified candidate. 
 If impartiality then is defined as not treating others unfairly 
but definitionally allows for differential treatment and allows 
for special consideration where such consideration is  warranted , 
then both Aristotelian and Kantian theories are impartial in this 
sense and can both account for the importance of friendships and 
other relationships in our lives, as well as allowing space for these 
relationships within our understanding of morality. 12 The virtue 
ethical objection then that Kantians do not allow room in their 
theory for relationships that are fundamental to living the good life 
no longer seems as relevant. 
 The reinterpretation of the Categorical Imperative, the refocusing of 
attention on imperfect duties and the re-examination of the requirements 
of impartiality allow neo-Kantians to offer convincing responses to the 
virtue ethical objection about the problems associated with rigid rules. 
In the next section, we will examine the degree of similarity between 
the Aristotelian and Kantian views on the emotions. 
 C. Acting from duty and the emotions 
 It seems incontrovertible that there are some passages in Kant ’ s 
works that suggest that he had a deep mistrust of the emotions and 
argued if not for expunging them at least for not allowing them 
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any role in the moral sphere. For example, the long passage we 
considered in Chapter 3, Section A, on the distinction between the 
 ‘ friend of man ’ who acts out of inclination and whose act therefore 
has no moral worth and the man who acts out of duty and therefore 
has true moral worth. Kant ’ s mistrust of the emotions arises from a 
variety of sources. Kant is concerned that the emotions are unreliable. 
Their source is our natural temperament or the circumstances that 
provoke them, neither of which are under our control. Emotions 
may be present at some times but not at others, they may appear 
in response to some circumstances but not others, so again we do 
not have power over them. Moral emotions cannot be called upon 
at will when they are needed and therefore cannot be the proper 
subject of moral praise and blame as we are not responsible for 
having or not having them. Also, many of our inclinations originate 
from what Kant sees as suspect sources. As human beings, it is our 
natural pathology to be overwhelmed by our desires. The motive of 
self-love is the motive we must guard against the most as this motive 
makes subjective considerations about our own well-being and 
self-interest into the objective determinant of the will. 13 Essentially 
what this means is that we are prone to taking on our desires as 
overriding moral considerations and therefore all our desires are 
suspect as grounds for morality because they tend to place us over 
others and give our empirical concerns priority over the demands 
of morality. Emotions cannot be the foundation of morality as they 
are not objective. Finally, the emotions are only, at best, incidentally 
aligned to the good. For example, sympathy may incline us to help 
someone who is doing evil because the emotions cannot distinguish 
between evil and good. 
 Neo-Kantians have developed two lines of thought in response 
to this, admittedly, problematic approach to the emotions. I say 
 ‘ problematic ’ because, on the whole, modern thinkers have accepted 
that there ought to be a greater role for the emotions than that assigned 
to them by the ideas presented above. While it is possible to  ‘ bite the 
bullet ’ and simply concur with Kant that he was right to mistrust the 
emotions, on the whole, the responses in the literature tend to accept 
that a plausible account of morality needs to allow a greater role 
for the emotions than that suggested by the passages above (or at 
least by the passages above examined in isolation). The two lines of 
thought then, which are not mutually exclusive, are first to highlight 
the kinds of emotions Kant does allow room for and second to 
Virtue Ethics.indb   144 7/12/2012   11:51:40 AM
THE KANTIAN RESPONSE 145
elaborate on the ways emotions can play different roles in Kantian 
theory. The latter strategy is more of a matter of interpretation and 
development of Kant ’ s ideas and so results in a number of different 
approaches. We will return to this thought shortly; first, we will 
consider the kinds of emotions Kant does allow room for. 
 Acting from the motive of duty has some affective aspects because 
it gives rise to a particular kind of emotion, a feeling of respect 
for the moral law. We all have certain feelings by virtue of being 
human which lie at the basis of morality and make us receptive 
to the demands of duty, that is, we are naturally predisposed to be 
affected by moral considerations. These feelings are moral feeling, 
conscience, love of one ’ s neighbour and respect for oneself 14 and 
they are all related to the moral law. Moral feeling is the sense of 
pleasure or displeasure that comes from acting from duty or failing 
to do so. Conscience is not something we acquire but a fact of our 
being that we are aligned with morality. Love of others and respect 
for oneself are based on the recognition that we and other humans 
are capable of being constrained by the moral law. These feelings 
are all aroused by our consciousness of the moral law, and similarly 
there are negative feelings of guilt, shame and contempt towards 
ourselves and others when we fail to do our duty. 15 
 Allen Wood also interprets Kant as allowing room for rational 
desires that accompany reason. These rational desires may at first 
glance seem similar to trained Aristotelian desires that go hand 
in hand with the right reason, but a closer look reveals quite a 
different account of the role of rational desires. In Aristotle, 
appropriate desires help us notice the requirement for action, 
help us determine what we should do and motivate us to do the 
right thing. In Kant, reason reveals our obligations and then also 
produces a feeling of pleasure, a special emotion of reverence for 
the moral law accompanied by joy at our willing what reason 
requires of us. Desires have no place as grounds for our motivation, 
even if they happen to be the right kinds of desires, but desires are 
produced by our pursuit of the objects of our rational choice. 16 
The ordering of the desires here is entirely different; for Aristotle, 
rational desires reveal morally salient particulars and are part of 
practical judgement; for Kant, rational desires are a by-product of 
the work done by reason alone. 
 While there is ample evidence of these special moral emotions 
in Kant ’ s writing, there is a worry that appeal to them doesn ’ t do 
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much for promoting a plausible account of our actual experience 
as emotional beings. These moral feelings are, if anything, rather 
peculiar instances of emotional sensitivity and there are concerns 
that in places Kant ’ s appeal to them becomes almost mystical and 
akin to religious fervour  – none of which helps with responding to 
the objection that the Kantian picture fails to take into account the 
important role of human emotions. 
 The second line of thought open to neo-Kantians is to find 
more substantial roles for emotions, a task which overwhelmingly 
requires reinterpreting if not reconstructing Kant ’ s own views. 
Marcia Baron asks us to reconsider our reading of Kant ’ s rejection 
of the inclinations as presented in the quote above. She argues 
that this particular passage is purposefully exaggerated in order 
to highlight the importance of acting from duty. She also argues 
that the contrast Kant is concerned with here is not one between 
two people, one of whom lacks inclination but possesses duty, 
and the other possessing inclination but lacking duty; rather, 
the correct contrast is between two people, both of whom have the 
right inclinations but only one of whom has a conception of the 
demands of duty. 17 However, this response moves quite far away 
from some of the fundamental Kantian claims. It allows some 
value to be placed on having the right inclinations, but seems to 
suggest that acting from the motive of duty then carries the day. 
It seems to make the motive of duty an extra point in favour of 
the agent ’ s motivation, whereas it should be the only ground for 
determining the agent ’ s moral worth and as such it may not be a 
solution acceptable to all Kantians. 
 Perhaps one way out of this problem is to consider the contrast 
between acting from inclination which has no moral worth and 
acting from duty  with inclination, which has moral worth and allows 
a role for the emotions. What exactly could this role be? Margaret 
Baxley suggests that we should reject inclinations as the ground 
of action because they are opposed to morality, but that we can 
allow room for inclinations that have been cultivated in accordance 
with reason. The  Metaphysics of Morals gives numerous examples 
of calls to cultivate those feelings which are responsive to the power 
of reason and play a variety of roles such as facilitating the choices 
involved in specifying imperfect duties, prompting beneficent 
actions and allowing us to fulfil the requirements of reason in a 
humane way. 18 The success of such approaches will depend on 
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how much room can be afforded to the emotions without making 
them the determining ground of the will. To further understand the 
possibilities here, we need to examine the Kantian understanding 
of virtue. 
 D. Virtue as strength of will 
 To understand Kant ’ s account of virtue, we need to appeal to a 
distinction which is central in Kant ’ s thought: the distinction 
between the intelligible (noumenal) and the sensible (phenomenal) 
worlds. A word of warning is appropriate before we move on; this 
is an extremely complex distinction, with a multiplicity of layers 
and implications for Kantian thought, and we can only give it the 
most cursory examination. The following discussion should be read 
with this caution in mind. 
 We are part of two worlds. The sensible world is the world of 
appearances, subject to causal laws that are naturally necessitated, 
and therefore it is difficult to see how freedom and choice are 
possible in this world. However, as moral agents we are also part of 
the intelligible world, transcendentally free and therefore can be held 
responsible for our choices. The intelligible world is the world of 
things-in-themselves, understood through reason alone, a capacity 
available to all human beings, at all times and with no reference 
to their background or prior circumstances. The intelligible world 
allows for an  a priori conception of the fundamental principle of 
morality which owes nothing to empirical contingencies, while the 
empirical world allows for a plausible picture of human nature as 
subject to empirical contingencies  – the challenge is how to reconcile 
these two worlds. 
 Correspondingly, Kant has two conceptions of virtue, virtue in 
the intelligible world and virtue in the sensible world. Virtue in the 
intelligible world is a conception of moral character ( Denkungsart ), 
a reorientation of the will towards the good, a sudden revolution 
of the will from the principle of self-love to the principle of duty. 
It is a commitment to morality that is available to everyone, any 
time, regardless of their background and empirical considerations. 
This change of heart to a commitment to the moral duty is the 
mark of real moral worth and cannot be brought about through 
any empirical influences such as habits or education. 
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 Virtue is present in the sensible world as well, as a disposition of 
strength of temperament in resisting inclinations ( Sinnesart ). Sensible 
virtue involves a change of mores, a gradual change of the empirical 
character that can be brought about through the development of 
right habits, education and other empirical influences. 
 Virtue involves struggle in both conceptions. In the intelligible 
conception, there is struggle as we are only finitely rational beings 
and feel the commands of morality as constraints. If the perception 
of the force of morality were absent, we would have holly wills, 
but we do not, so we feel constrained by the moral  ‘ ought ’ . At the 
same time, virtue is a struggle in the empirical world as we are led 
astray by our inclinations and virtue is the struggle to resist contrary 
inclinations. 19 However, struggle and a negative conception are not 
the only aspects of virtue. Virtue in the intelligible world is also 
self-constraint in accordance with the principle of inner freedom, 
so virtue is its own reward 20 and this recognition of the moral law 
produces, as we saw above, positive feelings of satisfaction and 
joy. 21 In turn though, because we are also beings in the sensible 
world, we can experience the feeling of reverence for the moral law 
reluctantly and feel humiliated by having to pay tribute to the merit 
of others. 22 
 The above is a very brief summary of some very complex ideas, 
but I want us to take two things from this discussion. The first is that 
any comparison between Aristotelian virtue and Kantian virtue is 
unlikely to be straightforward. The second is that a major challenge 
for neo-Kantians is to reconcile the account of the intelligible world 
with the account of the sensible world. 
 It should be evident from the discussions so far that both 
Aristotle and Kant have rich conceptions of virtue, which relate 
to many other ideas within their theories and that therefore any 
comparison of the concepts could never be a quick and simple affair. 
Kant ’ s account of empirical virtue certainly seems to have many 
points of similarity to Aristotelian virtue and therefore can be used 
by Kantians in response to the virtue ethical objections. Aristotle 
and Kant agree that although virtue is not habit in itself, habit is 
a useful tool for virtue. Unreflective repetition, though, which is 
how habitual action should be understood, cannot be true virtue 
as virtue involves choice. 23 However, Aristotle and Kant disagree 
on the precise role habit plays. For Aristotle, unreflective habit is a 
starting point, habituating oneself in  ‘ the that ’ will eventually, along 
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with other developments, lead to understanding  ‘ the because ’ . For 
Kant, the starting point is acceptance of the moral law, habituation 
may help shape practices, but virtue requires a conversion in one ’ s 
perspective, a reorientation towards the good (a revolution in the 
 Denkungsart ) which is not linked to one ’ s habits. 
 Character development therefore has a similar profile in both 
theories, that is, it plays an important role, it is gradual and subject 
to external influences, but the place of character development 
differs in the two theories. Primary in the Kantian picture is the 
exercise of reason which is the affirmation of the force of the 
moral law. While for Aristotle it is also central to choose virtue, 
do so knowingly and for its own sake, this choice is only possible 
through the development of the empirical character and may be 
impossible if thwarted by unfortunate empirical circumstances. For 
Kant empirical considerations are at best a temporary substitute 
for reason and this is most evident in his account of the role of 
emotions. 
 For Aristotle, the emotions play a significant and central role 
in the development of virtue and are seen primarily as a positive 
influence, at least as long as they are under the sway of positive 
influences and able to be shaped by reason. For Kant, the emotions 
are primarily suspect as contrary influences and their role is merely 
supplemental or temporary until reason can take over: 
 The principle of  apathy  – namely that the wise man must never 
be in a state of affect, not even in that of compassion with the 
misfortune of his best friend, is an entirely correct and sublime 
moral principle of the Stoic school; for affect makes us (more or 
less) blind.  – Nevertheless, the wisdom of nature has planted in 
us the predisposition to compassion in order to handle the reins 
 provisionally , until reason has achieved the necessary strength; 
that is to say, for the purpose of enlivening us, nature has added 
the incentive of pathological (sensible) impulse to the moral 
incentives of the good, as a temporary surrogate of reason. 24 
 While Aristotelian virtue is a state of balance between the right 
reason and the right desire, both necessary for and leading to the 
right action, Kantian virtue is a state of struggle against contrary 
inclinations and involves a feeling of resentment towards the 
commanding force of morality. Some commentators have suggested 
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that this is a problem for Kant, as Kantian virtue is therefore  ‘ merely ’ 
continence, but I think that this objection fails to see that this is 
not a like-for-like comparison. Kantian virtue is not comparable to 
Aristotelian continence as it isn ’ t supported by the same account of 
the relationship between reason and the emotions. Kantian virtue 
is not a  lesser account of virtue than Aristotle ’ s account of virtue 
because it is fundamentally about struggle; it is a  different account. 
It is only within the Aristotelian scheme that we have progression 
from struggle  – continence and incontinence  – to stability  – virtue; in 
the Kantian scheme, inclinations always remain suspect, so struggle 
against them is the only possible state for being such as us. 
 Aristotle and Kant have similar things to say about the role of 
the virtuous person. Neither is interest in the virtuous person as a 
direct example, as neither holds much stock in the possibility of 
achieving virtue by directly copying the actions of another. As we 
have seen, the Aristotelian emphasis is on the  orthos  logos and the 
virtuous person ’ s abilities to perceive it and act in accordance with 
it. Kant ’ s interest in the virtuous person is similar: 
 The  experimental (technical) means for cultivating virtue is  good 
example on the part of the teacher (his exemplary conduct) 
and  cautionary example in others, since, for a still undeveloped 
human being, imitation is the first determination of his will to 
accept maxims that he afterwards makes for himself.  – To form a 
habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any maxim, 
through frequently repeated gratifications of that inclination; it 
is a mechanism of sense rather than a principle of thought (and 
one that is easier to  acquire that  to get rid of afterwards).  – As for 
the power of examples (good or bad) that can be held up to 
the propensity for imitation or warning, what others give us can 
establish no maxim of virtue. For, a maxim of virtue consists 
precisely in the subjective autonomy of each human being ’ s 
practical reason and so implies that the law itself, not the conduct 
of other human beings, must serve as our incentive   . . .  A good 
example (exemplary conduct) should not serve as a model but 
only as a proof that it is really possible to act in conformity 
with duty. So it is not comparison with any other human being 
whatsoever (as he is), but with the  idea (of humanity), as he 
ought to be, and so comparison with the law, that must serve as 
the constant standard of a teacher ’ s instruction. 25 
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 Finally, while reason plays a central role in Aristotelian theory, and 
there are convincing comparisons between the importance of the 
concept of the noble and the good in Aristotle and the importance 
of the moral law in Kant, 26 the Kantian emphasis on the intelligible 
world and in general Kantian metaphysics do not have a direct 
comparison with Aristotle ’ s work. If one had to compare the relative 
merits of the two theories in one sentence, I think that one would 
say that the greatest challenge for Aristotle is providing an account 
of the objective grounding of virtue, while the greatest challenge for 
Kant is reconciling the relationship between the empirical and the 
intelligible worlds. 
 The task for neo-Kantians is to demonstrate the continuity and 
the overall coherence of the Kantian project, from metaphysics 
to moral psychology, from the intelligible to the empirical, from 
his earlier works to his later works. Kant does have convincing, 
plausible answers to the virtue ethical objections; his theory has 
the resources to account of the complexity of moral practice, to 
accommodate friendship and other partial relationships, to permit 
a role for the emotions, to find room for virtue and character. 
The answers Kantians give are not identical to the Aristotelian 
approach, there are significant similarities but also significant 
differences between the two theories, but they are interesting 
answers nonetheless that reveal a rich conception of morality. The 
question that still requires work is how all these ideas cohere with 
Kant ’ s metaphysical claims. 
 Further readings 
 Most of the suggestions for further readings relevant to this chapter 
are available in the footnotes. However, more specifically, for anyone 
interested in direct comparisons of Aristotle and Kant on virtue and 
character, Sherman, 1997, is an excellent, detailed and insightful 
account; Baron et al., 1997, is a very good introduction and more 
resources can be found in Beltzer, 2008 and Athanassoulis, 2005.  
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 CONCLUSION FOR 
PART THREE 
 In this part of the book we have considered three different, but 
interrelated topics, brought together under the heading of  ‘ current 
developments ’ in virtue ethics. The inclusion of these chapters in 
the present volume is significant because it gives some indication 
of further areas of research in this exciting field and may even 
prompt some readers to take up these topics for themselves. The 
disadvantage of this approach of attempting to cover three large 
areas of debate in three short chapters is that at our conclusion 
some crucial questions still remain unanswered. Readers interested 
in pursuing these topics more in-depth may wish to follow the 
suggestions in the  ‘ Further Readings ’ sections. 
 The challenge from personality psychology is not only a 
significant challenge to virtue ethics, one which demands an answer, 
but it also gave us the opportunity to further examine the concept 
of  ‘ character ’ . The challenge claims that evidence from experiments 
shows that there are no such things as character traits, or at least 
that it is situational rather than dispositional factors that affect 
behaviour, thus minimizing or altogether doing away with the 
influence of character. 
 While at first this seemed to be a critical point against virtue ethics, 
with wider devastating consequences for any theory which relies on 
character traits, a more careful examination of the empirical evidence 
showed three things. First, the interpretation of the evidence itself 
is under dispute even within personality psychology. Aggregation of 
the evidence has completely different results in terms of our ability 
to predict behaviour than examination of individual instances. 
 Second, if we accept the evidence as presented by those critical 
of virtue ethics, the theory can still account for the evidence by 
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illustrating that there are many more states of character than virtue. 
While virtue is a stable, settled and predictable state of character, it 
is also a rare one. Most of us are either continent or incontinent and 
as a result our characters are very vulnerable to situational factors. 
Continence and incontinence are states of struggle and flux, we 
move from one state to the other depending on situational factors 
such as the degree of temptation or duress present in different 
circumstances. That is, the experiments recreate exactly the sorts 
of situational factors that are likely to affect dispositions, which in 
turn result in differing behaviours. Character traits are themselves 
vulnerable to situational variants. The conception of virtue as a 
stable, reliable disposition is a correct one, but it is also a very rare 
one. What should surprise us in these experiments is the number 
of people who got it  right given how  rare virtue is, rather than the 
number of people who got it wrong. 
 Finally, a more in-depth examination of the results of the 
experiments came up with a surprising conclusion: the experiments 
reveal a wealth of information about how we can  ‘ get it wrong ’ 
and fail to act morally, all of which is very much compatible with 
the claims of virtue ethics as developed in this volume. So rather 
than being a challenge to virtue ethics, the experiments are a rich 
source of empirical material confirming what the virtue ethicist 
would expect to find in practice and a promising ground for 
further interdisciplinary work. The experiments also remind us that 
when it comes to moral matters for creatures such as ourselves, 
errors, failures, struggles and regress are integral parts of our 
development. 
 In Chapter 8, we continued to make reference to the evidence 
from personality psychology experiments in order to develop some 
ideas about the practical considerations involved in educating 
students of ethics on  how to think rather than about  what to think. 
We identified an initial difficulty in that many people fail to notice 
morally relevant situations in the first place, and that even this very 
first step of recognizing morality in practice requires sensitization. 
Crucial in resolving this problem is developing one ’ s moral 
imagination and coming to see the world as morally active and 
requiring our response. We achieve this by coming to see ourselves 
as occupying certain roles, sharing certain values, following the 
example of others and, importantly, learning from the example of 
our teachers. The examples need not be perfect or infallible  – we 
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can learn as much from contained, small, everyday examples of 
morality as we can from grand gestures and we can also learn a lot 
from observing failure both in ourselves and others. Immersive play, 
the use of narrative and integrating ethics into other disciplines are 
all useful tools for developing moral imagination. 
 We then moved on to re-examine in more detail the role of 
emotions as they play such an important role in moral development. 
We identified a number of functions for the emotions: 
 ?  The world provokes emotions in us, so it ’ s the role of 
education to manage the situations we come across to 
provoke the right emotions. 
 ?  The right emotions lead us to view the world in a particular 
way and alert us to the demands of morality, so it ’ s the role 
of education to cultivate these emotions. 
 ?  The emotions motivate us to act and make the flow from 
judgement to action smooth and unproblematic, so it ’ s the 
role of education to ensure that there is internal consistency 
and real commitment to morality. 
 ?  Finally, the emotions convey our values and judgements 
to others; they are a display of the genuineness of our 
commitment and form part of our moral judgements, so it ’ s 
the role of education to deal not only with how we should 
think but also with how we should feel. 
 This chapter concluded with a look at the possibility and signi-
ficance of change. One of the most interesting findings of the 
Milgram experiments was not so much how many people failed 
to act morally, but rather what lessons these subjects learnt from 
participating in the experiments. A closer look at Milgram ’ s work 
reveals subjects who made radical and life-defining changes as a 
result of learning more about themselves through the experiments. 
Fundamentally, moral development isn ’ t exclusively about progress, 
a large part of moral development is failure and how we respond 
to finding out that we have gone wrong. The role of education 
here is to manage failure, that is, to make sure that the failures we 
encounter are constructive and not destructive, that they lead to 
change and improvement, not disheartenment and defeat. 
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 Finally, in Chapter 9, we came full circle to consider whether 
the account of deontological theories on which virtue ethicists 
based their initial objections was correct and whether modern 
deontologists have developed replies to these objections. Overall, 
the chapter demonstrated that the neo-Kantian position is far more 
subtle than given credit for by early virtue ethicists, but that the early 
criticisms have, nonetheless, served to stimulate new discussions of 
Kant ’ s work and to develop Kantianism in novel ways. 
 The charge of rigourism, of relying on inflexible, rigid rules, 
has been addressed by a more detailed account of the role of 
the Categorical Imperative. Neo-Kantians have reinterpreted the 
Categorical Imperative as a test for subjective maxims, allowing 
room for either the formulation and/or the application of these 
maxims. This allows the theory to demonstrate contextual 
sensitivity and account for the multiplicity of morality. At the 
same time, neo-Kantians have refocused attention on the role of 
imperfect duties in Kantian theory. Imperfect duties allow room 
for interpretation; they allow for choice in respect to when, how 
and towards whom they are applied, thus responding to the 
virtue ethical concerns. Not only that, but they also allow room 
for partial considerations where appropriate, that is, where such 
considerations are warranted. The Kantian moral agent need not 
be the unpalatable moral saint, nor does she need to be committed 
to a life without friendships or a life lived in denial of any special 
concerns towards her loved ones. In this, it seems to me, that 
virtue ethics and neo-Kantianism have a lot in common and could 
probably make common cause against theories of impersonal value 
like some versions of consequentialism. 
 We then went on to reconsider the Kantian account of the 
emotions. Here, the picture becomes quite complicated as indeed 
there seem to be some passages in Kant ’ s works that strongly 
suggest a deep mistrust of the emotions as pathological, corrupting 
influences that should be eradicated. Where there is room for the 
emotions, it is as specifically conceived affective responses, for 
example, the reverence felt for the moral law. Having said that, many 
neo-Kantians have attempted to rehabilitate the Kantian account of 
the emotions, in some cases being willing to move quite far away 
from other foundational Kantian ideas in doing so. We considered 
accounts that place some moral worth on acting from inclination 
alongside acting from duty, and accounts that reject inclinations 
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as the ground of moral worth but still see some room for them 
when cultivated by reason. Essentially, the question of how one 
understands the role of emotions in Kantian thought refers back 
to a larger question of how one sees the relationship between the 
sensible and the intelligible aspects of humans. 
 The sensible/intelligible divide is a very complex topic in Kantian 
thought that gives rise to, for example, two conceptions of virtue. 
Sensible virtue has much in common with Aristotelian virtue, in 
that it is developed over time, gradually and subject to empirical 
contingencies. Moral worth, however, is only attributable to the 
intelligible virtue, the sudden revolution in perspective towards the 
moral law. For Aristotle, reason is central in virtue, but there is no 
account corresponding to the Kantian metaphysics, and the role 
of reason goes hand in hand with the emotions. For Kant, virtue is 
always struggle against untrustworthy inclinations, and although 
there might be some limited role for the emotions, there is no 
place for empirical naturalism. The conclusion of this chapter was 
that any comparison between the two theories on the concepts of 
 ‘ virtue ’ and  ‘ character ’ is likely to be quite a demanding project, 
requiring attention to detail and sensitivity to the wider theoretical 
considerations that shape each account. 
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 Chapter 9 has been a veritable whirlwind tour of some really 
complex Kantian ideas, too superficial to hope to be able to capture 
either the intricacies of Kantian thought or the richness of neo-
Kantian developments. However, within this volume, it has served 
an important function: it has allowed us to come full circle, from the 
criticisms of deontology (and consequentialism) as the status quo, 
to the detailed development of different accounts of virtue ethics, 
back to re-examining the precise nature of the disagreement between 
Kantians and virtue ethicists. In light of the discussions in Chapter 9, 
the earlier virtue ethical criticisms of deontology may seem unjustified. 
Some of the conceptions of deontology that thinkers like Anscombe 
and Williams objected to may appear to be veritable caricatures of 
Kant ’ s true theory. This conclusion, however, would be unfair as it 
does not consider the context within which all these ideas developed. 
At the time when virtue ethicists called for change, the predominant 
conception of Kantian thought followed very much the lines thinkers 
like Anscombe and Williams took themselves to be objecting to. It 
took the virtue ethical critique to spur neo-Kantians to re-examine and 
redefine their own theories. When they were formulated, the criticisms 
were appropriate, as their target was Kantian theory as conceived at 
that time. 
 Virtue ethics as a critical movement has had more than one 
consequence; it has led to a revival of Aristotelian thought and 
increased interest in other conceptions of virtue as primary in our 
accounts of normativity but it has also encouraged Kantians (and to 
an extent consequentialists) to reconsider their own theories. Virtue 
ethics has shaped the landscape of modern moral philosophy in 
opposition to its rivals, both in virtue of its own merits and as an 
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incentive for challenge and change in other theories. Virtue ethics 
as a positive movement offers us stand-alone, detailed and thought-
provoking alternatives in the field of normative theories. 
 Although we have, in some respects, come full circle, this has not 
been a futile project. The process of developing these ideas has been 
beneficial to all thinkers involved, in that it has encouraged new 
questions, new approaches and new answers to familiar debates. 
Not only has it led to the revival of virtue ethics and the redefinition 
of Kantianism but it also points the way towards further debate. 
The central element in the account of virtue ethics as presented in 
this volume is the importance of moral perception and practical 
wisdom. The challenge for virtue ethicists now is to further 
develop these ideas, especially in relation to practical projects. 
The chapters on personality psychology, Chapter 7, and moral 
education, Chapter 8, tried to give an indication of the task ahead. 
A theory which is concerned with how one should live one ’ s life 
and which places the development of practical wisdom at the heart 
of its deliberations should have a lot to say about the interplay 
between philosophy and practical disciplines such as psychology 
and education. Interdisciplinary work, while fashionable, is not 
easy to carry out successfully, but I think that the future for virtue 
ethics lies in clarifying the grounding of the virtues and illustrating 
how virtue is possible to develop in practice. 
 In Chapter 9, I pointed out that the greatest challenge for 
Aristotle is providing an account of the objective grounding of 
virtue, while the greatest challenge for Kant is reconciling the 
relationship between the empirical and the intelligible worlds. 
This conclusion accounts for the great interest there has been in 
the interplay between the two theories. Both theories have a rich 
account of concepts such as  ‘ virtue ’ and  ‘ character ’ and both 
theories appreciate the requirement for a strong conception of 
the role of reason in revealing moral requirements. At the same 
time the strengths of one theory are the weaknesses of the other. 
Where Aristotle has a very clear, plausible and persuasive account 
of our empirical natures, Kant struggles to reconcile two different 
viewpoints, sensible and intelligible, within his theory. However, 
where Kant has an objective account of reason as the grounding of 
morality, Aristotelians are still struggling to define virtue in a non-
circular manner. This conclusion may seem rather depressing as the 
conclusion of a volume that seeks to shed light on developments in 
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modern moral theory; however, in philosophy, the journey is often 
more important than the conclusion. The initial calls for change by 
virtue ethicists have made it possible for researchers to go on this 
journey of exploration and have inspired others to take up virtue 
ethics and to rethink Kantianism. At the end of the day, we may 
not have entirely clear answers on every point of either theory, but 
we have a much better understanding of both and of what further 
research is needed. 
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